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   ABSTRACT	  FIRM	  BEHAVIOR,	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  EXTERNALITIES	  AND	  PUBLIC	  POLICY	  BY	  E.	  MARK	  CURTIS	  MAY	  2014	  This	  dissertation	  consists	  of	  three	  essays	  which	  examine	  environmental	  policy,	  employer	  mandates	  and	  energy	  consumption.	  The	  essays	  explore	  how	  firms	  respond	  to	  government	  policies	  such	  as	  environmental	  regulation	  and	  employer	  mandates.	  Understanding	  how	  firms	  adjust	  to	  government	  policies	  is	  crucial	  to	  law	  makers	  attempting	  to	  design	  optimal	  policies	  that	  maximize	  net	  benefits	  to	  society.	  	  The	  first	  essay,	  titled	  Who	  Loses	  under	  Power	  Plant	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  Programs	  	  tests	  how	  a	  major	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program,	  known	  as	  the	  NOx	  Budget	  Trading	  Program	  (NBP),	  affected	  labor	  markets	  in	  the	  region	  where	  it	  was	  implemented.	  The	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program	  dramatically	  decreased	  levels	  of	  NOx	  emissions	  and	  added	  substantial	  costs	  to	  energy	  producers.	  Using	  a	  triple-­‐differences	  approach	  that	  takes	  advantage	  of	  the	  geographic	  and	  time	  variation	  of	  the	  program	  as	  well	  as	  variation	  in	  industry	  energy-­‐intensity	  levels,	  I	  examine	  how	  employment	  dynamics	  changed	  in	  manufacturing	  industries	  whose	  production	  process	  requires	  high	  levels	  of	  energy.	  After	  accounting	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  flexible	  state,	  county	  and	  industry	  trends,	  I	  find	  that	  employment	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  dropped	  by	  1.7%	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  NBP.	  Young	  workers	  experienced	  the	  largest	  employment	  declines	  and	  earnings	  of	  newly	  hired	  workers	  fell	  after	  the	  regulation	  began.	  Employment	  declines	  are	  shown	  to	  have	  occurred	  primarily	  through	  decreased	  hiring	  rates	  rather	  than	  increased	  separation	  rates,	  thus	  mitigating	  the	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  workers.	  	  The	  second	  essay,	  titled	  Evaluating	  Workplace	  Mandates	  with	  Flows	  versus	  Stocks:	  An	  
 Application	  to	  California	  Paid	  Family	  Leave	  uses	  an	  underexploited	  data	  set	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  California	  Paid	  Family	  Leave	  program	  on	  employment	  outcomes	  for	  young	  women.	  Most	  papers	  on	  mandated	  benefits	  examine	  labor	  outcomes	  by	  looking	  at	  earnings	  and	  employment	  levels	  of	  all	  workers.	  Examining	  these	  levels	  will	  be	  imprecise	  if	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  program	  develop	  over	  time	  and	  firms	  are	  wary	  to	  immediately	  adjust	  employment	  and	  wages	  for	  existing	  workers.	  Using	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicator	  data,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  on	  hires,	  new	  hire	  earnings,	  separations	  and	  extended	  leaves	  among	  young	  women.	  Earnings	  for	  young	  female	  new	  hires	  fell	  in	  California	  relative	  to	  other	  workers,	  but	  changed	  little	  relative	  to	  country-­‐wide	  comparison	  groups.	  We	  find	  strong	  evidence	  that	  separations	  (of	  at	  least	  three	  months)	  among	  young	  women	  and	  the	  number	  and	  shares	  of	  young	  female	  new	  hires	  increased.	  Many	  young	  women	  that	  separate	  (leave	  the	  payroll)	  eventually	  return	  to	  the	  same	  firm.	  Increased	  separation	  and	  hiring	  rates	  among	  young	  women	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  (“churning”)	  may	  reflect	  both	  increased	  time	  spent	  with	  children	  and	  greater	  job	  mobility	  (i.e.,	  reduced	  job	  lock)	  as	  the	  result	  of	  mandated	  paid	  family	  leave	  across	  the	  labor	  market.	  	  The	  third	  essay,	  Evidence	  of	  an	  Energy	  Management	  Gap	  in	  U.S.	  Manufacturing:	  
Spillovers	  from	  Firm	  Management	  Practices	  to	  Energy	  Efficiency,	  merge	  a	  well-­‐cited	  survey	  of	  firm	  management	  practices	  into	  confidential	  plant	  level	  U.S.	  Census	  manufacturing	  data	  to	  examine	  whether	  generic,	  i.e.	  non-­‐energy	  specific,	  firm	  management	  practices,	  ”spillover”	  to	  enhance	  energy	  efficiency	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  U.S.	  manufacturing	  plants	  we	  find	  this	  relationship	  to	  be	  more	  nuanced	  than	  prior	  research	  on	  UK	  plants.	  Most	  management	  techniques	  are	  shown	  to	  have	  beneficial	  spillovers	  to	  energy	  efficiency,	  but	  an	  emphasis	  on	  generic	  targets,	  conditional	  on	  other	  management	  practices,	  results	  in	  
 spillovers	  that	  increase	  energy	  intensity.	  Our	  specification	  controls	  for	  industry	  specific	  effects	  at	  a	  detailed	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  level	  and	  finds	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  energy	  use	  to	  be	  strongest	  for	  firms	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries.	  We	  interpret	  the	  empirical	  result	  that	  generic	  management	  practices	  do	  not	  necessarily	  spillover	  to	  improved	  energy	  performance	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  “energy	  management	  gap.”	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Chapter	  I:Who	  Loses	  Under	  Power	  Plant	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  Programs?	  Estimating	  
the	  Impact	  of	  the	  NOx	  Budget	  Trading	  Program	  on	  Manufacturing	  
Employment	  	  
Introduction	  The	  Environmental	  Protection	  gency’s	  regulation	  of	  the	  energy	  sector	  has	  become	  a	  highly	  contentious	  topic	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  federal	  regulations	  emphasize	  the	  health	  benefits	  that	  accrue	  to	  society	  when	  fewer	  pollutants	  are	  emitted	  by	  power	  plants,	  while	  critics	  claim	  that	  the	  current	  regulations	  harm	  the	  economy	  by	  imposing	  significant	  costs	  on	  industry	  and	  workers.	  Job	  loss	  in	  particular	  is	  cited	  as	  a	  primary	  means	  by	  which	  regulation	  inflicts	  damage	  on	  the	  economy	  and	  has	  gained	  special	  attention	  in	  recent	  years	  as	  the	  EPA	  has	  proposed	  new	  energy	  sector	  regulations	   at	  a	  time	  when	  labor	  markets	  are	  still	  recovering	  from	  the	  Great	  Recession	  and	  middle	  class	  jobs	  are	  disappearing.1	  	  The	  federal	  law	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  controversy	  is	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  Amendments	  (CAAA),	  which	  vests	  authority	  in	  the	  EPA	  to	  regulate	  the	  emissions	  of	  polluting	  industries.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  regulations	  that	  the	  CAAA	  imposes	  on	  pollution-­‐emitting	  establishments.	  The	  first,	  known	  as	  the	  National	  Ambient	  Air	  Quality	  Standards	  (NAAQS),	  began	  in	  the	  1970’s	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  1970	  CAAA	  and	  required	  polluting	  plants	  in	  counties	  with	  poor	  air	  quality	  to	  adopt	  “lowest	  available	  emission	  rate”	  technology.	  The	  labor	  market	  impact	  of	  the	  NAAQS	  and	  its	  subsequent	  expansions	  has	  been	  studied	  extensively	  by	  economists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Wall  Street  Journal  July	  26,	  2011	  op-­‐ed	  “The	  Latest	  Job	  Killer	  from	  the	  EPA”,	  “Getting	  Ready	  for	   a	  Wave	  of	  Coal-­‐Plant	  Shutdown”	  Washington  Post  “Wonkblog”	  Aug	  19,	  2011,	  “Obama	  Outlines	  Ambitious	  Plan	  to	  Cut	  Greenhouse	  Gases”	  New  York  Times  June	  25,	  2013	  and	  Autor	  &	  Dorn	  (2013).	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over	  the	  past	  decade	  (Greenstone	  2002;	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  2013;	  Walker	  2011;	  2013).	  These	  studies	  examine	  changes	  in	  manufacturing	  employment	  in	  counties	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  NAAQS	  attainment	  standards	  and	  are	  thus	  subject	  to	  tighter	  regulations.	  Since	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   1990	   CAAA,	   however,	   a	   second	   and	  wider	   reaching	  policy	   has	   taken	   form	  with	   the	   intent	  of	   regulating	   interstate	   air	  pollution.	   As	   counties	  began	   to	   realize	   that	   their	  own	  air	  quality	  was	  affected	  not	  only	  by	   local	  polluters	  but	  also	  by	  polluters	   located	   in	  other	  upwind	   states,	   there	  was	  a	  push	   for	   the	   regulation	  of	  all	  establishments	  whose	  air	  pollutants	  crossed	  state	  boundaries.	   In	  1990,	   the	  Acid	  Rain	  Program	   established	   a	   national	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   for	   Sulfur	   Dioxide	   (SO2)	  and	   in	  2003	  and	  2004	   the	  Nitrogen	  Oxide	   (NOx)	  Budget	  Trading	  Program	   (NBP)	  was	  established	   in	  nineteen	  states	  east	  of	   the	  Mississippi.	   Despite	   the	   size	  and	   far-­‐reaching	  impact	  of	   these	   two	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  programs,	   there	  has	  been	  no	  empirical	   research	   that	  has	   sought	   to	   evaluate	   their	   labor	  market	   implications.	  From	  an	  efficiency	   standpoint,	   the	  more	   recent	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  programs	  are	  preferable	  to	   the	  command	  and	  control	   style	   regulations	   that	  began	   in	   the	  1970’s.	   Cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  produces	  desired	  outcomes	  by	  allocating	  permits	  which	   grant	   the	  owner	   the	  right	   to	   emit	   a	   given	  quantity	  of	   a	  pollutant.	   The	   total	   quantity	  of	  permits	   is	   limited	  by	  the	  environmental	   authority	   and	   firms	  are	  allowed	   to	   trade	  permits	   in	   an	  open	  and	  competitive	  market.	  	  Allowing	   firms	   to	   participate	   in	   a	  market	   for	   permits	   guarantees	  that	   firms	  for	  whom	  pollution	  abatement	  costs	  are	  cheapest	  will	  be	  the	   first	   to	  reduce	  their	   emissions.	  	  While	   they	   provide	   an	   efficient	   and	  market-­‐based	   solution,	   tradable	  permit	   systems	  may	   still	   have	   potentially	   severe	   redistributional	   implications	   as	   firms	  which	   previously	   paid	   nothing	   to	   pollute	   now	   face	   a	   new	   input	   cost.	  	  In	   response,	   firms	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are	   likely	   to	  see	  an	   increase	   in	   their	  marginal	  costs	  and	  will	   re-­‐optimize	   their	   input	  bundles,	   including	   labor,	   so	   as	   to	  minimize	   total	   costs.	  The	   first	   such	   large	   scale	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program	   in	   the	  United	   States	  was	   the	  Acid	  Rain	  Program,	   but	   given	   that	   it	   applied	   to	   all	   large	  power	   plants	   in	   the	   country,	  empirically	  estimating	   its	   impact	   on	   employment	  has	  been	  difficult	   due	   to	   the	   lack	  of	   a	  valid	   counterfactual.2	  	  However,	   for	  a	  variety	  of	   reasons,	   the	  attributes	  of	   the	   recently	  implemented	  NBP	  make	   for	   a	  policy	  whose	   impacts	   are	   both	   important	   and	  possible	  to	  identify.	  	  First,	   the	  NBP	   had	   a	  major	   impact	   on	   energy	   production.	  	  The	   regulation	   of	  2,250	  gas,	  oil	  and	  coal-­‐fired	  electric	  generating	  units	  plus	  350	  large	  industrial	  units	  forced	  NOx	  	  emitting	   firms	   to	  make	   difficult	   and	   costly	   decisions	   on	   how	   to	   comply	   	  with	   the	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   scheme.	  	  Overall,	   complying	  with	   the	   NBP	  was	   expected	   to	   add	  $2.15	  billion	  dollars	  of	  annual	   costs	   to	  utilities,	  which	  would	   largely	  be	  passed	  on	   to	  consumers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  prices	  (Palmer	  et	  al.	  	  2001).	   Second,	  this	  policy	  was	   implemented	   in	  nineteen	  eastern	  states	  over	  a	  period	  of	   two	  years.	   Many	  states	  were	  not	   exposed	   to	   the	  NBP	   and,	   under	   certain	   assumptions	   discussed	   below,	  may	   be	  considered	   a	   valid	   counterfactual	   after	   controlling	   for	   preexisting	   differences.	  	  Finally,	  industries	   in	   the	  NBP	   region	   that	   require	  high	   levels	  of	   energy	   in	   their	   production	  process	  would	  be	  expected	   to	  be	  most	  affected	  by	   the	  NBP.	  These	  sources	  of	  	  	  geographic,	   time	   and	   industry	  heterogeneity	   form	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   identification	  strategy	   used	   to	   determine	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  NBP	   on	  manufacturing	   employment.	  	  To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	   this	   is	   the	   first	   such	  credible	  study	  of	   the	  employment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	   this	   reason,	   researchers	   have	   generally	   used	   structural	  models	   to	   estimate	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	  the	  Acid	  Rain	  Program	  (see	  Burtraw	  et  al.    (1998)).	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effects	  of	   any	   major	   EPA	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program.	  One	  reason	  why	  empirical	  methods	  may	  prove	  particularly	  useful	  is	  that	  economic	  theory	  gives	  no	  clear	  intuition	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  power	  plant	  regulation	  on	  manufacturing	   employment	   outcomes	   (Berman	  &	   Bui	   2001).	  	  Environmental	  regulation	   that	  causes	  an	  exogenous	  shock	   in	   the	  price	  of	  energy	   is	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	  two	  competing	  employment	   effects	   on	   an	   establishment’s	   intensive	  margin.	  	  First,	   given	  that	   capital	   and	   energy	  are	  complements	  and	  capital	  and	   labor	  are	   substitutes,	  a	  positive	   shock	   in	   the	  price	   of	   energy	  may	   lead	  plant	  managers	   to	   employ	  more	   labor	  and	   less	   capital.	  However,	  an	   increase	   in	   the	  price	  of	  electricity	  will	   also	   increase	  marginal	   costs	  and	   decrease	   the	  demand	   for	   labor	  due	   to	  a	  decline	   in	  production.	   Furthermore,	   firm	  owners	  may	  adjust	   the	  extensive	  margin	  as	   they	   take	  production	  costs	   into	  account	  when	  determining	  plant	   location.	   Plants	   in	  areas	  with	   increased	  energy	  prices	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   shut	  down	  and	  newly	  constructed	  plants	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  built	  in	   regions	  that	  did	  not	  experience	  a	  positive	  shock	  to	  energy	  prices.3	  	  Each	  of	   these	  effects	   will	   be	   at	   play	  whether	   the	  manufacturing	  plant	   produces	   its	   own	   energy	   and	  is	  directly	   regulated	  or	   chooses	   to	  purchase	   energy	   from	  now	   regulated	  utilities.4	  	  While	   qualitative	   predictions	   from	   theory	  may	   be	   somewhat	   ambiguous,	   recent	  empirical	   research	   studying	   the	   impact	   of	   environmental	   regulation	   on	   employment	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Carlton	   (1983)	   and	   Kahn	   &	   Mansur	   (2013)	   find	   strong	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   electricity	   prices	   are	   a	  major	   determinant	   of	   manufacturing	   establishment	   location	   and	   employment	   decisions.	  
4	  The	   350	   non-­‐EGU	   regulated	   units	   belong	   to	   140	   large	   manufacturing	   plants	   (Author’s	   calculation	  based	   on	   records	   from	   EPA’s	   website).	  Not	   surprisingly,	   these	   plants	   are	   almost	   entirely	   in	   energy-­‐	  intensive	   industries.	   The	   aggregate	   nature	   of	   the	   employment	   data	   used	   in	   the	   paper	   prevent	  estimating	   a	   separate	   effect	   for	   the	   manufacturing	   plants	   whose	   energy	   production	   was	   directly	  regulated.	  The	  need	   for	  a	  separate	  estimate	  is	  mitigated	  as	  energy	  production	  is	  regulated	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  occurs	  within	  the	   boundary	  of	  the	  firm.	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has	  shown	  either	  no	  change	  (Berman	  &	  Bui	  2001)	  or	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  employment	  levels	  of	   regions	  where	   regulation	  has	  been	   implemented	   (Greenstone	  2002;	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  2013;	  Walker	  2011).	   Furthermore,	  the	  broader	  literature	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  environmental	   regulation	   has	   consistently	   found	   a	   negative	   impact	   of	   regulation	   on	  plant	  openings	  and	  productivity	  levels	  (Becker	  &	  Henderson	  2000;	  Dean	  et	  al.	  	  2000;	  List	  et	  al.	   2003;	  Henderson	  1996;	  Hanna	  2010;	  Greenstone	  et	  al.	   2012).5	  	  Using	  a	  similar	  technique	  as	  that	  employed	  by	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  (2013)	  to	  study	  manufacturing	  industry	  location,	  this	  paper	  takes	  advantage	  of	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  industry	  energy	  intensity	  levels	  to	  perform	  a	  triple	  differences	  (DDD)	  analysis	  that	  estimates	  the	  NBP’s	  impact	  on	  manufacturing	  employment	  in	  the	  regions	  where	  it	  was	  enforced.	  In	  addition	  to	  examining	  the	  impact	  on	  employment	  levels,	  this	  paper	  also	   looks	  at	  worker	  turnover,	  earnings	  and	  examines	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  impact	  by	  worker	  age.	  Using	  County	  Business	  Patterns	  and	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicator	  data	  on	  employment	  as	  well	  as	  NBER’s	  Productivity	  Database,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  account	  for	  important	  state,	  county,	  industry	  and	  year	  controls	  as	  well	  as	  state,	  county	  and	  industry	  trends.	  These	  controls	  will	  prove	  important,	  as	  industries	  tend	  toward	  regional	   agglomeration	  and	  as	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  experienced	  general	  geographic	  shifts	  in	  recent	  years.	  Performing	  the	  DDD	  analysis	  with	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  controls,	  I	  find	  that	  employment	  in	  industries	  with	  an	  additional	  percentage	  point	  of	   energy	  intensity	  decreased	  1.38%	  in	  the	  region	  that	  was	  impacted	  by	  the	  NBP.	  This	  represents	  a	  loss	  of	  roughly	  1.7%	  of	  manufacturing	  employment	  in	  the	  NBP	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Of	   course	   there	   is	   also	   a	   large	   literature	   on	   the	   benefits	   of	   regulation	   and	   air	   quality	   improvements.	  See	  Chay	  &	  Greenstone	   (2003);	   Jerrett	   et  al.   (2009);	  Deschenes	   et  al.   (2012);	  Zivin	  &	  Neidell	   (2012)	   for	   a	  few	   representative	   examples.	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region.	  Using	   data	   on	  worker	   flows	   from	   the	   QWI,	   I	   find	   firms	   reduced	   their	  employment	   levels	  primarily	   through	  a	   reduction	   in	  hiring	   rather	   than	  an	   increase	   in	  separations.	   As	   a	   result,	   young	  workers,	  who	  have	  high	   turnover	   rates,	   experienced	   the	  largest	   employment	   declines.	  	  Furthermore,	  wage	   offers,	   as	  measured	   by	   new	   hire	  earnings,	   declined	  by	  as	  much	  as	  3.5%	  for	   industries	   in	  the	  top	  quartile	  of	  energy	  intensity	  as	  compared	  to	   the	  bottom	  quartile.	   The	  ability	   to	  observe	  new	  hire	  earnings	  is	   important	  as	   firms	  may	  be	  unable	   to	   immediately	  adjust	   earnings	  of	   incumbent	  workers.	   In	  order	   to	   evaluate	   the	   plausibility	   of	   these	   findings	   I	   then	   examine	   the	  NBP’s	   impact	   on	  electricity	  prices.	   These	  results	  suggest	  a	  rise	   in	  electricity	  prices	  within	  the	  range	  of	  ex-­‐ante	  predictions.	  I	  then	  back	  out	  an	  implied	  manufacturing	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  previous	  estimates	  (Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  2013)	  and	  suggests	  a	  plausible	  causal	  mechanism	  for	  the	  impact	  on	  labor	  markets.	  This	  paper	  adds	  to	   the	   literature	   in	  two	   important	  ways.	   It	   is	   the	   first	  paper	  to	  empirically	   estimate	   the	   impact	   of	   any	   EPA	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   on	   labor	  markets.	  Given	   the	   size	  of	   the	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  programs,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   current	  policy	  debate	  over	  additional	   energy	   sector	   regulations,	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   their	   impact	   is	   greatly	  needed.	  	  Second,	   it	   provides	   evidence	   of	  which	  workers	  were	   affected;	   uses	  worker	   and	  job	   flows	   to	   examine	  how	   the	  employment	   adjustments	  occurred;	   and	  examines	   the	  impact	  on	  worker	   earnings	  by	   focusing	  on	   the	   earnings	  of	  new	  hires,	   the	  margin	  on	  which	   earnings	   changes	  will	  most	   quickly	   adjust.	  	  Finally,	  while	   recent	  work	   by	  Walker	  (2013)	  has	   found	   long	  term	  earnings	   losses	   for	  existing	  workers	   in	  newly	  regulated	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plants,	   this	  paper	   suggests	   that	  workers	  hired	  after	   the	   regulation	  also	   face	   important	  costs	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  regulation.	  The	  remainder	  of	   the	  paper	   is	  organized	  as	   follows.	   Section	  2	  presents	  a	  brief	  history	  of	   the	   Clean	   Air	   Act	   Amendments	   and	   how	   the	  NBP	   came	   to	   be	   implemented.	  	  Section	   3	  describes	  conditions	  required	   for	   identification	  and	  Section	  4	  details	  important	  aspects	  of	   the	  data	  used	   in	   the	  analysis.	   Section	  5	  provides	   the	  econometric	  model,	   results	  and	   specification	  checks.	   Section	  6	  discusses	  the	  results.	   Section	  7	  performs	  a	  plausibility	   check	   and	   Section	  8	   concludes.	  	  
Background	  Originally	   passed	   in	   1963,	   the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	   (CAA)	   is	   the	  main	   federal	   law	   that	   seeks	  to	  control	   air	   pollution	   throughout	   the	   United	   States.	  	  The	   CAA	   has	   been	   amended	  multiple	  times	  including	  1966,	  1970,	  1977	  and	  1990.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  researched	  of	  the	  regulations	  	  brought	  	  upon	  	  by	  	  CAA	  	  and	  	  its	  	  amendments	  	  is	  	  the	  	  NAAQS.	  	  The	  	  NAAQS	  were	   established	   following	   the	   1970	   CAAAs	   and	   required	   polluting	   establishments	  located	  in	  counties	  that	  failed	  to	  achieve	  certain	  air	  quality	   levels	  to	  meet	  stricter	  emissions	   standards	   than	  establishments	   located	   in	   counties	  whose	  air	  quality	  was	  deemed	  acceptable.	   These	  emission	   regulations	  were	  by	   far	   the	  most	   important	   federal	  emissions	   regulations	   to	   date.	  The	   1977	   amendments,	   in	   addition	   to	   strengthening	   the	   NAAQS,	   included	  Section	   126,	   a	  provision	   that	   allowed	   the	  EPA	   to	   regulate	   interstate	   air	  pollution	   and	  limit	   the	   environmental	   harm	   that	   downwind	   states	   could	   impose	   on	   upwind	   states.	  	  The	   EPA	  did	  not	   immediately	   enforce	   Section	  126,	   however,	   choosing	   instead	   to	   focus	  regulation	   efforts	  on	  establishments	  whose	  pollutants	   impacted	   the	   air	  quality	  of	   their	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local	  community	   rather	   than	   those	   impacting	   regions	   outside	   their	   immediate	  geographic	  region.	   In	   fact,	  between	  1977	  and	  1998,	  the	  EPA	  never	  granted	  a	  petition	  filed	  under	  the	   interstate	   air	   pollution	   clause	   found	   in	   Section	  126	  of	   the	  CAA.	  The	   passage	   of	   the	   1990	   Clean	  Air	   Act	   Amendments	   strengthened	   the	   language	  of	  Section	  126	  and	  established	  the	   first	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  programs.	   It	  was	  passed	  in	  response	   to	   the	  continued	   failure	  of	  many	  northeastern	  regions	   to	  meet	  air	  quality	  requirements	   despite	  having	  already	  restricted	  emissions	   in	   their	   local	  region.	   Title	   IV	  of	   the	  1990	   CAAA	   established	   a	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   for	   SO2.	  	  This	   would	   become	  known	   as	   the	  Acid	  Rain	  Program	  and	   in	  1995	  the	  EPA	  began	  Phase	  I	   for	   the	  dirtiest	  110	  power	  plants.	  In	  1998	  the	  EPA	  granted	  its	  first	  petition	  under	  Section	  126,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   for	   NOx,	   an	   important	   precursor	   of	   ground-­‐level	  ozone.	  	  The	  granting	  of	  this	  petition	  came	  as	  the	  result	  of	  two	  factors.	   First,	  the	  1990	  amendments	  had	   strengthened	   the	   interstate	   pollution	   protection	   law,	   calling	   for	  “reasonably	   available	   control	   technology”	   throughout	   an	   ozone	   transport	   region.	  	  Second,	   numerous	   lawsuits	   filed	   against	   the	  EPA	  by	  northeastern	   states	   requested	  that	   the	  EPA	   regulate	  NOx	  	  emissions	   from	  states	  whose	  emissions	  directly	  contributed	   to	   their	  own	   levels	   of	   smog	   and	   ozone.	  	  These	   upwind	   states	   argued	  that	   NOx	  	   pollution	   from	   downwind	  sources	  not	  only	  had	  negative	  health	   impacts	  on	   their	   citizens	  but	  also	  prevented	   them	  from	  meeting	   the	   NAAQS	   ozone	   non-­‐attainment	   standards.	  	  In	   these	   lawsuits,	   a	   large	  body	  of	   scientific	   evidence	  was	  presented	   showing	   that	  NOx	  	  gases	   can	   in	   fact	   be	   transported	   significant	   distances	  by	  wind	   currents	   and	   that	   NOx	  	  emissions	   should	   therefore	  be	   subject	   to	  Section	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126	  of	   the	  CAAA.	  By	  granting	   the	  petition	  of	   the	  northeastern	   states,	   the	  EPA	  agreed	   to	   regulate	   and	   reduce	   the	   amount	   of	  NOx	  	  emitted	   by	   electric	   generating	  units	   (EGU’s)	   and	   large	   industrial	   plants	   in	   southern	   and	   central	   states.6	  	  The	  NBP	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   formally	   began	   for	   eight	   states	   and	   the	  District	   of	  Columbia	   in	  2003	  (see	  Figure	  1).	   States	  and	  utilities	   in	   the	  Midwest	  and	  Southeast	  continued	   to	   fight	   legal	  battles	   against	   the	  EPA	  with	  varying	  outcomes,	  but	  in	  2004	  eleven	  additional	   states	  began	  compliance	  with	   the	  NBP,	   for	   a	   total	  of	  nineteen	  states.7	  The	  program	  would	   regulate	   2,250	  EGU’s	   and	  350	   large	   industrial	   units	   that	  produced	   energy	   and	   heat	   for	   their	   own	   consumption.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  smaller	  and	  less	  restrictive	  program	  known	  as	  the	  Ozone	  Transport	  Commission	  NOx	  Budget	   Program	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  NBP)	  began	  for	  11	  northeastern	  states	  in	  1999.	  
7	  Through	   negotiations	   and	   court	   battles,	   Missouri	   delayed	   compliance	   until	   2007.	   Georgia,	   originally	  slated	   to	   also	   begin	   in	   2007,	   was	   eventually	   ruled	   exempt	   from	   the	   program	   altogether.	   Additionally,	  deals	   were	   struck	   in	   Missouri,	   Alabama	   and	   Michigan	   which	   limited	   compliance	   to	   only	   certain	  counties.	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   Figure	  1:	  NBP	  Compliance	  Region	  	  	  
	  	  	  
NBP Compliance Dates 
NBP Start Date: May, 2003  
NBP Start Date: May, 2004 
NBP Start Date: May, 2007 
Not Subject to the NBP 
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 While	  some	  northeastern	  states	  began	  in	  2003,	  the	  program	  started	  in	  full	  on	  May	  30,	  2004.	  This	  graph	  plots	  daily	  NOx	  emissions	  in	  2002,	  when	  no	   states	   were	   participating,	   and	   2004	   for	   the	   nineteen	   participating	  states.	  There	  is	  a	  visible	  reduction	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  NOx	  emissions	  in	  NBP	  states	  beginning	  on	  the	  start	  date	  that	  is	  not	  present	  in	  2002.	  






 As	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Figure	   2,	   EGU’s	   dramatically	   decreased	   their	   output	   of	   NOx	  	  on	  May	  31,	  2004,	   the	  first	  day	   in	  which	  all	  nineteen	  states	  began	  participating.	  Regulated	  establishments	   could	   choose	   to	   reduce	   their	  NOx	  	  emissions	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  ways.	  	  One	  option	  was	   fuel	   switching,	   whereby	   establishments	  would	   shift	   away	   from	  coal	   and	   towards	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  such	  as	  natural	  gas	   that	   release	   far	   less	  NOx	  	  into	   the	   atmosphere.	  	  Despite	   the	   additional	   production	   costs	   brought	   on	   by	   the	  NBP,	  most	   coal	  remained	  a	  cheaper	  source	  of	  energy	  than	  the	  alternatives	  (Fowlie	  2010).	   Because	   electricity	   production	   from	   coal	   fired	   plants	   remained	   inframarginal,	  utilities	   largely	   continued	   to	   burn	   coal	   and	   found	   alternative	  ways	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  NBP.	   The	  compliance	   costs	   could	  be	   fixed	   and	  upfront	   or	   they	   could	  be	   variable	   and	  spread	  out	  over	   time.	   Plants	   opting	   for	   the	  high	  upfront	   cost	   option	   installed	   selective	  catalytic	   reduction	   (SCR)	   technology.	  	  This	   technology	   cuts	  NOx	  	  emissions	   by	   up	   to	  90%	  but	  	  costs	  the	  average	  plant	  $40	  million	  dollars	  (Linn	  2008).	   On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  about	  30%	  of	  NBP	  regulated	  establishments	   chose	   to	  make	  no	  capital	  adjustments	   and	   simply	   purchased	   permits	   for	   every	   unit	   of	   NOx	  	   they	   emitted	   (EPA	  2009).8	  Regardless	  of	  which	  reduction	  technique	  they	  choose,	   the	  production	  costs	  of	  electric	  utilities	  will	   increase	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  NBP.	  Three	  estimates	  have	  been	  made	  that	  calculate	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  NBP	  to	  utilities.	   Palmer	  et	  al.	  	  (2001)	  estimated	  the	  program’s	  total	  costs	  to	  utilities	  at	  about	  $2.1	  billion	  per	  year.	  Deschenes	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  SCR	  is	  both	  the	  most	  expensive	  and	  most	  effective	  technology	  in	  	  reducing	  	  NOx	  	  emissions	  	  (Fowlie	   2010).	  There	   are	   a	   variety	   of	   less	   expensive	   and	   less	   effective	   technologies	   that	   utilizes	   chose	   to	   install.	  Selective	   non-­‐catalytic	   technologies	   cost	   the	   average	   plant	   $10	   million	   but	   only	   reduces	   NOx	   by	   35	  per-­‐	   cent.	   Additional	   pre-­‐combustion	   and	   combustion	   technologies	   can	   decrease	   emissions	   between	   15	  and	   50	   percent	   depending	   on	   the	   specifications	   of	   the	   plant.	   Fowlie	   shows	   that	   regulated	   utilities	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   pursue	   capital	   intensive	   solutions	   than	   deregulated	   utilities.	  
 13 
use	  the	  market	  price	  of	  permits	  to	  estimate	  the	  cost	  at	  $400-­‐700	  million	  per	  year	  and	  Linn	  (2010)	  examines	  utility	  stock	  prices	  to	  estimate	  a	  total	  (rather	  than	  annual)	  drop	  in	  expected	  utility	  profits	  of	  up	  to	  $25	  billion	  dollars.	   Palmer	  et	  al.	  	  (2001)	  argue	  that	  the	  costs	  of	   the	  NBP	  will	  be	  passed	  on	  to	   the	  consumer	   in	   the	   form	  of	  higher	  electricity	  prices.	   Indeed,	  the	  EPA	  (1999)	  estimated	  that	  electricity	  prices	  would	  rise	  by	  1.6%	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  NBP	  and	  a	   later	  report	  by	  Platts	  Research	  and	  Consulting	  (2003)	  predicted	   a	  $1-­‐$3/MWh	   increase	   in	   the	  price	  of	  wholesale	  electricity.9	  	  Carlton	  (1983)	  and	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  (2013)	  document	  that	  electricity	  prices	  are	  a	  major	  determinant	   of	  where	  manufacturing	   firms	   choose	   to	   locate	   their	  workers.	  Given	   the	   NBP’s	   substantial	   impact	   on	   electricity	   and	   energy	   production	   costs	  more	  generally,	  firms	   that	   require	  high	   levels	  of	  energy	   in	   their	  production	  process	  may	  be	  expected	   to	   reoptimize	   their	   input	  mixture	   in	  response	   to	  a	  change	   in	   the	  expected	  costs	  of	  a	  crucial	   input.	  	  Using	   a	   DDD	   approach,	   I	   test	  whether	   firms	  with	   high	   energy	  requirements	   did	   in	   fact	   respond	   to	   the	  NBP	  by	  decreasing	   employment	   levels	   after	  the	   implementation	   of	   the	  NBP,	   relative	   to	   low-­‐energy	   firms	   and	   relative	   to	   non-­‐NBP	  control	   areas.	  Since	   it	  began	   in	  2003	  and	  2004,	   the	  NBP	  has	  changed	  names	  but	   the	  market	  for	  NOx	  allowances	  continues	  to	  exist.	   In	  2008	  the	  NBP	  became	  part	  of	   the	  Clean	  Air	  Interstate	  Rule	   (CAIR)	   and	   in	   2011	   the	   EPA	   announced	   it	  would	   replace	   and	   expand	  the	  regulations	   of	   CAIR	   with	   the	   new	   Cross-­‐State	   Air	   Pollution	   Rule	   (CSAPR).10	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Using	   average	  wholesale	   prices	   in	   the	  Northeast	   ISO	   and	   the	   PJM	   in	   2003	   this	   is	   equal	   to	   an	   electricity	  price	   increase	   of	   between	   2.47%	   and	   7.41%.	   The	   Platts	   analysis	   was	   performed	   in	   light	   of	   an	  unexepected	   rise	   in	   the	  price	  of	   natural	   gas	   that	   took	  place	   just	  prior	   to	   the	  NBP.	  This	   rise	  made	   shifting	  to	  natural	  gas	  more	   expensive	   than	   had	   previously	   been	   expected.	  
10	  In	   2005	   the	   EPA	   announced	   that	   the	   Clean	   Air	   Interstate	   Rule	   (CAIR)	  would	   replace	   the	   NBP’s	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The	   regional	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   continues	   to	   be	   greatly	   debated.	  	  On	  August	   21,	   2012	   the	   D.C.	   Circuit	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   vacated	   CSAPR	   leaving	   the	   future	  of	   both	   the	   SO2	  	  and	  NOx	  	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  programs	   in	   doubt,	   but	   on	  April	   29,	   2014	  the	   Supreme	  Court	   reversed	   the	   ruling	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals.	  	  This	   decision	   clears	  the	  way	   for	   the	  EPA	   to	  move	   forward	  with	   the	   program’s	   expansion.	  	  Furthermore,	   it	  has	   sparked	   renewed	   interest	   among	   supporters	   of	   GHG	   regulations,	   who	   see	   the	  NBP	   as	   a	   template	   of	   a	   successful	   environmental	   regulation	   that	   can	  be	   implemented	  under	   the	   existing	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (Burtraw	  et	  al.	  	  2014).	  	  
Identifying	  NBP	  Employment	  Effects	  In	   order	   for	   a	  DDD	  methodology	   to	   accurately	   capture	   the	   causal	   effect	   of	   the	  NBP	  on	  manufacturing	   employment	   there	   are	   certain	   identification	   assumptions	   that	  must	  hold.	  One	  such	   crucial	   assumption	   is	   that	   control	  groups	  are	  not	  affected	  by	   the	  treatment.	  Identification	  rests	  on	   two	  sources	  of	  employment	  change	  variation.	   The	   first	   is	  the	  variation	  that	  occurs	  within	  a	  state	  across	   industries	  and	  the	  second	  is	   the	  variation	  that	  occurs	  within	   an	   industry	   across	   states.	   When	   considering	   the	  within-­‐state	  variation,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  workers	   leave	  high	  energy	   industries	   in	   the	  state	  and	  are	  hired	  by	   low	  energy	   industries	   in	   the	  state.	   These	   local	   labor	  market	  spillovers	  are	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  bias	  as	   this	  may	   result	   in	   increased	  employment	   levels	   for	   low	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  r egulation	   of	   NOx	  emissions	   in	   2009	   and	   SO2	   in	   2010.	   CAIR	  was	   intended	   to	   expand	   the	   number	   of	  covered	   states	   to	   twenty-­‐five	  and	   further	   tighten	  emissions	  standards.	   Given	   that	   there	  was	  significant	  legal	  uncertainty	   surrounding	   CAIR	  when	   it	  was	   announced,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	  manufacturing	   industries	  would	   have	   immediately	   reacted.	  Because	  CAIR	   is	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	  NBP	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program	   it	   is	  difficult	   and	   perhaps	   even	  unnecessary	   to	   disentangle	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  CAIR	  announcement	   from	   the	  implementation	   of	   NBP.	   In	   short,	  	  the	  	  interpretation	  	  of	  	  the	  	  evidence	  	  is	  	  influenced	  	  only	  	  slightly	  	  by	  	  CAIR,	  	  with	  	  all	  	  results	  still	   attributable	   to	   the	   overall	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   policy.	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energy	   industries	   in	   the	  NBP	   region.	   To	   check	  whether	   these	   spillovers	  are	  driving	   the	  results,	   I	   consider	  models	  where	   the	   identifying	   variation	   does	   not	   come	   from	  within-­‐state	   differences.	  The	  second	  source	  of	  variation	  is	  that	  which	  occurs	  across	  states.	  However,	  if	  firms	  shift	   production	  from	  NBP	  to	  non-­‐NBP	  states	  then	  estimates	  may	  overstate	  the	  effect.	  Determining	  an	  appropriate	   start	  date	   is	  another	   important	  part	  of	  determining	  the	   treatment	  effect.	   This	  analysis	  assigns	  start	  dates	  as	   the	  dates	  when	  the	  NBP	  went	  into	  effect	  (2003	  for	  eight	  states	  and	  2004	  for	  the	  eleven	  others).	  While	  the	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program	  was	   first	  approved	   in	  1998,	   there	  was	   significant	  uncertainty	  until	  March	  of	  2000	  when	  the	  D.C.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  ruled	   in	  Michigan	  et	  al.	   vs.	   EPA	  et	  al.	  that	   the	  program	  was	   legal.	   Some	  states	  and	  utilities	  continued	  with	   lawsuits	  after	   the	  2000	  court	  decision	  and	  electric	  utilities	  did	  not	   face	   the	   full	   costs	  of	   the	  NBP	  until	  sometime	  later,	   either	  when	   they	  purchased	   the	   abatement	   technology	   in	   the	   form	  of	  new	  capital,	  or	  once	   the	  program	  began	   in	   the	   form	  of	  purchasing	  emissions	  credits.11	  	  As	  seen	   in	  Figure	  2,	  electricity	  production	  itself	  was	  not	  affected	  until	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  NBP.	  By	  using	  the	  NBP	  start	  date	  I	  make	  the	  assumption	  that	  manufacturing	  firms	  remained	  uncertain	  of	  how	  the	  program	  would	  affect	  their	  production	  costs	  until	  after	  permit	  trading	  began	  and	  NOx	  emitters	  faced	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  the	  program.	  If	  manufacturing	  firms	  began	  decreasing	  employment	  before	  this	  date	   then	  the	  results	  would	  be	  biased	  towards	  zero,	  as	  some	  of	  the	  treatment	  effect	  would	  be	   attributed	  to	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  period.	  The	   timing	   of	   the	   policy	   should	   also	   be	   checked	   against	   other	   simultaneously	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  When	  examining	  the	  NBP’s	  impact	  on	  expected	  future	  utility	  profits,	  Linn	  (2010)	  uses	  2000	  as	  the	  beginning	  date.	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occurring	  events	   that	   may	   impact	  manufacturing	   employment.	  	  Given	  the	   DDD	  methodology,	   in	  order	   for	  such	  an	  event	   to	  drive	   the	  results	   it	  would	  have	   to	  have	  a	  different	   impact	  on	   the	   NBP	   region	   than	   the	   non-­‐NBP	   region	   and	   it	   would	   have	   to	  differentially	   impact	   industries	  based	  on	   their	   energy	   intensity	   levels.	   One	  potential	  event	  was	  a	   change	   in	  NAAQS	   nonattainment	   standards	  which	   caused	   408	   counties	  across	   the	   country	   to	  enter	  nonattainment	  status	   in	  2004.	   These	  counties	  were	  disproportionately	   located	  in	   the	  NBP	   treated	   region,	   and	   non-­‐attainment	   designation	  is	   likely	   to	   differentially	  impact	   industries	  based	  on	   their	  energy	   intensity.	   To	  control	  for	   this,	   I	  examine	  county-­‐industry	  data	  and	  allow	  for	  high	  energy	  industries	  in	  new	  NAAQS	  non-­‐attainment	   industries	   to	  experience	  a	   separate	  employment	  effect.	   My	  results	  are	  robust	   to	   controls	   for	   these	   potential	   NAAQS	   effects.	  A	  second	  potential	  concern	  is	  that	  certain	  regions	  may	  be	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	   changes	  in	  fuel	  prices.	  If	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  raises	  energy	  prices	  uniformly	  across	  the	  country,	  this	  will	  be	  picked	  up	  with	  the	  industry-­‐year	  fixed	  effects.	  However,	  certain	  regions	  rely	  heavily	  on	  one	  particular	  fuel	  source	  for	  their	  electricity	  production.	   To	  account	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  regional	  electricity	  prices	  may	  be	  differentially	   impacted	  by	  changing	  relative	  fuel	  prices,	  I	  obtain	  average	  oil,	  natural	  gas	  and	  coal	  prices	  for	  the	  years	  1998-­‐2008	  as	  well	  as	  the	  percent	  of	  electricity	  that	  is	  derived	  from	  that	  source	  in	  each	  North	  American	  Electric	  Reliability	  Corporation	  (NERC)	  region	  in	  the	  country.	  Interacting	  the	  fuel	  price	  with	  the	  percent	  of	  electricity	  derived	  from	  that	  fuel	  in	  the	  state’s	  NERC	  region	  and	  the	  industry	  indicator	  variables	  allows	  for	  the	  fact	   that	  certain	  industries	  in	  certain	  regions	  may	  be	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  a	  change	  in	   fuel	  prices.	  My	  results	  are	  insensitive	  to	  these	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controls	  as	  well.	  All	   time-­‐invariant	  differences	  are	  absorbed	  by	   full	   sets	  of	   state-­‐industry	  (or	   county-­‐industry)	   fixed	   effects.	  	  I	   use	   state,	   county	   and	   industry-­‐specific	   linear	  time	  trends	   to	  control	   for	  pre-­‐existing	   trends;	   in	  other	  models	   industry-­‐year	  and	  state-­‐year	  indicator	   variables	   flexibly	   account	   for	  nonlinear	   trends.	   Even	  after	  accounting	   for	   state	  and	   industry	   specific	   trends,	   results	   could	   still	   be	  driven	  by	  pre-­‐existing	   trends	   whereby	   high	   energy	   industries	   in	   the	  NBP	   region	   are	  trending	   differently	   than	   high	   energy	   industries	   in	   the	   non-­‐NBP	   region.	  	  For	  example,	   if	   energy	   intensive	   industries	   in	   the	   east	   and	  west	   have	   different	  employment	   trends	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  NAAQS	  or	   some	  other	   feature	   of	   earlier	  CAAA’s	   that	   disproportionately	   impacted	   the	   NBP	   region,	   then	   these	  pre-­‐existing	  trends	  could	  be	  mistakenly	  attributed	   to	   the	  NBP.	  To	  assure	   that	  separate	  pre-­‐existing	   trends	  are	  not	  being	  picked	  up,	   I	   allow	   for	  each	   industry	   to	   trend	  differently	  based	  on	   the	   region	   in	  which	   its	   employment	   is	   located.	   If	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	  NBP	   causes	   employment	   levels	   and	   trends	   to	   differ	   by	  region,	   then	  adding	   these	  separate	   trends	   is	   likely	   to	  absorb	  some	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  NBP.	  This	   again	  will	   result	   in	   a	   conservative	   estimate	   of	   the	  NBP’s	   impact	  on	   employment.	  Thus,	  my	  results	  are	  identified	  off	  of	  very	  weak	  assumptions,	  which	  allow	  for	  state	  and	  industry-­‐specific	  non-­‐parametric	  trends	  and	  pre-­‐existing	  east-­‐west	  differences	  in	   industry-­‐specific	  trends.	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Data	  	  
County	   Business	   Patterns	  The	  two	  employment	  datasets	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  NBP	  on	  manufacturing	  employment	  are	  the	  Census	  Bureau’s	  County	  Business	  Patterns	  (CBP)	  and	  the	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicators.	  The	  CBP	  is	  a	  yearly	  data	  product	  released	  by	  the	  Census	  Bureau	  that	  provides	  sub-­‐national	  economic	  data	  by	  industry.	  Data	  can	  be	  obtained	  at	  the	  national,	  state,	  county	  and	  metropolitan	  levels	  and	  include	  the	  total	  number	  of	  workers	  by	  industry	  in	  a	  geographic	  area.	  The	  source	  of	  the	  CBP	  is	  the	  Business	  Register,	  Census’	  Company	  Organization	  Survey	  and	  other	  economic	  censuses	  and	  surveys	  such	  as	  the	  Census	  of	  Manufactures	  and	  the	  Annual	  Survey	  of	  Manufactures.	  Using	  CBP	  data	  from	  1998-­‐2008,	  I	  create	  panel	  data	  sets	  at	  both	  the	  state-­‐industry	  and	  county-­‐industry	  level.	  In	  1998	  the	  Census	  Bureau	  switched	  its	  industry	  classifier	  variable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  changing	  face	  of	  the	  American	  economy.	  The	  Standard	  Industrial	  Classification	  (SIC)	  system	  was	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  newer	  North	  American	  Industry	  Classification	  System	  (NAICS).	  The	  change	  from	  SIC	  codes	  to	  NAICS	  codes	  in	  1998	  creates	  some	  difficulties	  in	  consistently	  estimating	  industry	  employment	  across	  time	  periods.	  Given	  that	  the	  NBP	  was	  implemented	  in	  2003,	  it	  is	  logical	  to	  use	  1998	  as	  a	  starting	  year	  for	  the	  data	   and	   avoid	   any	   inconsistencies	   that	  may	   arise	   from	  merging	  previous	   years	  with	  different	   industry	   definitions.	  	  All	   data	   between	  1998	   and	  2008	  use	  NAICS	   codes	  which	  are	   consistent	  across	   time	  periods.	   Following	  previous	   literature,	  this	  paper	  uses	  three-­‐digit	  NAICS	   codes	   as	   the	   industry	   level	   of	   observation	  (Greenstone	   2002;	   Kahn	  &	   Mansur	  2013).	  
 19 
While	   the	   CBP	   has	   the	   distinct	   advantage	   of	   being	   publicly	   available,	   it	   also	   has	  the	  disadvantage	  of	   having	   to	   undergo	   a	   thorough	   review	  process	   to	   prevent	   the	  release	   of	   any	  data	   that	  would	  disclose	   the	  exact	   records	  of	   any	   single	  establishment.	  Therefore,	   if	   very	   few	  establishments	  are	   located	   in	  a	  particular	   county	  or	   state-­‐industry,	   then	  employment	  data	  will	   be	   suppressed	   for	   that	  observation.	   The	  primary	  results	   of	   this	   paper	   use	   state-­‐industry	   data	  which	   has	   limited	   cell	   suppression	   for	  employment.	  	  In	   the	  state-­‐industry	  dataset	  76%	  of	  state-­‐industry	  cells	  are	  observed	  directly.	   These	  cells	  represents	  93%	  of	  all	  manufacturing	  employment	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   For	   those	  cells	   that	   are	   suppressed,	   I	   perform	  an	   imputation	  method	   similar	   to	  that	  used	  by	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  (2013)	  and	  Mian	  &	  Sufi	   (2012),	  which	   takes	  advantage	  of	  the	  CBP’s	  establishment-­‐size	   cell	   count	   variables	   and	   imputes	   employment	   for	   the	  suppressed	  cells	  by	  multiplying	   the	  number	  of	   establishments	   in	   each	   establishment-­‐size	   cell	   by	   the	  midpoint	   establishment	   size	  of	   that	   category.12	  	   The	   same	   imputation	  method	   is	  used	  for	   the	  county-­‐industry	   level	  data	  used	   in	   the	   robustness	   checks.13	  	  	  
Quarterly	   Workforce	   Indicators	  Like	  the	  CBP,	  the	  QWI	  is	  a	  publicly	  available	  dataset	  that	  contains	  sub-­‐national	  employment	  data	  by	  industry.	  The	  underlying	  microdata	  for	  the	  QWI	  is	  the	  Longitudinal	  Employer	  Household	  Dynamics	  (LEHD)	  program	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  which	  uses	  state	  unemployment	  insurance	  data	  as	  its	  primary	  input	  (see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  All	  state	  and	  county-­‐industry	  observations	  contain	  the	  number	  of	  establishments	  in	  narrowly	  defined	  employee	  size	  categories	  (1-­‐4,	  5-­‐9,	  10-­‐19,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  5,000+).	  For	  the	  5,000+	  category	  employment	  is	  top	  coded	  at	  6,000.	  See	  (Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  2013)	  for	  a	  full	  explanation	  of	  the	  imputation	  method.	  	  
13	   As	   discussed	   later	   in	   the	   paper,	   regressions	   weight	   state-­‐industry	   observations	   by	   their	   pre-­‐NBP	  employment	   level.	  This	   is	   common	   in	   the	   literature	   and	  mitigates	   concerns	   about	   imputation	   related	   bias	  as	   imputed	   cells	   are	   smaller	   and	   thus	   given	   less	  weight	   in	   the	   regressions.	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Abowd	  et	  al.	   (2006)	  for	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  the	  QWI	  and	  the	  LEHD).	  In	  recent	  years	  a	  number	  of	  papers	  have	  begun	  to	  use	  this	  data	  to	  evaluate	  the	  labor	  market	  impacts	  of	  the	  housing	  crash,	  changes	  to	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  and	  workplace	  mandates	  (Abowd	  &	  Vilhuber	  2012;	  Gittings	  &	  Schmutte	  2012;	  Dube	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Curtis	  et	  al.2013).14	  	  The	  QWI	  has	  both	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  compared	  to	  the	  CBP	  but	  there	   are	   two	  primary	  reasons	   to	  use	  QWI	  data.	   First,	   it	   contains	  detailed	  cuts	  of	  the	  data	  by	  worker	   characteristic.	  	  That	   is,	   the	  QWI	  provides	   not	   only	   total	  employment	  within	   a	  state-­‐industry,	   but	   also	   breaks	   down	   this	   employment	   by	   age	  group	   and	   gender.	  	  These	  data	  can	  then	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	   the	  treatment	  effect	  along	  a	   number	  of	  dimensions	   that	  are	  not	  available	   in	   the	  CBP.	  The	  second	  reason	   is	   that	   the	  QWI	  provides	   data	   not	   only	   on	   employment	   levels	   but	   also	  on	  worker	   flows	   (hires	   and	   separations)	  and	   job	   flows	  (creations	  and	  destructions).	  Finally,	   the	  quarterly	  nature	  of	  the	  data	   also	  provides	  more	   frequent	   snapshots	  of	  employment	  variables	   and	   thus	  gives	   a	  better	   feel	   for	   the	  dynamics	  at	  play	  and	   the	  impact	  of	   the	  program	  over	   time.	  The	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  QWI	  lie	  in	  its	  coverage	  and	  its	  data	  suppression.	  Most	  states	   have	  now	  agreed	  to	  share	  UI	  data	  with	  the	  LEHD	  system	  but	  the	  historical	  data	  they	  provide	  differs	  by	  state.	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  use	  data	  from	  the	  40	  states	  whose	  data	  goes	  back	  until	  at	  least	  2000	  so	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reasonable	  pre-­‐treatment	  period	  for	  each	  state.	  Of	   additional	  concern	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  on	  suppressed	  cells.	  When	  cells	  are	   suppressed	  in	  the	  CBP	  they	  can	  be	  imputed	  using	  the	  employee	  size	  categories,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Data	  on	  job	  flows	  has	  been	  available	  for	  longer.	  	  See	  Davis	  &	  Haltiwanger	  (2001)	  for	  an	  example	  of	  research	  examing	  job	  flows.	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which	  are	  available	  for	  every	  observation.	  In	  the	  QWI	  there	  are	  no	  additional	  variables	  which	   allow	  for	  the	  imputation	  of	  suppressed	  cells.	  Because	  of	  these	  disadvantages,	  the	   benchmark	  and	  primary	  employment	  specifications	  use	  the	  CBP.	  Importantly,	  results	  using	  the	  QWI	  employment	  data	  not	  only	  confirm	  findings	  using	  the	  CBP	  but	  are	  able	   to	  paint	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  NBP	  impacted	  labor	  markets.	  See	  the	  data	  appendix	  for	  additional	  details	  on	  both	  the	  QWI	  and	  the	  CBP.	  	  
NBER	   Productivity	   Database	  After	  obtaining	   annual	   (or	  quarterly)	   state-­‐industry	   labor	  data,	   I	  merge	   in	  three-­‐digit	  industry	   energy	   intensity	   data	   from	   the	   1998	  NBER	  Productivity	  Database.	  This	  database	   contains	   total	   energy	  expenditure	  by	   industry	   in	   the	  given	  year	   and	   is	   based	  on	   the	   Census	   of	   Manufactures	   and	   the	   Annual	   Survey	   of	   Manufactures.	  	  To	   construct	  an	  energy	   intensity	   index	   for	   the	  21	  different	  3	  digit	  manufacturing	   industries,	   I	   divide	  total	   industry	   energy	   expenditure	   by	   total	   value	   of	   shipments	   for	   the	   industry.15	   As	  seen	  in	  Table	  1,	  energy	   intensity	   in	   the	  manufacturing	   sector	  varies	  from	  a	  low	  of	  0.6%	  in	  the	  computer	  and	  electronic	  product	  industry	  to	  a	  high	  of	  5.5%	  in	   the	  primary	  metal	  manufacturing	  industry.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Because	  the	  NBP	  regulated	  NOx	  emissions	  from	  heat,	  steam	  and	  electricity	  production	  I	  use	  energy	  intensity	  rather	  than	  electricity	  intensity.	  	  
 22 
Table	  1:	  Energy	  Intensity	  of	  3-­‐Digit	  NAICS	  Manufacturing	  Industries	  	  	   NAICS	  3-­‐Digit	  Code	   Industry	  Description	   Energy	  Intensity	  Level	  311	   Food	  Manufacturing	   1.46%	  312	   Beverage	  and	  Tobacco	  Product	  Manufacturing	   0.71%	  313	   Textile	  Mill	   3.47%	  314	   Textile	  Product	  Mill	   1.33%	  315	   Apparel	  Manufacturing	   1.03%	  316	   Leather	  and	  Allied	  Product	  Manufacturing	   0.98%	  321	   Wood	  Product	  Manufacturing	   1.84%	  322	   Paper	  Manufacturing	   4.32%	  323	   Printing	  and	  Related	  Support	  Activities	   1.27%	  324	   Petroleum	  and	  Coal	  Products	  Manufacturing	   2.88%	  325	   Chemical	  Manufacturing	   3.25%	  326	   Plastics	  and	  Rubber	  Products	  Manufacturing	   2.18%	  327	   Nonmetallic	  Mineral	  Product	  Manufacturing	   4.96%	  331	   Primary	  Metal	  Manufacturing	   5.46%	  332	   Fabricated	  Metal	  Product	  Manufacturing	   1.59%	  333	   Machinery	  Manufacturing	   0.79%	  334	   Computer	  and	  Electronic	  Product	  Manufacturing	   0.61%	  335	   Electrical	  Equipment,	  Appliance,	  and	  Component	  Manufacturing	   1.00%	  336	   Transportation	  Equipment	  Manufacturing	   0.63%	  337	   Furniture	  and	  Related	  Product	  Manufacturing	   0.97%	  339	   Miscellaneous	  Manufacturing	   0.78%	  	  	   Note:	   The	   energy	   intensity	   measure	   is	   created	   by	   dividing	   the	   industry’s	   total	  energy	   expenditure	  by	   their	   total	   value	   of	   shipments.	   These	   variables	   are	   obtained	  from	  the	  NBER	  Productivity	  Database	  and	  use	  1998	  values.	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Econometric	  Model	   and	  Results	  In	   order	   to	  motivate	   the	   econometric	   analysis,	   provide	   summary	   statistics	   and	  preview	   the	   results,	   it	   is	   informative	   to	  begin	  by	  viewing	   the	   raw	  employment	  data	  between	   1998	  and	  2008.	  Based	  on	  the	  energy-­‐intensity	  index	  in	  Table	  1,	  I	  split	  the	  21	  industries	   into	   three	   separate	  groups.	   The	   seven	   industries	  with	   the	  highest	   energy	  intensity	  measures	   are	   defined	   as	   “high	   intensity	   industries”,	   the	   seven	   industries	  with	   the	   lowest	   energy	   intensity	  measures	   are	   defined	   as	   “low	   intensity	   industries”	  and	   the	  middle	   seven	   are	   defined	   as	   “medium	   intensity	   industries”.	  Figure	  3	  plots	  out	   the	   east-­‐west	   employment	  difference	   for	   each	   industry	  energy	   intensity	  grouping	   from	  1998-­‐2008.	   Specifically,	   the	   figure	  plots	   the	  percentage	  change	  in	  employment	   in	   the	  east	  minus	   the	  percentage	   change	   in	  employment	   in	   the	  west	   for	  each	   industry	  grouping,	  using	  1998	  as	   the	  baseline	  year.	   This	  plot	   suggests	   a	  potential	  effect	  of	   the	  NBP	  on	  employment,	   but	   it	   also	   reveals	   that	  pre-­‐existing	   trends	  may	  be	   present	   that,	   if	   unaccounted	   for,	   could	   bias	  DDD	   estimates.	  	  The	   plot	   shows	  that	  between	  1998	  and	  2008	  the	  east-­‐west	  employment	  difference	  falls	  most	  prominently	  for	   the	  high	   intensity	   industries	  while	   there	   is	   little	  change	   in	   the	  east-­‐west	  difference	   for	   the	   low-­‐energy	   industries.	  	  Employment	   in	  medium	   intensity	  industries	   tracks	   closely	  with	  high	  intensity	  for	  the	  first	  four	  years,	  but	  starting	  in	  2003,	  the	  east-­‐west	  employment	   difference	   begins	   to	   fall	   for	   high	   energy	   industries	  relative	   to	  medium	  energy	  industries.	   This	  gap	  widens	  substantially	  between	  2004	  and	  2008.	   Vertical	   lines	  are	  drawn	  in	  2001,	  the	  year	  after	  the	  courts	  determined	  the	  NBP’s	  legalitiy,	  and	  in	  2003,	  the	   start	   date	   of	   the	   program.	  	  Examining	   and	   accounting	   for	   any	  pre-­‐existing	   trends	  will	   be	   important	   to	   the	   internal	   validity	   of	   the	  DDD	   estimates.	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Figure	   3:	  	  East-­‐West	   Difference	   in	   Employment	   by	   Energy-­‐Intensity	   Grouping	  	  	  
	  

















Baseline	   Regression	   Specification	  The	  identification	  strategy	  of	  this	  paper	  takes	  advantage	  of	  the	  geographic,	  time	  and	  industry	  heterogeneity	  found	  in	  the	  data	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  NBP	  on	  manufacturing	  employment	  outcomes.	  As	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  exploiting	  this	  heterogeneity,	  I	  consider	  the	  following	  DDD	  model:	  	  	  
ygkt	  =	  βT	  (Postgt	  ×	  Eastg	  ×	  EnIntk	  )	  +	  βpe(Postgt	  ×	  Eastg)+	  +βpen(Postgt	  ×	  EnIntk	  )	  +	  θxgkt	  +	  δgk	  +	  ξt	  +	  egkt	  (1)	  In	   this	  model,	   ygkt	  	  is	   the	   employment	   outcome	   of	   interest	   (logged	   employment,	  hiring	  rate,	   separation	   rate,	   etc.)	  	  in	   geographic	   region	   g,	   in	   industry	  k	   in	   period	   t.	   All	  findings	   listed	   in	   the	   following	  section	  maintain	   the	   same	  definitions	   for	   the	  variables	  
Postgt,	  Eastg	   and	  EnIntk.	   Post	  is	  an	  indicator	  variable	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  the	  date	  is	  after	  the	  start	  of	   the	  NBP.16	  	  The	  NBP	  began	   in	  May	  of	  2003	   in	  eight	  states	  and	   in	  May	  of	  2004	  for	  eleven	  states.	   For	  the	  eight	  states	  beginning	  in	  2003,	  Post	  equals	  one	  for	  years	  2004	  and	   later.	   For	  all	  other	  states	  Post	  equals	  one	  for	  years	  2005	  and	  later.17	  	  The	  baseline	   specification	  also	  uses	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	   the	  variable	  East.	   The	  definition	  of	   the	  treated	   region	   is	   informed	   by	   the	  mechanism	   through	  which	   a	   change	   in	  employment	  would	  occur.	   I	  set	  East	  equal	   to	  one	   for	  all	  states	  whose	  electric	  utility	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Figure	  1	  for	  a	  map	  of	  the	  NBP	  region	  and	  the	  year	  which	  each	  state	  began	  compliance.	   Missouri	   is	  dropped	  because	   it	   did	  not	   begin	  until	   2007	  and	  only	   certain	  Missouri	   counties	  were	   required	   to	   comply.	  




provider	   is	   impacted	  by	   the	  NBP.	  This	  expands	   the	   treated	   region	   to	   include	  areas	   that	  were	  not	  directly	  regulated	  by	   the	  NBP.18	  	  The	  results	  are	  shown	  to	  be	   insensitive	   to	  alternate	  specifications	  that	  restrict	  the	  treated	  region	  to	  only	  those	  states	  and	  counties	  that	  were	   directly	   regulated.	  	  Figure	   4	  provides	   a	  map	  of	   the	   treated	   region	   and	  provides	   additional	  details.	   Finally,	   the	  variable	  EnIntk	  	  is	   a	   time-­‐invariant	  measure	  of	  the	  industry’s	   energy	   intensity	   as	   defined	   by	   total	   energy	   expenditure	   divided	   by	   total	  value	  of	   shipments	   for	   the	  entire	   industry	   in	  1998.	   The	  primary	  employment	  specifications	  will	  be	  at	   the	  state	   level	  such	  that	  gkt	   is	  state-­‐industry-­‐year	  data.	  Robustness	  checks	  will	  use	  county	   level	  data	  where	  a	  unit	  of	  observation	   is	  at	  the	  county-­‐industry-­‐year	   level	  and	   g	  refers	   to	   county	   rather	   than	  state.	   	  




	   Figure	  4:	  NBP	  Treated	  Region	  	  	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   Note:	   An	   area	   is	   defined	   as	   treated	   if	   its	   electricity	   provider	   is	   part	   of	   an	   ISO	  with	   coal-­‐burning	   power	   plants	   that	   were	   subject	   to	   the	   NBP.	   For	   example,	   Iowa,	  Minnesota,	  Wisconsin	   and	  North	  Dakota,	   while	   not	   part	   of	  	   the	  	   geographic	  	   area	  	   of	  	  the	   	   NBP	   	   are	   part	   of	   the	  Midwest	   Independent	   System	  Operator	  whose	   geographic	  region	   includes	   Indiana,	   Illinois	   and	   Michigan.	   Boundaries	   of	   ISO’s	   are	   notoriously	  fuzzy	   as	   they	   are	   defined	   according	   to	   utilities	   rather	   than	   a	   set	   geography.	  Furthermore	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   NBP	   will	   be	   dissipated	   for	   regions	   whose	  manufacturing	   establishments	   are	   not	   directly	   regulated.	   Because	   there	   is	   no	   clean	  geographic	   discontinuity	   to	   the	   policy,	   this	   makes	  border	   discontinuity	  methods	   an	  unattractive	  methodology	   for	   identifying	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  	  NBP.	   	  





The	  main	  coefficient	  of	   interest	   is	  βt,	  which	  captures	   the	  triple	   interaction	  of	  an	  observation	  being	   in	   the	   treatment	  group,	  after	   the	   treatment	  has	  been	  applied	  and	  allowing	   for	   differences	   by	   industry	   based	   on	   their	   energy-­‐intensity	   level.	  	  The	   variables	  
δgk	  	  and	  γt	  	  represent	   full	   sets	  of	   state-­‐industry	  and	  year	   indicator	  variables	   in	  order	  to	   control	   for	   time-­‐invariant	  differences	  across	  state-­‐industries	  and	  any	  shock	   that	  occurs	   in	   a	   given	   year	   and	   is	   common	   to	   all	  manufacturing	   industries	   and	   all	   states.	  	  A	   vector	  of	  variables,	  represented	  by	  xgkt	   is	   included	  in	  the	  robustness	  checks	  to	  ensure	  the	   results	  are	  not	  being	  driven	  by	  omitted	  variables.	   This	  specification	  does	  not	  capture	   secular	  state	  and	   industry	   trends	   that	  are	  unrelated	   to	   the	  NBP	  but	  are	  likely	  a	  driving	   source	   of	   the	   employment	   change	  within	   a	   state-­‐industry.19	  	  These	  and	  other	  concerns	  are	  addressed	  shortly,	  but	  before	  discussing	   the	  results	  and	  additional	   specifications,	   a	   few	   important	   details	   and	   assumptions	   bear	  mention.	  	  First,	  as	  is	  common	  in	  the	  literature,	  observations	  are	  weighted	  by	  their	  pre-­‐treatment	  1998	   employment	   levels	   to	  ensure	   that	   state-­‐industries	  with	   little	  or	  no	  employment	  do	  not	  drive	  the	  results	  (Greenstone	  2002;	  Walker	  2011).	   Second,	  while	  using	  aggregate	  state-­‐industry	  data	   reduces	   the	   computational	  burden	  and	  accounts	   for	  
some	  of	   the	  inference	  concerns	  raised	  by	  (Bertrand	  et	  al.	  	  2004),	  given	  that	  the	  identifying	  variation	   occurs	  at	  a	   level	  higher	  geographic	   level	   than	  the	  state,	   it	   is	  crucial	  to	  account	   for	  serial	  and	  spatial	  correlation	  of	   the	  error	   term	  to	  avoid	  understating	   the	  size	  of	   the	  standard	   errors.	   The	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	   the	  NBP	  region-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Industry	   level	   to	  address	   these	  concerns.20	  	  A	   final	   feature	   to	  note	   is	   that	   the	  model	  assumes	  a	   linear	  effect	   in	  energy	  intensity.	  When	   logged	   employment	   is	   the	   outcome	   variable,	   the	   triple	   difference	  coefficient	  should	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	  percentage	  change	   in	  employment	   that	  occurs	  for	  every	  additional	  percentage	  point	   in	  energy	   intensity.	   While	   there	  are	   strong	  theoretical	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  energy	   intensive	  industries	  will	  experience	  the	  greatest	   impact	   from	   the	  NBP,	   deciding	   exactly	   how	   to	  model	   this	   differential	  impact	   is	   not	  immediately	   straightforward.	  	  Imposing	   a	   linear	   assumption	   allows	   for	  results	   to	   be	   obtained	   in	   a	   single	  DDD	   coefficient	  which	   is	   easily	   interpretable	   for	   the	  manufacturing	  sector	   as	  whole.	  	  However,	   I	   provide	   additional	   results	  which	   calculate	  the	   impact	   of	   the	  NBP	  separately	  on	  each	  of	   the	  21	   industries.	   This	   is	  done	  by	  replacing	   the	   triple	   interaction	  variable	  with	  21	  separate	   industry-­‐specific	   triple	  interaction	  terms.	   Results	   from	   this	  non-­‐parametric	   approach,	  presented	   later,	   reveal	  that	   the	   linearity	   assumption	  is	   not	   unreasonable.	  	  
Employment	   Results	   Using	   County	   Business	   Patterns	  The	  main	  employment	   results	  of	   the	  paper	   are	   found	   in	  Table	  2	   and	  use	   employment	  data	   from	  the	  CBP,	  which	  contains	  data	   for	  every	  state-­‐industry-­‐year	  cell	  between	  1998	  and	  2008.	   Column	  1	  reports	  estimates	   from	  the	  base	  model	  with	  additional	  controls	  being	   added	   in	   each	   subsequent	   column	   to	   account	   for	   potential	   confounding	   factors.	  The	  preferred	   specification	   is	   reported	   in	  Column	  6	  and	   includes	   state	   trends,	   industry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




trends	  as	  well	  as	  separate	   industry	  by	  region	  trends.	   Tables	  3	  and	  4	  report	  a	  variety	  of	  robustness	  checks	  using	  a	  similar	   table	   layout	  but	  alternate	  samples	  and	  control	  variables.	   Each	  column	  represents	  a	   separate	  regression	  where	   the	  dependent	  variable	  is	   logged	  employment	  plus	  one.	   In	   each	   table	   the	   coefficient	  on	   the	  primary	   triple	  difference	  variable	  PostgtxEastgxEnIntk	   is	  reported	  as	  well	  as	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  




Table	  2:	  Employment	  Results:	  County	  Business	  Patterns	  	  
	   (1)	  ln(Emp)	   (2)	  ln(Emp)	   (3)	  ln(Emp)	   (4)	  ln(Emp)	   (5)	  ln(Emp)	   (6)	  ln(Emp)	  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐3.861	   -­‐2.293∗∗   -­‐2.301∗∗   -­‐1.458∗   -­‐1.164	   -­‐1.385∗∗  
	   (2.991)	   (0.966)	   (0.869)	   (0.798)	   (0.729)	   (0.631)	  PostxEast	   0.0024	   	   0.0155	   0.0113	   	   0.0043	  
	   (0.0799)	  	   (0.0166)	   (0.0151)	  	   (0.0164)	  State-­‐Ind	  FE	  Year	  FE	  Ind-­‐Year	  FE	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	  State-­‐Year	   FE	  State	  Linear	  Trend	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	  E	  /	  W	  Ind	  Trends	   	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Observations	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	  R-­‐Squared	   0.985	   0.994	   0.994	   0.993	   0.994	   0.994	  Standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses	  




exogenous	  state	  and	   industry	   trends	  which	  are	  not	   controlled	   for	   in	   this	  base	  model.	   	  Because	  state	  and	   industry	   trends	  are	   likely	   to	  be	   important,	   I	   consider	   two	  methods	  of	  controlling	   for	   this	   source	  of	  variation.	   The	   first	   takes	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  approach	  by	   including	   a	   full	   set	   of	   industry-­‐year	   and	   state-­‐year	   indicator	   variables.	  	  The	   inclusion	   of	   industry-­‐year	   indicator	   variables	   accounts	   for	   any	   industry-­‐specific	  shock	   that	   is	  common	   to	  all	   states	   in	  a	  given	  year	  while	   the	   inclusion	  of	   state-­‐year	  indicator	  variables	  accounts	   for	  any	   shock	   that	   is	   common	   to	  all	  manufacturing	  employment	   in	  a	   state	   in	  a	  given	   year.	  	  The	   non-­‐parametric	   specification	   provides	   the	  model	  with	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   flexibility	  but	   the	   large	  set	  of	   indicator	  variables,	  particularly	   the	  set	  of	   state-­‐year	  dummies,	   are	   quite	   demanding	   of	   the	  data	   as	   they	  dramatically	   reduces	   the	  degrees	   of	   freedom	   in	   the	   regression.21	   Results	  using	   the	  fully	  non-­‐parametric	   approach	  with	   sets	   of	   state-­‐year	   and	   industry-­‐year	   indicator	  variables	   are	   given	   in	  Column	  2	  of	  Table	  2.	  The	   triple	   difference	   coefficient	   is	   negative	   and	   statistically	   significant,	   implying	  that	   employment	   in	   high	   energy	   industries	   fell	   relative	   to	   low	   energy	   industries	   and	  relative	   to	  other	  high	  energy	   industries	   in	  non-­‐treated	  states.	  If	  we	  are	  willing	   to	   relax	   these	  non-­‐parametric	   trend	  assumptions	  we	  may	  continue	   to	  account	   for	  state	  specific	   time	   trends	  by	   including	  a	   full	   set	  of	   state	  indicator	  variables	   that	  have	  been	   interacted	  with	  a	   linear	   time	  trend	  variable.	   While	  not	  as	   flexible	  as	   the	  non-­‐parametric	  approach,	   these	  state-­‐specific	   linear	   trends	  are	  likely	   to	  capture	  a	   substantial	  portion	  of	   the	  year	   to	  year	   change	  as	  employment	   levels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





















Alternative	   Employment	   Specifications	  To	  examine	  the	  robustness	  of	   the	  result	   in	   the	  preferred	  specification,	   I	  consider	  models	  which:	   (1)	   include	  additional	  controls	   in	  the	  regression	  model;	  (2)	  more	  narrowly	  define	   the	  treated	  region;	  (3)	  examine	  county-­‐level	  rather	  than	  state-­‐level	  data	  and	  (4)	  relax	  the	   assumption	  of	   a	   linear	  employment	  effect	   in	  energy	   intensity.	   Panel	  A	  of	  Table	  3	   reports	  results	   from	   identical	  models	  as	  Table	  2	  but	  controls	   for	  exogenous	  changes	   in	   fuel	  prices	   that	  may	   impact	   the	  energy	  costs	  of	   certain	   regions	  more	   than	  others.	   Any	  shock	   in	  energy	  prices	   that	   is	  common	  to	   the	  entire	  country	  will	  be	  picked	  up	   in	   the	  industry-­‐year	  fixed	  effects	  but	  if,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  and	  certain	  regions	  heavily	  rely	  on	  oil	  for	  electricity,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  regions	  will	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  energy	  that	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  NBP.22	  To	  ensure	  that	  shocks	  to	  oil,	  natural	  gas	  and	  coal	  prices	  are	  not	  driving	  the	  results	  I	  gather	  data	  on	  annual	  fuel	  prices	  for	  each	  of	  these	  fuels	  and	  interact	  these	  prices	  with	  the	  percent	  of	  electricity	  that	  is	  derived	  from	  that	  fuel	  in	  the	  NERC	  region	  to	  which	  that	  state	  belongs.	  This	  variable	  is	  then	  interacted	  with	  the	  energy	  intensity	  variable	  to	  control	  for	  the	  fact	   that	  high	  energy	  industries	  in	  certain	  regions	  may	  be	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  certain	   fuel	  price	  shocks.	  The	  results	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  insensitive	  to	  these	  controls.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Annual	  oil,	  natural	  gas	  and	  coal	  prices	  are	  the	  Brent	  Price,	  the	  Henry	  Hub	  Natural	  Gas	  spot	  price	  and	  the	  EIA	   total	   average	   coal	  price	  and	  were	  downloaded	   from	  




Table	  3:	   Employment	  Results:	  	  State	  Robustness	  Checks	  
Panel	  A:	  Fuel	  Price	  /	  Composition	  
Controls	  
  
	   (1)	  ln(Emp)	   (2)	  ln(Emp)	   (3)	  ln(Emp)	   (4)	  ln(Emp)	   (5)	  ln(Emp)	   (6)	  ln(Emp)	  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐4.405	   -­‐2.509∗∗   -­‐2.459∗∗∗   -­‐1.247	   -­‐1.379∗   -­‐1.326∗∗  
	   (3.203)	   (1.037)	   (0.904)	   (0.909)	   (0.711)	   (0.633)	  PostxEast	   0.0100	   	   0.0184	   0.0083	   	   0.0039	  
	   (0.0816)	  	   (0.0162)	   (0.0165)	  	   (0.0164)	  Observations	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	   11,319	  
Panel  B:  Restricted  NBP  Region  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐3.925	   -­‐2.185∗∗   -­‐2.247∗∗∗   -­‐1.739∗∗   -­‐1.207∗   -­‐1.575∗∗∗  
	   (3.329)	   (0.866)	   (0.798)	   (0.821)	   (0.664)	   (0.554)	  PostxEast	   -­‐0.0100	   	   0.0130	   0.0135	   	   0.00397	  
	   (0.0901)	  	   (0.0137)	   (0.0152)	  	   (0.0142)	  Observations	   9,240	   9,240	   9,240	   9,240	   9,240	   9,240	  State-­‐Ind	  FE	  Year	  FE	  Ind-­‐Year	  FE	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	     Yes	   Yes	     Yes	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	     Yes	   Yes	     Yes	  State-­‐Year	   FE	  State	  Linear	  Trend	   	   Yes	      Yes	   	   Yes	      Yes	  E	  /	  W	  Ind	  Trends	   	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses	  




Panel	  B	  of	  Table	  3	  continues	  to	  use	  state	   level	  data	  but	  uses	  an	  alternate	  definition	  for	   the	   treated	  region.	   Rather	   than	  use	   the	  broad	  definition	  described	   in	  Figure	  4,	   this	   specification	  defines	   the	  NBP	  region	  as	  only	   those	   states	   that	  were	  directly	   impacted	  by	   the	   program.	  	  Using	   this	   narrower	   definition,	   North	   Dakota,	  Minnesota,	   Iowa,	  Wisconsin,	   Maine,	   New	   Hampshire	   and	   Vermont	   are	   dropped	   from	  the	   sample.	  	  Results	  using	   this	  new	  definition	   find	   the	  coefficient	  on	   the	   triple	  difference	  variable	   to	  be	   -­‐1.57,	  thus	  suggesting	  a	  slightly	  greater	  impact	  of	  the	  NBP	  than	  was	  found	  in	  the	  baseline	  specification.	  Table	   4	   provides	   new	   estimates	   of	   the	  NBP’s	   employment	   impact	   using	   county	  rather	  than	  state	   level	  data.	   The	  use	  of	   county	   level	  data	   comes	  with	  both	  benefits	  and	  costs.	  The	  primary	   reason	  why	  county	  data	  may	  be	  useful	   is	   that	   it	   allows	   the	  specifications	   to	   control	   for	   county	   level	   changes	   to	   the	   NAAQS	   non-­‐attainment	  standards	   that	  occurred	  to	  408	  counties	   in	  2004,	  the	  first	  year	  that	  the	  NBP	  was	  fully	  implemented.	  These	  counties	  were	   located	  across	   the	  United	  States	  but	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  were	   located	   east	   of	   the	  Mississippi.	  	  Using	   county	   data	   also	  allows	   for	   additional	   robustness	   checks	   that	   allow	   the	  NBP	   treatment	   group	   to	  be	  defined	  along	   county	   rather	   than	  state	   lines.	   While	   the	  NBP	  was	  a	  state	   level	  program,	  certain	  counties	   in	  both	   Alabama	   and	  Michigan	  were	   ruled	   exempt	   of	   the	   regulation	  and	   can	   be	   excluded	  from	   the	   treated	   region	  when	  using	   county	   level	  data.23	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	   4:	  	  Employment	   Results:	  	  County	   Robustness	   Checks	  
	  
Panel  A:  Base  Regressions  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
	   ln(Emp)	   ln(Emp)	   ln(Emp)	   ln(Emp)	   ln(Emp)	   ln(Emp)	  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐3.223	   -­‐1.510	   -­‐1.456	   -­‐1.546∗   -­‐1.465	   -­‐1.250∗∗  
	   (2.847)	   (0.898)	   (0.932)	   (0.896)	   (0.889)	   (0.597)	  PostxEast	   0.0156	   	   -­‐0.0003	   0.0108	   	   -­‐0.0033	  
	   (0.0803)	  	   (0.0159)	   (0.0161)	  	   (0.0153)	  Observations	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	  
Panel  B:  Restricted  NBP  Region  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐3.270	   -­‐1.416	   -­‐1.318	   -­‐1.689∗   -­‐1.550	   -­‐1.211∗  
	   (2.997)	   (0.897)	   (0.913)	   (0.955)	   (0.943)	   (0.655)	  PostxEast	   -­‐0.0293	   	   -­‐0.0084	   0.00980	   	   -­‐0.0102	  
	   (0.0852)	  	   (0.0156)	   (0.0168)	  	   (0.0161)	  Observations	   320,323	   320,323	   320,323	   320,323	   320,323	   320,323	  
Panel  C:  NAAQS  Controls  PostxEastxEnInt	   -­‐3.326	   -­‐1.573∗   -­‐1.523	   -­‐1.651∗   -­‐1.540∗   -­‐1.345∗∗  
	   (2.825)	   (0.914)	   (0.935)	   (0.915)	   (0.912)	   (0.593)	  PostxEast	   -­‐0.0161	   	   0.0083	   0.0096	   	   -­‐0.0025	  
	   (0.0806)	  	   (0.0162)	   (0.0157)	  	   (0.0152)	  Observations	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	   374,356	  State-­‐Ind	  FE	  Year	  FE	  Ind-­‐Year	  FE	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	   Yes	  	   Yes	  State-­‐Year	   FE	  State	  Linear	  Trend	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	   	   Yes	  E	  /	  W	  Ind	  Trends	   	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses	  




range	  provided	  in	  the	  data.	  This	  imputation	  process	  reduces	  the	  true	  employment	  variation	  in	  the	  data	  and	  raises	  other	  concerns	   regarding	  when	  cells	  may	  fall	  into	  and	  out	  of	  suppression	  status.	  These	  concerns	  are	  mitigated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  state	  data	  which	  is	  suppressed	  far	  less	  often	  Panel	  A	  of	  Table	  4	  reports	  results	  using	  a	  nearly	  identical	  set	  of	  regression	  specifications	  in	  Table	  2	   but	  at	  the	  county	  rather	  than	  state	  level.	  County-­‐industry	  fixed	  effects	  control	  for	  any	   time	  invariant	  differences	  in	  employment	  levels	  and	  industry,	  state	  and	  industry	  by	  region	  trends	  are	  controlled	  for	  in	  an	  analogous	  manner.	  Reassuringly,	  Panel	  A	  reveals	  the	  county	  level	  results	  to	  be	  of	  similar	  magnitude	  to	  their	  state	  level	  counterparts.	  Results	  are	  no	   longer	  statistically	   significant	   for	  Columns	  2	  and	  3	  but	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	   the	  5%	  level	   in	  Column	  6,	   the	  preferred	   specification	  which	   includes	  separate	   region	   by	  industry	   trends.	  Panel	  B	  of	  Table	  4	  restricts	  the	  treated	  region	  to	  only	  the	  counties	  that	  were	  directly	   impacted	  by	   the	  NBP.	  The	   results	   for	   the	  preferred	   specification	   suggest	   a	  slightly	  smaller	   impact	   than	   suggested	  by	   the	   state	   level	   counterpart,	  but	   the	  coefficient	   falls	  well	  within	   the	  confidence	   interval	  of	   the	   state	   level	   results.	   The	   final	  important	  use	  of	   the	   county	   level	   data	   is	   to	   control	   for	   changes	   in	   county	   level	  NAAQS	   non-­‐attainment	  standards.	  	  To	   isolate	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   NBP	   from	   any	   impact	  of	   the	   NAAQS,	   I	   include	   a	   term	   in	   the	   econometric	  model	  which	   interacts	   2004	  county	  NAAQS	   nonattainment	  status	  with	  the	  Post	  and	  EnergyIntensity	  variables.24	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




As	  a	   final	  specification,	   I	  return	  to	   the	  state-­‐level	  data	  and	  consider	   the	  effect	  that	   the	  NBP	   had	   separately	   on	   each	   specific	  manufacturing	   industry.	  	  To	   do	   this,	   the	  main	   triple	  difference	   interaction	  variable	   is	   replaced	  with	  21	  different	   industry-­‐specific	  interaction	  variables.25	  	  The	  coefficients	  on	  the	  industry	  specific	   interaction	  variables	  represent	  the	   estimated	  effect	  of	   the	  NBP	  on	  each	   industry.	   Figure	  5	  plots	  each	  of	   the	  resulting	  coefficients	   on	   the	   y-­‐axis	   and	   the	   industry’s	   energy	   intensity	   on	   the	   x-­‐axis.	  	  As	  expected,	   the	  higher	   the	  energy	   intensity	  of	   the	   industry,	   the	  greater	   it	  was	   impacted	  by	   the	  NBP.	  There	  are	  no	  clear	  outlier	   industries	   that	  would	  be	  driving	   the	  results	   in	  the	  benchmark	   specification.	  	  Low	   energy	   industries	   generally	   experienced	   no	   clear	  impact	  while	   high	  energy	   industries	   experienced	   a	   negative	   impact.	   The	   apparent	  linearity	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   an	   industry’s	   energy	   intensity	   and	   their	   NBP	  related	   employment	   change	   supports	   the	   identification	   strategy	  used	   in	   the	   triple	  difference	  models.	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  That	  is,	  I	  drop	  the	  Postst  ×  Easts  ×  EnIntk   variable	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  Postst  ×  Easts  ×  Ind1k,	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 Note:	  	  This	   chart	   plots	   the	   each	   industry	   specific	   triple	   difference	   coefficient	  against	   that	   industry’s	   energy	   intensity	  measure.	  	  The	   coefficients	   are	   obtained	  by	   replacing	   the	  PostxEastxEnInt  variable	  with	  21	  industry	  specific	  triple	  interaction	  variables	  (PostxEastxInd1,	  PostxEastxInd2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  PostxEastxInd21)	  and	  then	  running	  the	  specification	  described	  in	   equation	  (2).	  Other	  model	  specifications	  yield	  similar	  plots.	  	   	  	  
Worker	  Flows	  and	  Earnings	  by	  Age	  Group:	   Results	   f rom	  theQuarterly	  Workforce	  
Indicators	   Data	  While	  employment	  is	  an	  important	  and	  policy	  relevant	  outcome,	  estimating	  the	  NBP’s	  impact	  on	  industry	  employment	  levels	  does	  not	  fully	  capture	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  







regulation	  on	  worker	  welfare	  or	  labor	  markets.	  In	  a	  dynamic	  economy	  where	  worker	  transitions	  are	  costless,	  jobs	  can	  be	  reallocated	  between	  firms	  and	  industries	  such	  that	  workers	  leaving	  shrinking	  firms	  immediately	  find	  jobs	  in	  expanding	  firms.	  In	  this	  case,	  workers	  may	  experience	  no	  negative	  impact	  from	  industry	  regulation	  because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  easily	  switch	  to	  another	  job.	  Gathering	  insight	  into	  workers’	  transitional	  costs	  is	  therefore	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy.	  Past	  research	  has	  shown	  these	  costs	  are	  especially	  large	  for	  workers	  that	  experience	  involuntary	  separations	  and	  should	  be	  given	  particular	  attention	  when	  considering	  regulation	  Walker	  2013).26	  The	  method	  of	  employment	  reduction	  (whether	  voluntary	  or	  voluntary)	  and	  the	  associated	  transitional	  costs	  are	  essential	  to	  understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy.	  One	  final	  yet	  very	  important	  margin	  on	  which	  firms	  may	  adjust	  to	  regulation	  is	  through	  worker	  earnings.	  A	  change	  in	  earnings	  will	  clearly	  have	  implications	  for	  worker	  welfare.	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  QWI	  allows	  for	  these	  changes	  to	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  way	  that	  previous	  research	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  accomplish.	  	  
Worker	  Flows	  and	  Labor	  Adjustment	  	  The	  QWI	  provides	  data	  on	  the	  near	  universe	  of	  worker	  flows	  at	  a	  level	  of	  detail	  not	  available	  in	  any	  other	  public	  dataset.	  Evaluating	  these	  flows	  allows	  the	  researcher	  to	  determine	  whether	  firms	  adjusted	  employment	  by	  decreasing	  hiring	  or	  increasing	  separations.	  This	  distinction	  is	  important,	  particularly	  for	  evaluating	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  incumbent	  workers.	  If	  firms	  lower	  their	  employment	  levels	  by	  laying	  off	  long-­‐time	  employees	  there	  will	  be	  a	  significant	  negative	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  




workers.	  However,	  there	  will	  be	  little	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  workers	  if	  the	  firm	  reduces	  their	  labor	   force	  by	  lowering	  hiring	  rates	  and	  allowing	  employment	  to	  decline	  through	  voluntary	   separations	  such	  as	  quits	  and	  retirements.27	  These	  potential	  employment	  reduction	  paths	  are	  plotted	  out	  in	  Figure	  A.6	  While	  layoffs	  (involuntary	  separations)	  are	   not	  directly	  observed	  in	  the	  data,	  the	  QWI	  contains	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  that	  separate	   from	  a	  given	  firm	  and	  tracks	  them	  for	  up	  to	  four	  quarters	  after	  they	  leave	  the	  firm.	  The	  data	  reports	  the	  average	  length	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  these	  separating	  workers.	  If	  firms	  reduce	  employment	  primarily	  through	  layoffs	  then	  not	  only	  will	  there	   be	  an	  increase	  in	  separations	  but	  there	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  length	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  those	  workers	  separating	  from	  the	  firm	  following	  the	  regulation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	  6:	  Employment	  Adjustment	  Paths:	  Natural	  Separations	  vs.	  Layoffs	  	  	  
	   	  
	   	  	  	  	  
Slope = Natural Sep Rate 
	   	  








 Note:	   This	   chart	   plots	   two	   employment	   adjustment	   paths	   a	   firm	   may	   take	   to	  arrive	   at	   a	   new	   employment	   level	   following	   a	   permanent	   negative	   shock.	   The	  dashed	  line	   represents	   the	   path	   taken	   when	   the	   firm	   adjusts	   through	   natural	   separations	  (quits	   and	   retirements)	   and	   the	   solid	   line	   represents	   the	   path	   when	   the	   firm	  adjusts	   immediately	   through	  	   layoffs.	  	  	   Before	  reporting	  results	  on	  worker	   flows	   it	   is	   important	  as	  a	  validity	  check	   to	  begin	  by	   replicating	   the	  primary	  employment	   regression	  described	   in	   equation	   (2)	  using	   employment	   data	   from	   the	   QWI.	   Column	   1	   of	   Table	   5	   shows	   the	   DDD	   estimate	  using	  QWI	  data	  is	  smaller	  (-­‐0.871	  as	  compared	  to	  -­‐1.38)	  but	  it	  remains	  negative	  and	  
 
 








Table	  5:	   Job	  and	  Worker	  Flows	  	   	   VARIABLES	   (1)	  ln(Emp)	   (2)	  Hiring	  Rate	   (3)	  Separation	  Rate	   (4)	  Job	  Creation	  Rate	   (5)	  Job	   Destruction	  Rate	  	   PostxEastxEnint	   	   -­‐0.871**	   	   -­‐0.225**	  	   -­‐0.187	   	   -­‐0.140	   	   -­‐0.104	  




Table	  6:	  Employment,	  Flows	  and	  Earnings	  by	  Age	  Group	  	  
	   (1)	  ln(Emp)	   (2)	  Hires	  Rate	   (3)	  Seps	  Rate	   (4)	  Seps:	  Qtrs	  of	  Non-­‐Emp	   (5)	  ln(New	  Hire	  arnngs	  
(6)	  ln(Avg	  Earnings	  All	   -­‐0.871∗∗   -­‐0.225∗∗   -­‐0.187	   -­‐0.516	   -­‐1.277∗∗∗   0.435	  
	   (0.411)	   (0.0999)	   (0.128)	   (0.636)	   (0.470)	   (0.299)	  Age	  19-­‐21	   -­‐1.939∗∗   -­‐0.0559	   -­‐0.477∗∗   0.719	   -­‐0.689∗   -­‐0.387	  
	   (0.722)	   (0.254)	   (0.179)	   (0.585)	   (0.352)	   (0.274)	  Age	  22-­‐24	   -­‐2.121***   -­‐0.288∗   -­‐0.358∗∗   0.688	   -­‐0.737∗   -­‐0.417	  
	   (0.647)	   (0.171)	   (0.163)	   (0.738)	   (0.400)	   (0.287)	  Age	  25-­‐34	   -­‐0.860	   -­‐0.144	   -­‐0.154	   0.0354	   -­‐0.982∗∗   0.141	  
	   (0.588)	   (0.122)	   (0.126)	   (0.699)	   (0.436)	   (0.217)	  Age	  35-­‐44	   -­‐0.861∗∗   -­‐0.222∗∗   -­‐0.149	   -­‐0.170	   -­‐1.214∗∗   0.370	  
	   (0.398)	   (0.0868)	   (0.142)	   (0.723)	   (0.482)	   (0.332)	  Age	  45-­‐54	   -­‐0.718	   -­‐0.156	   -­‐0.0986	   -­‐0.724	   -­‐0.887	   0.434	  
	   (0.521)	   (0.117)	   (0.136)	   (1.216)	   (0.550)	   (0.327)	  Age	  55-­‐64	   -­‐0.304	   -­‐0.113	   -­‐0.214	   -­‐0.984	   -­‐1.877∗∗   0.303	  
	   (0.387)	   (0.105)	   (0.138)	   (1.370)	   (0.723)	   (0.328)	  Age	  65-­‐99	   -­‐0.748∗   -­‐0.0391	   -­‐0.0635	   -­‐1.829	   -­‐1.664	   0.361	  
	   (0.400)	   (0.0927)	   (0.0888)	   (1.111)	   (1.267)	   (0.484)	  Standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses	  




are	   imprecisely	   measured,	   it	   is	  of	   interest	   that	   they	  both	  point	  negative.	  The	  hiring	  and	  separation	  results	  suggest	  firms	  may	  have	  lowered	  employment	  through	   reductions	  in	  hiring	  rather	  than	  increases	  in	  layoffs.	  If	  true	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	   no	  concomitant	  rise	  in	  the	  periods	  of	  nonemployment	  for	  workers	  separating	  from	  a	  high	  energy	  industry	  following	  the	  NBP.	  Column	  4	  of	  Table	  6	  report	  these	  results.	  The	  estimates	  reported	  in	  row	  1	  of	  Column	  4	  show	  there	  to	  be	  no	  clear	  evidence	  that	  the	  NBP	  increased	  the	  average	  period	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  separating	  workers.28	  	  Table	  6,	  in	  addition	  to	  reporting	  the	  impact	  on	  periods	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  separating	  workers,	  reports	  the	  major	  findings	  for	  employment	  and	  each	  of	  the	  key	  flow	  variables	  in	  the	  QWI	  by	  age	  group.	  The	  ability	  to	  match	  worker	  characteristics	  to	  the	  firm	  at	  this	  level	  of	  detail	  is	  a	  feature	  that	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  QWI	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  explore	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  impact	  by	  worker	  age.	  Each	  cell	  reports	  the	  coefficient	  from	  a	  separate	  regression	  using	  a	  different	  outcome-­‐age	  group	  combination.	  All	  regressions	  use	  the	  main	  specification	  listed	  in	  equation	  (2).	  The	  first	  row	  of	  Table	  6	  uses	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  workers.	  The	  first	  three	  Columns	  of	  this	  row	  are	  therefore	   identical	  to	  the	  first	  three	  Columns	  of	  Table	  5.	  Breaking	  these	  results	  down	  by	  worker	   age	  grouping	  reveals	  interesting	  patterns.	  The	  heterogenous	  impact	  of	  the	  NBP	  on	   employment	  and	  periods	  of	  non-­‐employment	  following	  a	  separation	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




especially	   important.	  If	  firms	  are	  decreasing	  hiring	  rates	  then	  employment	  declines	  will	  be	  greatest	  for	  worker	  groups	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  turnover.	  For	  example,	  young	  workers	   are	  both	  hired	  and	  separate	  from	  firms	  at	  a	  faster	  clip	  than	  other	  workers.	  When	  firms	   stop	  or	  reduce	  their	  hiring,	  the	  flow	  of	  all	  new	  workers	  into	  the	  firm	  declines.	  However,	  the	  flow	  of	  worker	  flows	  out	  of	  the	  firm	  (separations)	  continues	  to	  be	  much	  higher	  for	  the	  young	  than	  the	  old.29	  Therefore,	  the	  employment	  drop	  will	  be	  greatest	   for	  young	  workers.	  This	  story	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  results	  found	  in	  Table	  6.	  Following	   the	  NBP,	  hiring	  drops	  in	  high	  energy	  industries	  for	  nearly	  all	  age	  groups	  but	  employment	  declines	  are	  largest	  for	  the	  youngest	  groups.	  Also	  consistent	  with	  this	  story	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  spike	  in	  separations	  for	  middle	  aged	  workers	  nor	   is	  there	  an	  increase	  in	  periods	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  those	  middle-­‐aged	  workers	  that	   do	  separate.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  middle-­‐aged	  workers	  are	  a	  group	  with	  significant	  industry	  and	  firm	  specific	  capital	  and	  past	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  non-­‐voluntary	  separations	  for	  this	  group	  are	  particularly	  large	  Jacobson	  et	  
al.	  (1993);	  Walker	  (2013).	  That	  middle	  aged	  workers	  experience	  no	  clear	  increase	  in	  separations	  or	  periods	  of	  non-­‐employment	  provides	  further	  evidence	  that	  firms’	  method	  of	   employment	  adjustment	  had	  minimal	  costs	  to	  incumbent	  workers.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	   7:	  	  Separation	   Rate	   by	   Age	   Group	  	  	  
	  
1998               2003               2008          2011 
Year 
 
























Event-­‐Time	  Models	  To	  understand	  how	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  policy	  evolved	  over	   time	   it	   is	  useful	   to	  perform	  an	  
event-­‐time	   study.	   In	   the	   context	  of	   the	  above	  models,	   an	  event-­‐time	   study	   tracks	  how	  the	  coefficient	  on	   the	  variable	  Eastg	  ×	  EnIntk	  	  changes	   throughout	   the	  study	  period.	   I	  use	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2003	  to	  be	  the	  start	  date	  and	  normalize	  the	  coefficient	  for	  this	  period	   to	   be	   zero.	  	  Specifically	   I	   estimate	   the	   following	  model:	  	  




leading	  up	  to	  the	  law’s	   implementation	  suggest	  that	  firms	  did	  not	  react	  to	  the	  law	  until	  it	  began	  in	  full.	  	   Figure	  8:	  Impact	  of	  NBP	  on	  Employment	  by	  Quarter	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   Figure	  9:	  Impact	  on	  Periods	  of	  Non-­‐employment	  for	  Separating	  Workers	  by	  Quarter	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 Note:	   This	  chart	  plots	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  from	  a	  version	  of	  equation	  3	  where	  the	  outcome	   variable	   is	   periods	   of	   non-­‐employment	   for	   separating	   workers.	   Specifically,	   it	  plots	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  event	  time	  indicator	  variables	  which	  demonstrate	  the	  impact	  of	   the	   policy	   on	   periods	   of	   non-­‐employment	   for	   separating	   workers	   evolved	  over	   time.	   The	   dashed	   lines	   represent	  the	   95%	   confidence	  	  intervals.	  The	   coefficients	  are	  always	   close	   to	  zero	  and	  are	  never	  statistically	  distinguishable	   from	  zero.	  










Discussion	  Taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  results	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  how	  labor	  markets	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries	  respond	  to	  energy	  sector	  regulation.	  The	  findings	  show	  that	  employment	  in	  industries	  in	  the	  top	  quartile	  declined	  4.4%	  compared	  to	  manufacturing	  employment	  in	   the	  bottom	  quartile.	  This	  employment	  decline	  provides	  evidence	  of	  a	  labor	  demand	  shock,	  but	  there	  are	  important,	  policy	  relevant	  measures	  that	  the	  employment	  decline	  does	  not	  capture.	  To	  gain	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  impact,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  how	  the	  declines,	  occurred,	  which	  workers	  were	  impacted	  and	  how	  wages	   changed	   in	   response	   to	   the	   policy.	  Separating	  workers,	  regardless	  of	  their	  age,	  did	  not	  experience	  increased	  periods	  of	   non-­‐employment	  following	  their	  regulation.	  While	  more	  research	  and	  better	  data	  is	   needed,	  this,	  together	  with	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  hiring	  rate	  suggests	  that	  firms	  may	  have	  reduced	  employment	  through	  voluntary	  separations,	  such	  as	  retirements	  and	  job-­‐to-­‐job	   transitions	  rather	  than	  involuntary	  transitions	  (layoffs).	  Given	  the	  presence	  of	  unions	   and	  labor	  adjustment	  costs,	  such	  as	  severance	  packages	  and	  increased	  unemployment	   insurance	  taxes,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  firms	  will	  choose	  to	  adjust	  to	  small	  demand	  shocks	  primarily	  through	  natural	  separations.30	  Distinguishing	  between	  layoffs	  and	  voluntary	  separations	  is	  important	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  workers	  who	  experience	  mass	  displacement	  events	  experience	  extended	  periods	  of	  unemployment,	   large	  earnings	  losses	  and	  increased	  mortality	  rates	  (Sullivan	  &	  von	  Wachter	  2009;	  Davis	  &	  von	  Wachter	  2011;	  Farber	  2011).	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




not	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  paper,	  these	  findings	  also	  provide	  a	  potential	  explanation	  for	  the	  aging	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  workforce	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Young	  workers	  leave	  firms	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  than	  old	  workers.	  Therefore,	   when	  a	  firm	  stops	  hiring,	  their	  employment	  of	  young	  workers	  will	  shrink	  faster	  than	   their	  employment	  of	  old	  workers.	  On	  the	  earnings	  side,	  we	  observe	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  earnings	  of	  new	  hires	  but	  no	  such	  drop	   in	  the	  overall	  average	  earnings.	  This,	  together	  with	  the	  worker	  flow	  findings,	  suggest	  that	  incumbent	  workers	  do	  not	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  regulation’s	  impact.	  The	  effects	  are	  felt	   by	  future	  workers	  who	  receive	  lower	  wages,	  and	  potential	  future	  workers,	  who	  are	  no	   longer	  hired	  due	  to	  the	  regulation.	  These	  effects	  are	  important	  to	  labor	  markets	  and	  the	  economy	  but	  are	  quite	  distinct	  from	  the	  traditional	  job	  loss	  story	  that	  portrays	  long-­‐time	   incumbent	  workers	   as	   the	  primary	   losers	   from	  environmental	   regulation.31	  	  	  
Plausibility	  Check:	   Electricity	  Results	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  employment	  loss	  figures,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  revisit	   the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  connect	  the	  NBP	  to	  declines	  in	  manufacturing	  employment.	  First,	  large	  manufacturing	  plants	  that	  were	  directly	  regulated	  by	  the	  program	  may	  have	  made	  employment	  adjustments	  on	  their	  intensive	  margin	  in	  response	  to	  the	  new	  costs	   imposed	  upon	  them.	  Second,	  energy	  intensive	  firms	  may	  have	  chosen	  to	  locate	  new	   large	  industrial	  plants	  in	  regions	  where	  they	  would	  not	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












Table	  7:	   Electricity	  Price	  Regressions	  	  
	   (1)	  ln(Elec	  Price)	   (2)	  ln(Elec	  Price)	   (3)	  ln(Elec	  Price)	  PostxEast	   0.0456	   0.0587∗   0.0350	  
	   (0.0321)	   (0.0322)	   (0.0319)	  PerCoalxCoalPrice	   0.0228∗∗∗  (0.0054)   0.0121	  (0.0122)	  	   0.0122	  (0.0121)	  	  PerOilxOilPrice	  	  PerNatGasxNatGasPrice	   0.0091∗∗∗  (0.0008)	  0.0663∗∗∗  (0.0126)	  
0.0088∗∗∗  (0.0010)	  0.0811∗∗∗  (0.0231)	  
0.0089∗∗∗  (0.0009)	  0.0819∗∗∗  (0.0229)	  
State	  FE	  Year	   FE	  E	  /	  W	  Trends	   Yes	   Yes	  Yes	   Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Observations	   539	   539	   539	  R-­‐Squared	   0.918	   0.924	   0.925	  Standard	  errors	   in	  parentheses	   	   	   	  




Using	  the	  electricity	  price	  estimates	  together	  with	  the	  employment	  loss	  calculated	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  allows	  us	  to	  estimate	  the	  implied	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity	  associated	  with	  the	  NBP	  and	  to	  compare	  it	  to	  recent	  studies	  which	  have	   sought	  to	  estimate	  this	  elasticity.32	  Deschenes	  (2010)	  estimates	  an	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity	  of	  -­‐0.10.	  Using	  only	  manufacturing	  employment,	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  (2013)	  find	  an	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity	  ranging	  between	  -­‐0.15	  for	   the	  computer	  products	  industry	  to	  -­‐1.17	  for	  the	  energy	  intensive	  primary	  metals	   industry.	  Using	  results	  from	  Columns	  2	  and	  3	  of	  Table	  7	  along	  with	  the	  primary	  employment	  findings	  in	  Column	  6	  of	  Table	  2,	  this	  paper	  suggest	  an	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity	  of	  between	  -­‐0.12	  and	  -­‐0.20	  for	  the	  computer	  products	  industry	  and	  between	  -­‐1.12	  and	  -­‐1.88	  for	  the	  primary	  metals	  industry.	  The	  implied	  elasticities	  associated	  with	  the	  NBP	  in	  this	  study	  fall	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Kahn	  and	  Mansur	  range.	  Although	   imprecisely	   estimated,	   the	   electricity	  price	   results	   together	  with	   a	  reasonable	   employment	   electricity	   price	   elasticity	   adds	   credence	   to	   the	  main	  employment	   findings.	  To	  be	  clear,	   this	  elasticity	  estimate	  is	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  plausibility	  check	  to	  the	  employment	   finding	   in	   the	  previous	   section	   and	   should	  not	  be	  interpreted	   as	   a	  stand-­‐alone,	  well	  identified	  employment	  electricity	  price	  elasticity.	  Again,	  the	  NBP	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  other	  impacts	  on	  employment	  in	  energy	  intensive	  manufacturing	   industries	  that	  did	  not	  occur	  through	  its’	  impact	  on	  electricity	  prices.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Most	  obviously,	  the	  NBP	  directly	  regulated	  the	  energy	  production	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  heat,	  steam	  and	   electricity)	  of	  140	  large	  manufacturing	  plants.	  Furthermore,	  energy	  intensive	  manufacturing	  firms	  may	  have	  responded	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  the	  NBP	  created	  in	  the	  markets	  rather	  than	  an	  actual	  increase	  in	  electricity	  prices	  themselves.	  Attributing	  the	  entire	  employment	  change	  to	  electricity	  prices	  will	  overstate	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  elasticity.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   a	  plausibility	   check,	   the	   estimates	   are	  reassuringly	   in	   line	  with	   previous	   estimates,	   lending	   confidence	   to	   the	   overall	  employment	   effects.	  	  




through	   voluntary	  separations,	  thus	  mitigating	  the	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  workers.	  The	  labor	  market	  impacts	  of	  the	  NBP	  accrue	  primarily	  to	  future	  workers	  who	  earn	  less	  and	  the	  potential	  future	  workers	  who	  would	  have	  been	  hired	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  regulation.	   	  Looking	  forward,	  future	  research	  should	  perform	  ex-­‐post	  evaluations	  of	  energy	  sector	   regulation’s	  impact	  on	  electricity	  prices.	  While	  a	  number	  of	  papers	  have	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  energy	  prices	  on	  employment	  (Davis	  &	  Haltiwanger	  2001;	  Deschenes	  2010;	  Kahn	  &	  Mansur	  2013),	  there	  have	  been	  surprisingly	  few	  ex-­‐post	  studies	  of	  regulation’s	   impact	  on	  energy	  prices.	  More	  precise	  estimates	  of	  these	  impacts	  will	  permit	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  at	  play.	  Furthermore,	  data	  distinguishing	  between	  voluntary	  and	  involuntary	  separations	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  types	  of	  worker	  flows	  that	  occur	  following	  regulation.	  





Chapter	  II:	  EVALUATING	  WORKPLACE	  MANDATES	  WITH	  FLOWS	  VERSUS	  STOCKS:	  
AN	  APPLICATION	  TO	  CALIFORNIA	  PAID	  FAMILY	  LEAVE	  	   	  	  
Introduction	  
	  	  Economic	  analysis	  of	  employer	  mandates,	  be	  they	  workplace	  safety,	  health	  coverage	  requirements,	  family	  leave	  policies,	  or	  the	  like,	  depends	  crucially	  on	  measurement	  of	  changes	  in	  workplace	  wages	  and	  employment.	  The	  costs	  of	  mandates	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  borne	  by	  both	  employers	  and	  employees,	  with	  the	  division	  of	  costs	  a	  function	  of	  the	  relative	  labor	  demand	  and	  supply	  elasticities	  and	  workers’	  valuation	  of	  the	  mandated	  benefits.	  A	  special	  case	  is	  one	  in	  which	  a	  workforce	  values	  the	  benefits	  dollar-­‐for-­‐dollar	  and	  the	  full	  costs	  are	  shifted	  to	  individual	  workers	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  lower	  wages)	  according	  to	  their	  benefit	  valuation.	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  there	  is	  no	  distortion	  in	  employment,	  given	  that	  relative	  labor	  costs	  are	  unchanged,	  and	  thus	  no	  deadweight	  welfare	  loss	  (Summers	  1989,	  Gruber	  1994).	  	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  economic	  analyses	  of	  workplace	  mandates	  typically	  focus	  on	  measuring	  how	  wages	  and	  employment	  have	  been	  impacted.	  Because	  mandates	  often	  impact	  some	  groups	  of	  workers	  more	  than	  others,	  are	  implemented	  in	  some	  settings	  (e.g.,	  states,	  countries)	  but	  not	  others,	  and	  are	  adopted	  at	  different	  times,	  evaluation	  studies	  most	  often	  use	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	  (DD)	  or	  triple-­‐difference	  (DDD)	  estimators	  to	  identify	  the	  treatment	  effects	  of	  such	  policies	  (e.g.,	  Ruhm	  1998;	  Baum	  2003).	  




paid	  family	  leave	  program	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  and	  statistical	  methods	  used	  in	  our	  analysis	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  used	  in	  prior	  studies	  examining	  workplace	  mandates,	  with	  one	  notable	  difference.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  changes	  in	  wages	  and	  employment	  among	  the	  stock	  of	  incumbent	  employees,	  we	  examine	  wage	  offers	  among	  new	  hires	  and	  employment	  flows,	  the	  latter	  including	  the	  number	  of	  new	  hires,	  permanent	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves	  with	  return	  to	  work.	  Specifically,	  we	  examine	  changes	  in	  these	  outcomes	  following	  enactment	  of	  PFL	  among	  young	  women	  in	  California	  relative	  to	  young	  men	  and	  older	  women	  within	  the	  state,	  and	  relative	  to	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country.	  Data	  from	  the	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicators	  (QWI)	  (Abowd	  et	  al.	  2009)	  are	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  earnings	  and	  employment	  of	  “stable”	  new	  hires,	  and	  provide	  information	  on	  separations	  and	  extended	  leaves,	  all	  by	  quarter,	  county,	  age,	  and	  sex.33	  	  
Why	  the	  focus	  on	  new	  hires	  and	  other	  labor	  market	  flows?	  A	  limitation	  of	  existing	  studies	  is	  that	  wage	  and	  employment	  effects	  resulting	  from	  workplace	  mandates	  develop	  gradually	  over	  time.	  We	  should	  not	  expect	  employers	  to	  instantly	  move	  to	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  employment	  level	  and/or	  rapidly	  change	  the	  demographic	  composition	  of	  their	  workforce	  following	  a	  mandate,	  although	  such	  adjustments	  might	  occur	  quickly	  in	  establishments	  with	  unusually	  high	  turnover.	  Following	  a	  mandate	  employers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  implement	  wage	  changes	  among	  their	  incumbent	  workers,	  adjustments	  that	  should	  vary	  according	  to	  how	  particular	  workplace	  groups	  value	  a	  mandated	  benefit.	  While	  we	  expect	  a	  




small	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  employees	  (the	  intensive	  margin),	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  quickly	  observe	  treatment	  effects	  among	  new	  hires	  (the	  extensive	  margin)	  and	  other	  employment	  flows.	  As	  described	  subsequently,	  we	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  small	  wage	  decrease	  for	  the	  treated	  group	  (young	  women)	  relative	  to	  untreated	  group,	  while	  relative	  employment	  for	  young	  women	  can	  decrease,	  remain	  constant,	  or	  increase,	  depending	  on	  the	  valuation	  of	  benefits	  and	  degree	  of	  cost	  shifting.	  To	  understand	  how	  universal	  paid	  leave	  is	  affecting	  worker	  and	  firm	  behavior,	  we	  need	  to	  examine	  not	  just	  hiring	  and	  earnings,	  but	  also	  changes	  in	  separations,	  extended	  leaves,	  and	  the	  demographic	  composition	  of	  employment.	  	  
Although	  our	  focus	  is	  on	  paid	  family	  leave,	  the	  implications	  are	  much	  broader,	  applying	  to	  any	  event,	  behavior,	  or	  policy	  that	  shifts	  labor	  market	  demand	  or	  supply.	  Even	  were	  a	  workplace	  mandate	  to	  have	  a	  substantial	  impact,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  the	  impact	  by	  measuring	  changes	  in	  employment	  levels	  and	  average	  wages,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  heavily	  weighted	  by	  incumbents.	  A	  focus	  on	  new	  hire	  earnings	  and	  composition,	  along	  with	  employment	  flows,	  should	  allow	  researchers	  to	  detect	  the	  effects	  of	  workplace	  policies	  shortly	  following	  their	  implementation.34	  
Overview	  of	  California	  paid	  family	  leave	  policy	  (CPFL)	  	  
	  
Overview/coverage.	  California’s	  Paid	  Family	  Leave	  (CPFL)	  policy	  was	  enacted	  August	  30,	  2002	  and	  took	  effect	  July	  1,	  2004.	  Prior	  to	  the	  2004	  implementation	  of	  CPFL,	  women	  had	  access	  to	  paid	  disability	  leave	  during	  pregnancy	  and	  shortly	  after	  birth.	  To	  understand	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  California’s	  paid	  family	  leave	  program,	  one	  must	  recognize	  how	  it	  interacts	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  programs	  and	  how	  multiple	  policies	  are	  used	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  




leave	  that	  is	  job	  protected	  and	  paid.	  As	  described	  below,	  the	  most	  typical	  effect	  of	  CPFL	  has	  been	  to	  extend	  paid	  leave	  among	  mothers	  by	  six	  weeks.	  




Table	  8:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  on	  California	  Paid	  State	  Disability	  Insurance	  (SDI)	  and	  Paid	  Family	  Leave	  (PFL)	  
SDI/PFL	  claims	  and	  benefits	   FY	  2005	   FY	  2006	   FY	  2007	   FY	  2008	   FY	  2009	   FY	  2010	   FY	  2011	  
Total	  SDI	  pregnancy	  claims	  paid	   172,623	   175,194	   183,013	   189,139	   181,685	   169,957	   168,593	  
SDI	  claims	  transitioning	  to	  PFL	  
bonding	  claims	   	   	   108,818	   115,392	   119,442	   111,024	   127,529	  
Estimated	  PFL/SDI	  share	   	   	   0.655	   0.631	   0.636	   0.614	   0.655	  
Average	  weekly	  benefit,	  SDI	  
pregnancy	  claims	   	   	   $354	   $368	   $382	   $397	   $398	  
Average	  weeks,	  SDI	  pregnancy	  
claims	   	   	  
11.97	   10.43	   10.43	   10.50	   10.70	  
Average	  weekly	  benefit,	  PFL	  claims	  	   $409	   $432	   $441	   $457	   $472	   $488	   $488	  
Average	  weeks	  per	  PFL	  claim	   4.84	   5.32	   5.37	   5.35	   5.39	   5.37	   5.30	  
Total	  PFL	  claims	  filed	   150,514	   160,988	   174,838	   192,494	   197,638	   190,743	   204,893	  
Total	  PFL	  claims	  paid	   139,593	   153,446	   165,967	   182,834	   187,889	   180,675	   194,777	  
Total	  PFL	  benefits	  paid*	   $300.42	   $349.33	   $387.88	   $439.49	   $472.11	   $468.79	   $498.44	  
%	  of	  PFL	  claims	  filed	  for	  bonding	   87.7%	   87.8%	   87.6%	   87.6%	   88.8%	   87.8%	   87.3%	  
number	  of	  bonding	  claims	  filed	  by	  
women	   109,566	   112,631	   119,893	   129,986	   132,958	   123,632	   128,774	  
%	  of	  bonding	  claims	  filed	  by	  women	   83.0%	   79.7%	   78.3%	   77.1%	   75.8%	   73.8%	   72.0%	  
CY	  SDI/PFL	  tax,	  contribution,	  
benefit	  rules	   CY	  2000	   CY	  2001	   CY	  2002	   CY	  2003	   CY	  2004	   CY	  2005	   CY	  2006	  
Contribution	  rate	   0.65%	   0.70%	   0.90%	   0.90%	   1.18%	   1.08%	   0.80%	  
Taxable	  wage	  ceiling	   $46,327	   $46,327	   $46,327	   $56,916	   $68,829	   $79,418	   $79,418	  
Maximum	  worker	  contribution	   $324	   $324	   $417	   $512	   $812	   $858	   $635	  
Maximum	  weekly	  benefits	   $490	   $490	   $490	   $603	   $728	   $840	   $840	  
	   CY	  2007	   CY	  2008	   CY	  2009	   CY	  2010	   CY	  2011	   	   	  
Contribution	  rate	   0.60%	   0.80%	   1.10%	   1.10%	   1.20%	   	   	  
Taxable	  wage	  ceiling	   $83,389	   $86,698	   $90,669	   $93,316	   $93,316	   	   	  
Maximum	  worker	  contribution	   $500	   $693	   $997	   $1,026	   $1,120	   	   	  
Maximum	  weekly	  benefits	   $882	   $917	   $959	   $987	   $987	  
	   	  
*	  dollar	  amounts	  are	  in	  millions	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  






Payroll	  tax	  financing.	  The	  SDI/CPFL	  employee	  tax	  rate	  and	  cap	  on	  total	  contributions	  have	  varied	  substantially	  across	  years	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  funds	  to	  pay	  current	  benefits.	  As	  seen	  in	  Table	  8,	  the	  payroll	  tax	  rate	  varied	  from	  0.6%	  to	  1.2%	  between	  2003	  and	  2011,	  while	  the	  cap	  on	  payments	  varied	  from	  a	  low	  of	  $500	  in	  2007	  to	  $1,120	  in	  2011.35	  In	  2011,	  the	  1.2%	  employee	  SDI/CPFL	  contribution	  rate	  combined	  with	  a	  taxable	  wage	  ceiling	  of	  $93,316	  to	  produce	  a	  maximum	  annual	  contribution	  of	  $1,120.	  The	  taxable	  wage	  base	  is	  adjusted,	  typically	  annually,	  to	  reflect	  state	  wage	  growth.	  
SDI	  wage	  base	  and	  benefit	  calculation.	  SDI,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  new	  CPFL	  program,	  provides	  partial	  wage	  replacement,	  with	  benefits	  equal	  to	  55%	  of	  workers’	  wages	  up	  to	  a	  cap.	  Workers	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  work	  due	  to	  a	  non-­‐work-­‐related	  illness	  or	  injury	  (including	  pregnancy)	  may	  be	  eligible	  for	  SDI	  benefits.	  The	  SDI	  benefit	  period	  is	  four	  weeks	  before	  the	  due	  date	  and	  six	  weeks	  postpartum	  for	  normal	  pregnancies,	  but	  up	  to	  eight	  weeks	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Caesarian	  births	  or	  other	  difficulties	  (the	  latter	  requiring	  doctor	  certification).	  The	  benefit	  amount	  is	  calculated	  using	  a	  wage	  base	  equal	  to	  the	  highest	  paid	  quarter	  during	  the	  12	  month	  reference	  period	  5	  to	  17	  months	  before	  the	  SDI	  disability	  claim	  (eligibility	  requires	  at	  least	  $300	  in	  earnings	  during	  the	  12	  month	  reference	  period).	  Average	  SDI	  pregnancy	  claim	  benefits	  in	  FY	  2011	  were	  $398	  per	  week	  and	  the	  average	  length	  of	  benefits	  was	  10.7	  weeks.	  The	  2011	  benefit	  floor	  was	  $50	  and	  ceiling	  $987	  per	  week.	  CPFL	  uses	  the	  same	  benefit	  calculation	  as	  does	  SDI.	  
CPFL	  description.	  CPFL	  was	  created	  for	  mothers	  (or	  fathers)	  to	  bond	  with	  their	  newborns,	  although	  it	  also	  provides	  benefits	  to	  workers	  to	  care	  for	  a	  seriously	  ill	  child,	  




spouse,	  domestic	  partner,	  or	  for	  a	  newly	  adopted	  child	  or	  recently	  placed	  foster	  child.36	  Although	  California	  was	  the	  first	  state	  to	  provide	  paid	  family	  leave,	  two	  others	  have	  followed	  with	  similarly	  structured	  programs.37	  CPFL	  funds	  are	  administered	  under	  the	  SDI	  umbrella,	  with	  employees	  covered	  by	  SDI	  being	  eligible	  for	  CPFL	  insurance.	  Following	  receipt	  of	  six	  to	  eight	  post-­‐partum	  weeks	  under	  SDI,	  a	  new	  mother	  is	  eligible	  for	  up	  to	  six	  additional	  weeks	  of	  paid	  family	  leave	  using	  the	  same	  benefit	  formula	  described	  above	  for	  SDI.	  In	  FY	  2011,	  the	  average	  CPFL	  payout	  was	  $488	  a	  week	  for	  5.3	  weeks.	  Approximately	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  women	  receiving	  SDI	  pregnancy	  benefits	  transition	  to	  CPFL	  benefits.	  
Job	  protection	  vs.	  paid	  leave.	  Although	  providing	  partial	  pay	  replacement,	  neither	  SDI	  nor	  CPFL	  provides	  job	  protection.	  Job	  protection	  is	  provided	  by	  state	  and	  federal	  laws	  guaranteeing	  unpaid	  leave.38	  A	  combination	  of	  SDI,	  CPFL,	  other	  state	  programs,	  and	  the	  federal	  FMLA	  provides	  workers	  with	  a	  “package”	  of	  protected	  leave	  with	  partial	  wage	  replacement.	  And	  of	  course	  some	  employers	  provide	  paid	  maternity	  leave	  independent	  of	  




any	  legal	  requirements.39	  The	  most	  generous	  mandated	  package	  includes	  up	  to	  28	  weeks	  of	  job	  protection	  (up	  to	  16	  weeks	  of	  pregnancy	  disability	  covered	  by	  the	  state	  PDL	  concurrent	  with	  FMLA,	  plus	  12	  weeks	  protection	  from	  the	  CFRA	  postpartum)	  and	  16-­‐18	  weeks	  of	  partial	  wage	  replacement	  (4	  weeks	  pregnancy	  and	  6-­‐8	  weeks	  post-­‐partum	  under	  SDI,	  plus	  6	  weeks	  from	  CPFL).40	  	  
The	  transition	  rate	  from	  SDI	  pregnancy	  benefits	  to	  CPFL	  claims	  is	  well	  below	  100%,	  being	  65.5%	  in	  FY	  2011.	  This	  can	  occur	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Some	  women	  may	  prefer	  or	  feel	  a	  financial	  need	  to	  return	  to	  work	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  full	  rather	  than	  partial	  pay.	  One	  might	  expect	  this	  to	  be	  disproportionately	  from	  women	  in	  low	  income	  households	  who	  cannot	  easily	  bear	  the	  reduced	  income,	  highly	  paid	  workers	  whose	  CPFL	  benefits	  are	  well	  below	  55%	  of	  their	  usual	  pay	  due	  to	  the	  benefits	  cap,	  and	  workers	  for	  whom	  promotion	  and	  earnings	  growth	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  a	  timely	  return	  to	  work.	  In	  addition,	  workers	  in	  small	  companies	  (fewer	  than	  fifty	  employees)	  do	  not	  receive	  job	  protection	  through	  the	  FMLA	  and	  thus	  may	  risk	  losing	  their	  job	  with	  a	  lengthy	  maternity	  leave.	  Even	  absent	  risk	  of	  job	  loss,	  a	  new	  mother	  may	  choose	  to	  return	  to	  her	  job	  at	  a	  small	  company	  if	  her	  employer	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  her	  contribution.	  Not	  only	  do	  some	  mothers	  choose	  not	  to	  transition	  from	  SDI	  pregnancy	  benefits	  to	  CPFL,	  a	  substantial	  number	  take-­‐up	  CPFL	  without	  having	  taken	  SDI	  benefits.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  household	  financial	  constraints	  or	  reflect	  company-­‐provided	  time	  off	  during	  pregnancy	  and/or	  postpartum.	  	  
In	  short,	  the	  principal	  effect	  of	  California’s	  2004	  Paid	  Family	  Leave	  program	  was	  to	  




extend	  paid	  maternity	  leave	  by	  six	  weeks.	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  substantive	  expansion	  of	  benefits,	  the	  policy	  did	  not	  involve	  a	  shift	  from	  no	  mandated	  paid	  leave	  to	  its	  current	  level.	  Given	  the	  incremental	  nature	  of	  the	  program,	  identifying	  CPFL’s	  impact	  using	  standard	  methods	  and	  data	  is	  likely	  to	  prove	  difficult.	  Shifting	  the	  focus	  from	  the	  policy	  impact	  on	  total	  wage	  and	  employment	  levels	  to	  its	  impact	  on	  new	  hire	  wages	  and	  employment	  flows	  should	  enhance	  chances	  of	  an	  informative	  analysis.	  	  
Previous	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  California	  paid	  family	  leave	  and	  the	  labor	  market	  
	  We	  are	  aware	  of	  five	  studies	  (one	  published)	  that	  use	  household	  data	  to	  analyze	  various	  effects	  of	  CPFL	  on	  labor	  market	  outcomes.	  Espinola-­‐Arrendondo	  and	  Mondal	  (2010)	  examine	  CPFL	  employment	  effects	  using	  the	  March	  2001-­‐2007	  CPS.	  They	  compare	  female	  employment	  changes	  in	  California	  following	  CPFL	  relative	  to	  changes	  for	  women	  in	  other	  states	  with	  and	  without	  expanded	  FMLA	  provisions.	  Using	  numerous	  combinations	  of	  treatment	  and	  comparison	  groups,	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	  all	  their	  treatment	  estimates	  are	  “both	  economically	  and	  statistically	  insignificant.”	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  CPFL	  are	  close	  to	  zero.	  But	  another	  is	  that	  CPFL	  effects	  are	  likely	  to	  first	  show	  up	  in	  data	  on	  new	  hires	  and	  not	  incumbent	  employees.	  Because	  of	  the	  relatively	  small	  sample	  sizes	  of	  treated	  employees	  in	  the	  March	  CPS	  and	  the	  time	  required	  for	  wage	  and	  employment	  effects	  to	  be	  reflected	  across	  the	  labor	  force,	  one	  must	  identify	  labor	  market	  outcomes	  based	  on	  data	  many	  years	  beyond	  implementation	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  




cannot	  be	  precisely	  measured),	  they	  provide	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  CPFL	  increased	  time	  off	  from	  work	  among	  mothers	  of	  young	  children.	  Although	  not	  the	  principal	  focus	  of	  their	  paper,	  the	  authors	  also	  provide	  estimates	  of	  earnings	  and	  employment	  effects	  of	  CPFL.	  They	  conclude	  that	  there	  were	  no	  changes	  in	  employment	  following	  CPFL,	  but	  that	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  work	  hours	  (hours	  last	  week	  and	  in	  the	  prior	  year),	  conditional	  on	  employment.	  The	  authors	  note	  that	  future	  study	  is	  needed.	  
Byker	  (2013)	  examines	  the	  effects	  of	  California’s	  and	  New	  Jersey’s	  paid	  family	  leave	  policies	  on	  women’s	  labor	  force	  interruptions	  following	  birth	  of	  a	  child	  using	  monthly	  longitudinal	  data	  from	  the	  Survey	  of	  Income	  and	  Program	  Participation	  (SIPP).	  Data	  from	  the	  two	  treatment	  states	  are	  used	  jointly,	  New	  York,	  Florida,	  and	  Texas	  form	  the	  comparison	  group	  states.	  She	  finds	  little	  effect	  from	  paid	  family	  leave	  on	  job	  attachment	  among	  college-­‐educated	  mothers,	  those	  who	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  access	  to	  employer-­‐provided	  paid	  leave	  absent	  a	  legal	  mandate.	  For	  mothers	  with	  less	  than	  a	  college	  degree,	  she	  concludes	  that	  paid	  leave	  reduces	  exits	  lasting	  less	  than	  six	  months,	  while	  having	  little	  effect	  on	  exits	  longer	  than	  six	  months.41	  	  
Baum	  and	  Ruhm	  (2013)	  use	  the	  National	  Longitudinal	  Survey	  of	  Youth	  (NLSY-­‐97)	  to	  examine	  CPFL	  effects	  on	  use	  of	  leave	  surrounding	  child	  birth	  and	  subsequent	  labor	  market	  outcomes.	  They	  conclude	  that	  an	  average	  mother’s	  use	  of	  leave	  increased	  by	  about	  2.4	  weeks,	  typically	  at	  about	  the	  time	  that	  disability	  benefits	  were	  exhausted.	  Fathers	  took	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  off	  immediately	  following	  birth.	  Baum	  and	  Ruhm	  find	  increased	  work	  




probabilities	  for	  mothers	  nine	  to	  twelve	  months	  after	  birth	  and	  increased	  weeks	  and	  hours	  worked	  (and	  possibly	  wage	  increases)	  in	  the	  child’s	  second	  year	  of	  life.	  	  
Das	  and	  Polachek	  (2014)	  use	  CPS	  data	  aggregated	  to	  the	  state	  level	  and	  use	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  techniques	  to	  identify	  CPFL	  effects	  on	  labor	  force	  participation	  (LFP)	  and	  unemployment	  among	  young	  women	  in	  California.	  They	  conclude	  that	  CPFL	  increases	  LFP	  among	  young	  women,	  but	  also	  increased	  their	  unemployment	  and	  unemployment	  duration.	  Similar	  tests	  based	  on	  placebo	  laws	  were	  generally	  insignificant,	  strengthening	  the	  authors’	  confidence	  that	  their	  results	  are	  robust	  and	  causal.	  	  
Although	  the	  focus	  and	  approaches	  by	  these	  authors	  are	  quite	  different,	  Baum	  and	  Ruhm	  (2013),	  Das	  and	  Polachek	  (2014),	  and	  (to	  a	  lesser	  extent)	  Byker	  (2013)	  each	  conclude	  that	  CPFL	  increases	  the	  labor	  force	  attachment	  of	  young	  women.	  Their	  results	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  broadly	  consistent	  with	  evidence	  we	  will	  subsequently	  present	  on	  job	  flows,	  finding	  that	  although	  CPFL	  is	  associated	  with	  higher	  separations	  from	  their	  employers	  among	  young	  women	  (i.e.,	  moving	  off	  a	  company’s	  payroll),	  CPFL	  also	  leads	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  new	  hiring	  of	  young	  women	  and	  higher	  rates	  of	  recall	  (return	  to	  the	  same	  employer	  following	  time	  off	  quarterly	  payrolls).	  One	  interpretation	  of	  such	  evidence	  is	  that	  universal	  paid	  family	  leave	  increases	  the	  mobility	  of	  young	  women	  (i.e.,	  reduced	  job	  lock)	  and	  led	  to	  efficiency-­‐enhancing	  resorting	  in	  the	  labor	  market.	  
The	  expected	  effects	  of	  the	  CPFL	  mandate	  on	  wages,	  employment,	  and	  turnover	  




lower	  average	  costs	  per	  hour	  and	  zero	  marginal	  cost.	  The	  payroll	  tax	  costs	  from	  CPFL	  are	  independent	  of	  whether	  a	  worker	  is	  likely	  to	  use	  and/or	  values	  paid	  family	  leave.	  Because	  the	  payroll	  tax	  is	  levied	  at	  nearly	  all	  California	  establishments,	  labor	  supply	  is	  highly	  inelastic	  (particularly	  so	  for	  men),	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  readily	  shifted	  to	  employers	  (and/or	  consumers)	  in	  those	  product	  markets	  where	  output	  prices	  are	  determined	  nationally	  or	  internationally.	  
Apart	  from	  the	  payroll	  costs	  paid	  by	  workers,	  employers	  face	  “disruption	  costs”	  resulting	  from	  time	  off	  the	  job	  among	  employees	  taking	  family	  leave	  and	  increased	  uncertainty.	  Time	  off	  among	  experienced	  employees	  reduces	  output	  and/or	  requires	  added	  employment	  by	  others.	  Employers	  face	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  whether	  and	  when	  a	  worker	  on	  family	  leave	  will	  return.	  Such	  uncertainty	  existed	  prior	  to	  CPFL;	  up	  to	  six	  weeks	  of	  added	  leave	  could	  make	  return	  to	  either	  more	  or	  less	  likely.	  The	  costs	  to	  employers	  from	  workers’	  time	  off	  will	  vary	  across	  workplaces.	  Such	  costs	  will	  disproportionately	  occur	  among	  young	  female	  employees,	  while	  being	  more	  limited	  with	  older	  female	  and	  young	  male	  employees.	  Older	  men	  may	  be	  least	  likely	  to	  use	  family	  leave,	  and	  arguably	  provide	  a	  less	  attractive	  control	  group	  than	  do	  groups	  similar	  to	  young	  women	  in	  age	  (young	  men),	  sex	  (older	  women),	  or	  both	  (young	  women	  in	  states	  without	  PFL).42	  
The	  expected	  general	  equilibrium	  wage	  and	  employment	  effects	  resulting	  from	  CPFL	  can	  be	  evaluated	  using	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  “tax	  incidence”	  approach	  (Summers	  1989).	  Effectively,	  any	  costs	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  placing	  a	  “tax	  wedge”	  between	  labor	  demand	  




(and	  the	  gross	  wage	  to	  which	  employers	  respond)	  and	  labor	  supply	  (and	  the	  net	  wage	  to	  which	  workers	  respond).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  labor	  supply	  is	  more	  inelastic	  than	  labor	  demand,	  most	  costs	  are	  shifted	  to	  employees.	  The	  statutory	  payroll	  cost	  facing	  employees	  shifts	  labor	  supply	  upward	  for	  all	  workers.	  The	  valuation	  of	  such	  benefits	  by	  young	  women	  (or	  others)	  shifts	  their	  labor	  supply	  outward.	  “Disruption”	  costs	  facing	  employers	  cause	  a	  downward	  shift	  in	  demand	  for	  young	  women.	  Such	  shifts	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  separately	  for	  young	  women	  (or	  of	  the	  treated	  group)	  and	  for	  other	  (non-­‐treated)	  workers.43	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  CPFL	  mandate	  are	  not	  independent	  of	  how	  financing	  is	  structured.	  Imagine	  a	  mandate	  to	  employers	  dictating	  that	  they	  directly	  provide	  and	  fund	  paid	  leave	  for	  their	  employees,	  rather	  than	  having	  it	  paid	  through	  a	  state	  agency	  funded	  by	  a	  mandatory	  payroll	  tax.	  Alternatively,	  paid	  family	  leave	  might	  have	  been	  funded	  by	  a	  state	  payroll	  tax	  that	  was	  fully	  experience	  rated.	  In	  these	  two	  alternative	  scenarios,	  the	  cost	  to	  a	  business	  would	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  frequency	  of	  use.	  All	  else	  the	  same,	  employers	  would	  prefer	  to	  hire	  workers	  least	  likely	  to	  use	  paid	  leave,	  producing	  employment	  and	  wage	  differentials	  due	  to	  demand	  shifts	  for	  worker	  groups	  with	  different	  expected	  use	  of	  leave.	  CPFL,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  a	  financing	  cost	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  
use	  at	  the	  firm	  level,	  given	  that	  payroll	  taxes	  are	  not	  experience	  rated,	  unlike,	  say,	  unemployment	  insurance	  or	  employer-­‐based	  private	  health	  insurance	  plans,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  at	  least	  partially	  experience	  rated.	  Ignoring	  scheduling	  and	  productivity	  costs	  that	  might	  accompany	  longer	  leaves,	  employers	  would	  then	  have	  no	  economic	  incentive	  to	  select	  employees	  who	  are	  less	  or	  more	  likely	  to	  collect	  paid	  leave	  from	  the	  state	  fund.	  	  




The	  funding	  of	  CPFL	  affects	  employers’	  choice	  of	  employee	  mix	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  produces	  changes	  in	  relative	  market	  wages.	  Labor	  supply	  shifts	  inward	  for	  all	  workers	  due	  to	  the	  payroll	  tax	  costs,	  while	  shifting	  outward	  for	  workers	  based	  on	  their	  valuation	  of	  CPFL	  benefits.	  The	  resulting	  shift	  in	  aggregate	  labor	  supply	  is	  indeterminate.	  If	  there	  existed	  a	  unified	  labor	  market	  in	  which	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  were	  perfect	  substitutes,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  wage	  difference	  between	  equally	  productive	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers.	  No	  shifting	  of	  payroll	  costs	  to	  young	  women	  relative	  to	  other	  workers	  would	  be	  possible.	  What	  should	  produce	  a	  relative	  wage	  decrease	  for	  young	  women	  is	  the	  downward	  shift	  in	  labor	  demand	  due	  to	  disruption	  costs	  associated	  with	  family	  leave.	  	  	  
This	  special	  case	  in	  which	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  are	  perfect	  substitutes	  in	  a	  unified	  labor	  markets,	  with	  PFL	  payroll	  taxes	  independent	  of	  firms’	  use	  of	  leave,	  helps	  inform	  expectations	  about	  real-­‐world	  labor	  markets	  where	  young	  women	  compete	  with	  other	  workers	  in	  many,	  but	  far	  from	  all,	  markets.	  In	  the	  unified	  market	  case,	  wage	  rates	  are	  determined	  jointly	  for	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers,	  with	  wages	  and	  employment	  determined	  via	  the	  shift	  in	  aggregate	  labor	  supply.	  This	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease,	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  outward	  labor	  supply	  shift	  from	  valuation	  of	  family	  leave	  is	  greater	  or	  less	  than	  the	  inward	  shift	  due	  to	  payroll	  taxes.	  The	  market	  wage	  for	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease,	  but	  there	  should	  be	  no	  change	  in	  




increasing	  equilibrium	  employment.	  With	  a	  downward	  demand	  shift	  due	  to	  disruption	  costs,	  however,	  we	  should	  see	  a	  relative	  decrease	  in	  wages	  for	  young	  women,	  while	  employment	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease	  depending	  on	  the	  relative	  sizes	  of	  the	  shifts.	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  Wage-­‐Employment	  Effects	  of	  CPFL	  in	  California	  with	  Separate	  Markets	  for	  Young	  Women	  and	  Other	  Workers	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wages	  among	  young	  women.	  Employment	  can	  increase	  or	  decrease	  from	  the	  pre-­‐mandate	  level,	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  supply	  increase	  and	  demand	  decrease.	  In	  short,	  in	  the	  differentiated	  market	  case,	  wages	  for	  young	  women	  should	  unambiguously	  decrease	  relative	  to	  other	  workers,	  while	  relative	  employment	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  examining	  wages	  and	  employment,	  based	  primarily	  on	  evidence	  on	  new	  hire	  flows	  and	  new	  hire	  earnings,	  we	  examine	  evidence	  on	  separations	  and	  extended	  leaves	  (referred	  to	  as	  “recalls”	  in	  our	  data	  set).	  Such	  evidence	  is	  valuable	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  provides	  a	  broader	  picture	  of	  how	  paid	  leave	  affects	  labor	  market	  outcomes.	  Second,	  it	  can	  strengthen	  (or	  weaken)	  confidence	  in	  our	  empirical	  evidence	  since	  labor	  market	  flows	  are	  not	  independent	  of	  each	  other.	  For	  example,	  if	  paid	  family	  leave	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  separations,	  hiring	  is	  affected	  since	  separations	  and	  hiring	  tend	  to	  move	  roughly	  together	  over	  time.	  The	  extension	  of	  temporary	  leave	  among	  young	  women	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  hiring	  of	  young	  women	  to	  fill	  these	  slots.	  Longer-­‐term	  separations	  would	  further	  increase	  hiring.	  The	  effect	  of	  CPFL	  on	  long-­‐run	  permanent	  separations	  is	  ambiguous.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  longer	  leave	  may	  prevent	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  quits.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  universal	  paid	  family	  leave	  reduces	  job	  lock	  and	  increase	  job	  mobility	  among	  young	  women.	  	  




wages	  that	  decrease	  according	  to	  workers’	  use	  and	  valuation	  of	  benefits.	  While	  individual	  workers	  know	  whether	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  use	  family	  leave	  (or	  whether	  they	  value	  the	  option	  to	  do	  so),	  employers	  have	  less	  complete	  information.	  Firms	  that	  introduce	  paid	  family	  leave	  will	  face	  adverse	  selection	  and	  attract	  “high-­‐leave”	  (high-­‐cost)	  workers.	  Knowing	  this,	  employers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  offer	  such	  benefits.	  Alternatively,	  the	  market	  evolves	  into	  one	  where	  there	  exist	  high-­‐leave/low	  wage	  firms	  with	  paid	  leave	  and	  low-­‐leave/high	  wage	  firms	  without	  leave.	  	  
Starting	  from	  an	  equilibrium	  in	  which	  job	  matches	  and	  equilibrium	  wages	  were	  determined	  based	  in	  part	  on	  company	  leave	  policies,	  the	  introduction	  of	  mandated	  universal	  paid	  leave	  unambiguously	  adds	  churn	  to	  the	  labor	  market	  in	  the	  years	  following	  its	  introduction.	  With	  universal	  leave,	  the	  wages	  of	  firms	  that	  provided	  paid	  leave	  prior	  to	  the	  mandate	  are	  now	  too	  low,	  while	  wages	  at	  firms	  that	  had	  not	  provided	  leave	  are	  too	  high.	  Worker	  turnover	  should	  increase	  as	  workers	  sort	  on	  wages	  and	  attributes	  other	  than	  paid	  leave	  (sorting	  still	  exists	  for	  paid	  leave	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  mandate).	  We	  should	  then	  see	  higher	  levels	  of	  separations	  and	  new	  hires	  among	  workers	  who	  value	  paid	  family	  leave.	  Following	  the	  post-­‐CPFL	  resorting,	  we	  suspect	  that	  long-­‐run	  turnover	  rates	  for	  young	  women	  will	  remain	  higher	  than	  rates	  prior	  to	  the	  mandate.	  Because	  of	  labor	  market	  search	  frictions	  (i.e.,	  search	  is	  costly	  and	  the	  number	  of	  employers	  providing	  a	  good	  match	  is	  not	  typically	  large),	  many	  workers	  faced	  job	  lock	  prior	  to	  CPFL.	  With	  paid	  family	  leave	  now	  universal,	  search	  frictions	  are	  lower	  and	  equilibrium	  levels	  of	  turnover	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  higher.	  	  
How	  large	  an	  effect	  might	  CPFL	  have	  on	  wages?	  A	  back-­‐of-­‐the-­‐envelope	  exercise	  




higher	  pre-­‐tax	  and	  lower	  post-­‐tax	  wages	  among	  all	  workers	  if	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  are	  perfect	  substitutes.	  To	  assess	  the	  plausibility	  of	  relative	  wage	  change	  estimates	  in	  our	  empirical	  analysis,	  we	  ask	  the	  question:	  What	  effect	  might	  we	  expect	  California’s	  paid	  family	  leave	  program	  to	  have	  on	  wages	  if	  the	  full	  costs	  are	  borne	  by	  young	  women?	  A	  back-­‐of-­‐the-­‐envelope	  calculation	  is	  informative.	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  full	  shifting,	  such	  a	  calculation	  provides	  an	  upper-­‐bound	  on	  the	  expected	  wage	  changes	  seen	  from	  CPFL.	  	  




To	  what	  extent	  would	  nominal	  wages	  need	  to	  decrease	  for	  young	  women	  and	  increase	  for	  other	  workers	  to	  fully	  shift	  the	  payroll	  tax	  burden?	  Letting	  C	  be	  the	  total	  payroll	  tax	  cost	  for	  a	  workforce,	  Y	  the	  total	  taxable	  earnings	  for	  that	  workforce,	  t	  the	  administrative	  payroll	  tax	  rate	  used	  for	  CPFL,	  and	  Pf	  and	  (1-­‐Pf)	  the	  shares	  of	  taxable	  payroll	  for	  young	  women	  and	  others	  (the	  treated	  and	  non-­‐treated),	  respectively,	  the	  total	  payroll	  cost	  across	  a	  workforce	  would	  be:	  
C	  =	  tY	  =	  Pf	  (tY)	  +	  (1-­‐Pf)(tY).	  We	  wish	  to	  solve	  for	  the	  percentage	  reduction	  in	  relative	  earnings	  required	  to	  load	  all	  costs	  C	  onto	  young	  women.	  We	  designate	  this	  “tax”	  rate	  as	  tf,	  which	  collapses	  to	  the	  simple	  relationship:	  
tf	  =	  t/Pf	  ,	  where,	  as	  above,	  t	  =	  is	  the	  statutory	  tax	  rate	  and	  Pf	  the	  share	  of	  taxable	  earnings	  among	  young	  women.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  set	  t	  at	  0.2%	  (.002)	  and	  assume	  that	  young	  women	  account	  for	  20%	  of	  total	  taxable	  payroll	  (i.e.,	  Pf	  =	  0.2),	  the	  effective	  tax	  rate	  tf	  for	  young	  women	  is	  1.0%.	  This	  1.0%	  is	  made	  up	  of	  two	  parts,	  the	  0.2%	  payroll	  tax	  plus	  a	  0.8%	  reduction	  in	  wages.	  The	  effective	  tax	  rate	  for	  other	  workers	  is	  zero,	  implying	  that	  their	  wage	  increases	  by	  (up	  to)	  0.2%	  to	  fully	  offset	  the	  payroll	  tax.44	  With	  full	  shifting,	  the	  relative	  wage	  differential	  between	  young	  women	  and	  others	  in	  the	  (California)	  labor	  market	  would	  be	  equal	  to	  tf	  or	  1.0%	  (young	  women’s	  wages	  fall	  0.8%	  and	  others’	  wages	  rise	  0.2%).	  Were	  one	  comparing	  	  young	  women	  in	  California	  relative	  to	  young	  women	  (or	  




others)	  outside	  of	  California,	  the	  differential	  would	  be	  0.8%	  rather	  than	  1.0%	  since	  the	  comparison	  group	  is	  not	  levied	  the	  payroll	  tax.	  	  
Using	  CPS	  data	  for	  California	  in	  the	  two	  years	  prior	  to	  CPFL,	  we	  calculate	  the	  share	  of	  taxable	  payroll	  among	  young	  women.	  We	  obtain	  an	  estimate	  of	  21.5%.	  For	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  total	  1%	  SDI	  payroll	  tax	  that	  covers	  PFL	  costs,	  we	  use	  the	  value	  0.111	  based	  on	  the	  2012	  value	  of	  11.1%.	  Thus,	  the	  implied	  relative	  wage	  effect	  from	  full	  shifting	  would	  be	  t/Pf	  	  =	  0.111/0.215	  =	  0.52%,	  or	  half	  of	  one	  percent.45	  Such	  a	  “back-­‐of-­‐the-­‐envelope”	  estimate	  is	  imprecise,	  but	  does	  provide	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  wage	  effects	  that	  might	  result	  from	  CPFL.	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  relative	  wage	  effects	  resulting	  from	  the	  direct	  costs	  of	  CPFL	  (the	  payroll	  tax)	  should	  be	  small	  –	  less	  than	  1%	  even	  with	  full	  shifting.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  young	  women	  and	  other	  workers	  compete	  in	  the	  same	  labor	  markets	  and/or	  that	  the	  young	  women/other	  worker	  comparisons	  do	  not	  align	  with	  those	  who	  value	  and	  do	  not	  value	  paid	  leave	  benefits,	  then	  the	  full	  shifting	  assumption	  provides	  an	  upper	  bound.	  Working	  in	  the	  opposite	  direct	  is	  that	  there	  may	  be	  substantive	  disruption	  costs	  to	  firms	  associated	  with	  added	  leave	  taking	  resulting	  from	  PFL.46	  	  
Causal	  wage	  effects	  on	  the	  order	  of	  1%	  or	  less	  are	  difficult	  to	  reliably	  observe	  with	  standard	  data	  sets,	  in	  particular	  if	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  wage	  levels	  (rather	  than	  new	  hire	  wages)	  and	  using	  data	  sets	  based	  on	  relatively	  small	  samples,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with,	  say,	  CPS	  analyses	  of	  CPFL.	  Even	  with	  our	  data	  set,	  which	  provides	  administrative	  earnings	  records	  




for	  new	  hires	  by	  gender,	  age	  group,	  county,	  and	  quarter,	  obtaining	  reliable	  estimates	  of	  very	  small	  causal	  wage	  effects	  is	  likely	  to	  prove	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Data	  description:	  The	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicators	  
	  The	  earnings	  and	  employment	  flow	  variables	  central	  to	  our	  analysis	  are	  obtained	  from	  the	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicators	  (QWI)	  database.	  The	  QWI	  is	  publicly	  available	  data	  derived	  from	  the	  Local	  Employment	  Dynamics	  (LED)	  data	  program,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  built	  on	  the	  confidential	  Longitudinal	  Employer-­‐Household	  Dynamics	  (LEHD)	  program.	  The	  LEHD	  is	  based	  on	  state	  unemployment	  insurance	  data	  and	  contains	  individual	  level	  quarterly	  earnings	  data	  that	  matches	  workers	  to	  firms.	  Crucially	  for	  our	  analysis,	  the	  LEHD	  identifies	  when	  a	  worker	  begins	  at	  a	  new	  firm	  as	  well	  as	  their	  earnings.	  The	  data	  rely	  on	  state	  participation	  and	  while	  all	  states	  have	  now	  signed	  on	  to	  participate,	  eight	  have	  not	  shared	  data	  prior	  to	  2000	  (our	  analysis	  begins	  in	  2002).47	  The	  QWI	  provides	  employment	  and	  earnings	  measures	  at	  the	  state,	  metropolitan	  statistical	  area	  (MSA),	  and	  county	  levels.	  Based	  on	  individual	  level	  LEHD	  data,	  these	  measures	  are	  aggregated	  into	  narrowly-­‐defined	  demographic	  categories	  including	  age,	  sex,	  ethnicity,	  race	  and	  education	  within	  the	  geographic	  area.	  The	  data	  cover	  98%	  of	  all	  private,	  non-­‐agriculture	  employment	  in	  the	  states	  for	  which	  data	  are	  available.48	  	  
In	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows,	  we	  utilize	  measures	  of	  the	  average	  number	  of	  new	  hires,	  average	  monthly	  earnings	  for	  new	  hires,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves	  (called	  recalls	  in	  




the	  QWI),	  within	  tightly	  defined	  sex-­‐age	  groupings.49	  We	  examine	  these	  outcomes	  both	  in	  levels	  and	  in	  shares	  for	  young	  women.	  	  
All	  data	  are	  observed	  quarterly.	  In	  results	  shown,	  we	  use	  data	  for	  2002:3	  through	  2004:2	  as	  the	  pre-­‐CPFL	  period	  and	  2004:3	  through	  2006:2	  as	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  period.	  Thus	  we	  have	  the	  same	  number	  and	  composition	  of	  quarters	  before	  and	  after	  implementation	  of	  the	  law	  in	  July	  2004.	  Examination	  of	  the	  data	  suggested	  no	  apparent	  effect	  of	  the	  policy	  between	  its	  passage	  and	  eventual	  implementation	  in	  July	  2004.50	  We	  were	  reluctant	  to	  reach	  back	  to	  earlier	  years	  because	  the	  “tech	  bubble”	  had	  substantial	  effects	  through	  2001,	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  earnings	  and	  employment	  of	  young	  men	  in	  California,	  with	  relatively	  smaller	  effects	  on	  young	  women	  and	  those	  outside	  California.51	  	  
The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  is	  at	  the	  demographic-­‐region-­‐quarter	  level	  where	  demographic	  groups	  are	  defined	  by	  sex-­‐age	  group	  categories	  and	  “region”	  is	  at	  the	  state	  or	  county	  level.	  These	  data	  allow	  us	  to	  measure	  average	  monthly	  earnings	  of	  new	  employees	  for	  the	  first	  full	  quarter	  in	  which	  they	  are	  employed.	  We	  are	  able	  to	  distinguish	  all	  new	  hires	  from	  all	  new	  “stable”	  hires,	  where	  stable	  hires	  are	  defined	  as	  employees	  who	  have	  worked	  at	  least	  a	  full	  quarter	  at	  the	  firm	  where	  they	  were	  hired,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  presence	  on	  that	  firm’s	  UI	  records	  for	  three	  consecutive	  quarters.52	  Our	  analysis	  includes	  employment	  and	  




earnings	  data	  only	  for	  stable	  hires.	  Among	  other	  things,	  the	  focus	  on	  stable	  hires	  largely	  avoids	  including	  hires	  of	  temporary	  replacement	  workers	  at	  non-­‐representative	  wages.	  	  
The	  narrowly	  defined	  demographic	  and	  geographic	  groupings	  over	  time	  in	  the	  QWI	  are	  ideally	  suited	  to	  help	  identify	  treatment	  effects	  from	  California’s	  paid	  family	  leave	  policy.	  If	  CPFL	  affects	  employment	  and	  earnings,	  then	  we	  expect	  this	  to	  be	  most	  evident	  in	  relative	  new	  hire	  employment	  and	  new	  hire	  earnings	  among	  young	  women	  in	  California.	  The	  QWI	  panel	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  changes	  that	  occurred	  following	  CPFL	  among	  young	  female	  treatment	  groups	  in	  California,	  as	  compared	  to	  changes	  for	  other	  demographic	  groups	  within	  California,	  as	  well	  as	  compared	  to	  young	  women	  and	  other	  demographic	  groups	  outside	  California.	  




Table	  9:	  Descriptive	  Evidence	  on	  QWI	  New	  Hire	  Earnings,	  Employment,	  Separations,	  and	  Recalls,	  Pre-­‐	  and	  Post-­‐CPFL	  
Panel A   new hire earnings (monthly)     new hires   
 
Pre Post log diff Pre (1000's) Post (1000's) log diff 
California             
young women $2,103  $2,159  0.0175 1,845 2,031 0.0662 
young men $2,635  $2,718  0.0238 2,049 2,194 0.031 
older women $2,662  $2,797  0.0452 1,471 1,566 0.0486 
older men $4,167  $4,382  0.0472 1,744 1,849 0.0413 
all workers $2,878  $2,988  0.0307 7,111 7,641 0.0435 
"All" states except CA  
     young women $1,822  $1,850  0.0102 12,615 14,191 0.0622 
young men $2,452  $2,505  0.0146 13,105 14,766 0.0558 
older women $2,342  $2,411  0.0263 10,097 11,458 0.0672 
older men $3,981  $4,086  0.0247 11,019 12,566 0.0695 
all workers $2,618  $2,684  0.0218 46,837 52,983 0.0623 
 
  separations     recalls   
 
Pre (1000's) Post (1000's) log diff Pre (1000's) Post (1000's) log diff 
California             
young women 1,932 2,097 0.0519 226 222 -0.0434 
young men 2,156 2,230 -0.0046 275 260 -0.0951 
older women 1,855 1,912 0.015 340 318 -0.0738 
older men 2,314 2,342 -0.0051 451 439 -0.0495 
all workers 8,259 8,584 0.0096 1,293 1,244 -0.0631 
"All" states except CA  
     young women 13,912 15,139 0.0247 2,027 1,942 -0.0751 
young men 14,476 15,547 0.0054 2,419 2,295 -0.0955 
older women 13,689 14,521 0.0007 3,105 2,967 -0.0674 
older men 15,622 16,303 -0.0136 3,849 3,686 -0.0703 
all workers 57,700 61,512 -0.0005 11,401 10,891 -0.0734 
Panel B Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
California   relative new hire earnings     new hire share   
young women 0.7308 0.7224 -0.0084 0.2596 0.2658 0.0062 
young men 0.9154 0.9096 -0.0058 0.2883 0.2872 -0.0011 
older women 0.9249 0.9361 0.0112 0.2069 0.205 -0.0019 
older men 1.4476 1.4663 0.0187 0.2453 0.242 -0.0033 
"All" states except CA  
     young women 0.6961 0.6893 -0.0068 0.2693 0.2678 -0.0015 
young men 0.9366 0.9333 -0.0033 0.2798 0.2787 -0.0011 
older women 0.8943 0.8983 0.0039 0.2156 0.2163 0.0007 
older men 1.5202 1.522 0.0018 0.2353 0.2372 0.0019 
California   separations share     recall share   
young women 0.234 0.2444 0.0104 0.1749 0.1795 0.0046 
young men 0.2611 0.2599 -0.0012 0.2129 0.21 -0.0029 
older women 0.2247 0.2228 -0.0018 0.2631 0.2566 -0.0065 
older men 0.2802 0.2729 -0.0073 0.3491 0.3539 0.0049 
"All" states except CA  
     young women 0.2411 0.2461 0.005 0.1778 0.1784 0.0005 
young men 0.2509 0.2527 0.0019 0.2122 0.2107 -0.0014 
older women 0.2372 0.2361 -0.0012 0.2724 0.2724 0.0001 
older men 0.2708 0.2651 -0.0057      0.3376   0.3385   0.0008 
In addition to excluding California, the "All" states group does not include Arkansas, Arizona, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Mississippi.  
Young women and men are ages 19-34 and older women and men are ages 35-65. All ratios and shares include values for all workers in the 
denominator and values for the identified group (e.g., young women) in the numerator. Log differences are calculated using the mean of the 





 In	  order	  to	  provide	  some	  feel	  for	  the	  QWI	  data,	  Table	  9	  shows	  average	  new	  hire	  monthly	  earnings,	  and	  the	  average	  monthly	  number	  of	  stable	  new	  hires,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves	  (recalls),	  each	  for	  young	  (ages	  19-­‐34)	  women	  in	  California	  and	  in	  all	  states,	  other	  than	  California	  and	  the	  five	  states	  without	  complete	  QWI	  data	  during	  these	  years	  (Arkansas,	  Arizona,	  Massachusetts,	  New	  Hampshire,	  and	  Mississippi).	  For	  each	  of	  these	  four	  outcomes	  we	  also	  provide	  relative	  (or	  share)	  measure	  for	  young	  women.	  Specifically,	  we	  show	  the	  ratio	  of	  young	  women’s	  new	  hire	  earnings	  to	  average	  earnings	  for	  all	  new	  hires,	  the	  share	  of	  all	  new	  hires,	  all	  separations,	  and	  all	  extended	  leaves	  who	  are	  young	  women.	  These	  latter	  four	  measures	  are	  shown	  for	  both	  the	  periods	  before	  and	  following	  implementation	  of	  California’s	  paid	  family	  leave.	  	  
Focusing	  first	  on	  the	  change	  in	  log	  earnings	  among	  new	  hires,	  we	  see	  that	  both	  in	  California	  and	  other	  states,	  new	  hire	  earnings	  among	  young	  women	  grew	  somewhat	  more	  slowly	  than	  for	  other	  groups.	  For	  example,	  in	  California,	  the	  change	  in	  real	  earnings	  was	  1.8	  percent,	  similar	  to	  that	  for	  young	  men	  (2.4	  percent)	  but	  less	  than	  the	  4.5	  among	  older	  women	  and	  4.7	  percent	  among	  older	  men.53	  New	  stable	  hires	  among	  young	  women	  in	  California	  increased	  by	  nearly	  7	  percent	  between	  the	  two	  periods,	  as	  compared	  to	  3	  percent	  for	  young	  men	  and	  4-­‐5	  percent	  for	  older	  women	  and	  men.	  Also	  noteworthy	  is	  that	  new	  hire	  earnings	  in	  California	  grew	  over	  time	  at	  a	  considerably	  faster	  rate	  than	  outside	  the	  state	  for	  all	  demographic	  groups	  (overall	  rates	  being	  3.1	  versus	  2.2	  percent).	  Our	  statistical	  analysis	  will	  compare	  changes	  in	  young	  women’s	  outcomes	  in	  California	  




following	  CPFL,	  compared	  to	  those	  for	  young	  men	  and	  older	  women	  in	  California,	  and	  compared	  to	  young	  women	  outside	  California.	  We	  then	  compare	  the	  changes	  in	  outcomes	  of	  young	  women	  relative	  to	  other	  demographic	  groups	  in	  California	  to	  these	  same	  relative	  outcome	  changes	  seen	  in	  other	  states.	  The	  results	  of	  our	  subsequent	  analysis,	  which	  indicate	  little	  relative	  change	  in	  earnings,	  but	  with	  increased	  hiring,	  separations,	  and	  recalls	  for	  young	  women	  due	  to	  CPFL,	  can	  be	  gleaned	  to	  at	  least	  a	  limited	  degree	  from	  the	  information	  in	  Table	  9.	  	  
Method	  of	  analysis	  
	  As	  evident	  in	  the	  summary	  statistics	  shown	  in	  Table	  9,	  there	  are	  three	  major	  sources	  of	  variation	  that	  can	  be	  exploited	  to	  identify	  the	  impact	  of	  CPFL	  on	  young	  women	  in	  California	  –	  time,	  demographic	  group,	  and	  location.	  We	  begin	  by	  setting	  up	  a	  simple	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	  (DD)	  model	  that	  uses	  demographic	  variation	  within	  California	  over	  time	  to	  identify	  the	  impact	  on	  new	  hires,	  new	  hire	  earnings,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves.	  Then	  we	  progress	  to	  a	  model	  that	  includes	  data	  from	  other	  states,	  thus	  utilizing	  geographic	  variation	  in	  demographic	  differences	  over	  time	  to	  identify	  estimated	  treatment	  effects	  on	  young	  women	  in	  California.54	  
Consider	  first	  the	  following	  simple	  econometric	  specifications,	  which	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  impacts	  of	  the	  CPFL	  within	  California.	  
ln(𝑌!"#) =   𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!   x      𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔_𝐹𝑒𝑚! + 𝛿! + 𝛾!+  𝛼! + 𝜖!"#   	   	   (1)	  In	  these	  specifications	  only	  data	  from	  California	  is	  used.	  In	  equation	  (1)	  the	  unit	  of	  




observation	  is	  at	  the	  demographic-­‐quarter-­‐county	  level	  with	  ln  (𝑌!"#)	  representing	  one	  of	  the	  four	  log	  outcome	  measures	  –	  average	  monthly	  new	  hire	  earnings,	  total	  new	  hires,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves,	  each	  measured	  for	  a	  given	  demographic	  group	  (d),	  in	  a	  given	  quarter	  (q),	  and	  in	  a	  given	  county	  (c).	  The	  coefficient	  of	  interest	  is	  𝛽! ,	  which	  measures	  the	  impact	  (i.e.	  treatment)	  on	  young-­‐female	  new	  hires	  or	  earnings	  following	  implementation	  of	  CPFL.	  The	  variable	  Post	  is	  an	  indicator	  variable	  equal	  to	  one	  for	  all	  observations	  in	  or	  after	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2004,	  after	  CPFL	  went	  into	  effect.55	  The	  variable	  Young_Fem	  is	  an	  indicator	  variable	  equal	  to	  one	  for	  the	  19-­‐21,	  22-­‐24	  and	  25-­‐34	  categories.56	  𝛿! 	  and	  𝛾! 	  represent	  full	  sets	  of	  demographic	  group	  and	  quarter	  indicator	  variables	  to	  account	  for	  time	  invariant	  differences	  between	  demographic	  groups	  and	  common	  shocks	  that	  hit	  all	  demographic	  groups	  in	  a	  given	  quarter,	  plus	  county	  fixed	  effects.	  From	  this	  specification,	  we	  can	  extract	  estimates	  for	  CPFL	  treatment	  effects	  on	  young	  women	  relative	  to	  both	  young	  men	  and	  older	  women	  in	  California.	  	  
Equation	  2	  presents	  a	  DD	  model	  that	  expands	  the	  data	  to	  include	  other	  states,	  but	  restricts	  the	  comparison	  group	  and	  sample	  to	  observations	  for	  young	  women.	  Including	  other	  states	  (or	  counties	  from	  other	  states)	  allows	  us	  to	  directly	  compare	  changes	  to	  hiring	  and	  wage	  offers	  for	  young	  women	  in	  California	  with	  young	  women	  in	  other	  states	  not	  impacted	  by	  CPFL.	  	  
ln(𝑌!") =   𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!   x  𝐶𝐴 + 𝛾! + 𝛼! + 𝜖!"   	   	   	   (2)	  




In	  equation	  (2),	  𝛽!   	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  log	  differences	  in	  new	  hires	  and	  new	  hire	  earnings	  for	  young	  women	  in	  California	  following	  CPFL,	  as	  compared	  to	  outcomes	  for	  young	  women	  in	  other	  states,	  conditioned	  on	  fixed	  effects	  for	  quarter	  q	  and	  location.	  Equation	  (2)	  can	  be	  estimated	  using	  either	  state	  or	  county	  as	  units	  of	  observation,	  the	  latter	  providing	  a	  comparison	  of	  California	  counties	  with	  counties	  in	  other	  states.	  We	  show	  only	  results	  using	  counties	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  Use	  of	  state	  observations	  provides	  highly	  similar	  results.	  
Finally,	  we	  extract	  estimated	  treatment	  effects	  from	  a	  more	  general	  triple-­‐diff	  model	  that	  includes	  all	  counties	  across	  California,	  all	  states	  and	  all	  demographic	  groups,	  but	  now	  identifies	  𝛽!   off	  the	  comparison	  of	  time	  changes	  in	  new	  hires	  and	  earnings	  (among	  other	  outcomes)	  for	  young	  women	  relative	  to	  other	  demographic	  groups	  in	  California	  counties	  compared	  to	  these	  same	  relative	  changes	  over	  time	  for	  young	  women	  in	  counties	  in	  other	  states.	  It	  takes	  the	  form	  	  
ln(𝑌!"#) =   𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!   x  𝐶𝐴  x    𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒! + 𝛿!" + 𝛾!" + 𝛼!" + 𝜖!"# ,	  (3)	  where	  the	  variables	  𝛿!" ,	  𝛾!" 	  and	  𝛼!!" 	  represent	  full	  sets	  of	  county-­‐demographic,	  state-­‐quarter,	  and	  demographic	  group-­‐quarter	  indicator	  variables	  to	  control	  for	  time	  invariant	  differences	  between	  county-­‐demographic	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  shocks	  to	  demographic	  groups	  and	  states	  that	  occur	  in	  a	  given	  quarter.57	  	  
The	  inclusion	  of	  these	  large	  sets	  of	  indicator	  variables	  effectively	  controls	  for	  many	  of	  the	  worker	  differences	  that	  vary	  across	  demographic	  groups,	  counties,	  and	  years.	  Consider	  




education,	  a	  crucial	  determinant	  of	  new	  hire	  earnings.	  If	  young	  women	  in	  California	  have	  different	  levels	  of	  education	  than	  other	  demographic-­‐	  county	  combinations	  these	  differences	  will	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  𝛿!" 	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  time	  invariant	  over	  this	  period.	  Furthermore,	  if	  county	  education	  levels	  or	  demographic	  group	  education	  levels	  are	  changing	  over	  time	  these	  changes	  will	  be	  picked	  up	  by  𝛾!" 	  and	  𝛼!" 	  respectively.	  	  County	  rather	  than	  state	  level	  results	  naturally	  provide	  greater	  variation	  to	  the	  outcome	  variables	  of	  interest	  than	  will	  the	  state	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  provide	  more	  precise	  estimates.	  There	  are	  two	  minor	  disadvantages.	  First,	  the	  county	  models	  become	  large	  given	  the	  substantial	  number	  of	  interaction	  variables	  required	  in	  fixed	  effects	  models.	  Second,	  county	  data	  are	  somewhat	  noisier	  than	  are	  state	  data.	  Indeed,	  the	  QWI	  does	  not	  report	  data	  for	  very	  small	  data	  cells	  in	  order	  to	  insure	  confidentiality	  (this	  involves	  a	  tiny	  proportion	  of	  total	  county-­‐by-­‐demographic	  observations).	  That	  said,	  the	  noise	  is	  on	  the	  left-­‐hand	  side	  and	  thus	  unlikely	  to	  bias	  estimates.	  All	  of	  our	  analyses	  of	  new	  hires	  and	  new	  hire	  earnings	  weight	  observations	  by	  the	  number	  of	  new	  hires	  for	  which	  the	  observed	  employment	  or	  earnings	  is	  measured.	  This	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  blowing	  up	  the	  sample	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  full	  population	  of	  new	  hires	  and	  gives	  relatively	  low	  weights	  to	  observations	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  noisiest.	  Separation,	  recall,	  and	  employment	  regressions	  weight	  by	  total	  (rather	  than	  new	  hire)	  employment.	  
Estimates	  of	  CPFL	  treatment	  effects	  on	  new	  hire	  earnings	  and	  employment	  
	  
Double	  difference	  estimates	  using	  within	  and	  across	  California	  analyses	  








Table	  10:	  CPFL	  Effects	  on	  Earnings	  and	  Flows	  of	  Young	  Women:	  Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff	  	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   ln(NH	  Earn)	   ln(New	  Hires)	   ln(Seps)	   ln(Recalls)	  Panel	  A:	  County	  level	  California	  Older	  Women	  Comparison	  Post	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.0204***	   0.0141	  	   0.0380***	   0.0386***	  	   (0.0060)	   (0.0125)	   (0.0103)	   (0.0112)	  Observations	   5,422	  	   5,455	  	   5,462	  	   5,365	  	  R2	   0.9830	  	   0.9980	  	   0.9970	  	   0.9790	  	  
Panel	  B:	  County	  level	  California	  Younger	  Men	  Comparison	  Post	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.0128**	   0.0240*	   0.0439***	   0.0414***	  	   (0.0050)	   (0.0142)	   (0.0130)	   (0.0146)	  Observations	   5,413	  	   5,444	  	   5,447	  	   5,314	  	  R2	   0.9900	  	   0.9980	  	   0.9980	  	   0.9840	  	  
Panel	  C:	  County	  level	  California	  All	  Dem	  Comparison	  Post	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.0173***	   0.0186*	   0.0468***	   0.0276**	  	   (0.0041)	   (0.0105)	   (0.0090)	   (0.0109)	  Observations	   10,841	  	   10,916	  	   10,939	  	   10,713	  	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared	   0.9860	  	   0.9970	  	   0.9960	  	   0.9790	  	  
Panel	  D:	  County	  level	  Other	  State	  Young	  Women	  Comparison	  Post	  x	  Calif	   0.0130***	   0.0053	  	   0.0281***	   0.0313***	  	   (0.0036)	   (0.0090)	   (0.0081)	   (0.0121)	  Observations	   133,480	  	   135,988	  	   138,939	  	   119,523	  	  R2	   0.9700	  	   0.9960	  	   0.9960	  	   0.9580	  	  
Note:	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  SE’s	  are	  
clustered	  at	  the	  County-­‐Dem	  level	  in	  Panels	  A,B	  and	  C	  and	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  county	  
level	  in	  Panel	  D.	  County,	  Dem	  and	  Quarter	  FE’s	  are	  included	  in	  Panels	  A,B	  and	  C	  and	  
County	  and	  Quarter	  FE’s	  are	  used	  in	  Panel	  D.	  
	  	  




given	  full	  shifting.58	  Estimates	  on	  worker	  flows	  (hires,	  separations	  and	  extended	  leaves)	  find	  positive	  and	  significant	  point	  estimates.	  Examining	  these	  flows	  together	  is	  important.	  Taken	  in	  isolation,	  an	  increase	  in	  young	  female	  new	  hires	  of	  between	  1.4%	  and	  2.4%	  is	  surprising,	  until	  one	  observes	  that	  separations	  also	  increase	  substantially	  (at	  the	  aggregate	  level,	  hiring	  and	  separations	  tend	  to	  move	  together).	  Particularly	  interesting	  is	  the	  estimate	  of	  a	  4	  percent	  increase	  in	  extended	  leaves	  (i.e.,	  QWI	  recalls).	  In	  short,	  the	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  paid	  family	  leave	  led	  to	  more	  separations	  (i.e.,	  workers	  not	  on	  the	  payroll	  for	  at	  least	  three	  months)	  among	  young	  women.	  But	  we	  also	  see	  a	  relatively	  high	  rate	  of	  recall,	  i.e.,	  individuals	  observed	  on	  a	  firm’s	  payroll	  in	  a	  given	  quarter	  t	  who	  had	  not	  been	  there	  in	  quarter	  t-­‐1,	  but	  who	  had	  been	  on	  that	  same	  firm’s	  payroll	  in	  quarters	  t-­‐2,	  t-­‐3,	  or	  t-­‐4.	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  paid	  family	  leave	  leads	  to	  more	  separations	  and	  extended	  leaves	  for	  young	  women	  with	  children,	  but	  that	  there	  is	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  composition	  of	  the	  workforce	  because	  many	  of	  these	  women	  return	  to	  the	  same	  employer	  (i.e.,	  recalls)	  and	  there	  are	  increased	  levels	  of	  new	  hires,	  some	  of	  whom	  may	  have	  taken	  leave	  and	  permanently	  separated	  from	  other	  employers.	  	  
These	  results	  are	  informative	  but	  cannot	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  young	  women	  as	  a	  whole,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  in	  California,	  may	  be	  experiencing	  changes	  in	  these	  measures	  relative	  to	  other	  demographic	  groups	  for	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  CPFL.	  The	  across-­‐state	  double	  difference	  specifications	  found	  in	  Panel	  D	  of	  Table	  10	  compare	  young	  women	  in	  California	  to	  young	  women	  in	  other	  states	  to	  account	  for	  this	  possibility.	  While	  controlling	  for	  changes	  that	  are	  occurring	  to	  young	  women	  across	  the	  country,	  this	  




specification	  has	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  not	  controlling	  for	  economic	  conditions	  in	  California	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.59	  Using	  young	  women	  in	  other	  states	  as	  the	  control	  group	  yields	  similar	  results	  for	  hires,	  separations	  and	  recalls	  but	  indicates	  an	  increase	  of	  about	  1	  percent	  in	  new	  hire	  earnings	  attributable	  to	  the	  CPFL.	  We	  do	  not	  lend	  strong	  credence	  to	  these	  results	  as	  they	  are	  likely	  picking	  up	  overall	  improvements	  and	  rapid	  growth	  in	  California’s	  economy	  that	  were	  not	  experienced	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  However,	  they	  are	  worth	  reporting	  as	  they	  further	  bolster	  the	  need	  for	  a	  triple	  difference	  specification	  that	  controls	  for	  changes	  occurring	  both	  within	  and	  across	  states.	  
Triple	  difference	  analysis	  across	  states	  and	  demographic	  groups	  
Rather	  than	  examine	  CPFL	  wage	  and	  employment	  effects	  based	  on	  either	  comparisons	  within	  California	  or	  comparisons	  of	  young	  women	  across	  states,	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  our	  preferred	  analysis	  in	  which	  the	  experience	  of	  young	  women	  in	  California	  is	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  other	  young	  women	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  each	  being	  relative	  to	  other	  demographic	  groups	  within	  their	  respective	  states.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  move	  toward	  the	  triple-­‐difference	  evaluation	  method	  shown	  in	  equation	  3.	  	  
Before	  turning	  to	  our	  primary	  results,	  we	  first	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  CPFL	  on	  the	  traditional	  dependent	  variables,	  overall	  employment	  and	  average	  earnings	  levels	  (i.e.,	  the	  stocks	  versus	  flows	  comparison	  referred	  to	  in	  our	  title).	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  CPFL-­‐induced	  labor	  market	  changes	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  picked	  up	  using	  levels	  of	  employment	  and	  earnings,	  which	  are	  driven	  mainly	  by	  incumbent	  workers	  and	  adjust	  slowly	  over	  time.	  Panels	  A	  and	  B	  of	  Table	  11	  present	  the	  results	  of	  the	  triple-­‐difference	  specification	  in	  




equation	  3	  using	  employment	  levels	  and	  average	  worker	  earnings	  as	  the	  dependent	  variables.	  Results	  are	  reported	  for	  both	  stable	  employment	  (workers	  who	  have	  been	  at	  the	  firm	  for	  at	  least	  three	  months),	  all	  employment	  (total	  number	  of	  workers	  with	  earnings	  in	  the	  quarter)	  and	  each	  group’s	  average	  monthly	  earnings.	  Not	  surprising,	  the	  earnings	  level	  coefficients	  on	  the	  triple	  difference	  variable	  produce	  point	  estimates	  close	  to	  zero.	  For	  employment,	  the	  point	  estimates	  are	  positive,	  but	  the	  standard	  errors	  are	  large	  enough	  to	  limit	  any	  confidence	  we	  might	  have	  in	  these	  results.	  That	  said,	  estimates	  of	  positive	  employment	  level	  effects	  of	  about	  1	  percent	  reinforce	  our	  confidence	  in	  the	  conclusion	  that	  CPFL	  did	  not	  reduce	  overall	  employment	  among	  young	  women.	  	  
Table	  11:	  CPFL	  and	  Employment	  and	  Earnings	  Levels	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   ln(Emp	  Stable)	   ln(Emp	  All)	   ln(Earn	  Stable)	   ln(Earn	  All)	  Panel	  A:	  All	  State,	  Dem	  Comparison	  with	  Cnty,	  Dem	  and	  Qtr	  FE's	  Post	  x	  Calif	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   0.0144	   0.0139	   0.00074	   0.0022	  	   (0.0108)	   (0.0108)	   (0.0043)	   (0.0041)	  Observations	   588,319	   588,320	   588,319	   588,316	  R2	   0.994	   0.994	   0.965	   0.962	  
Panel	  B:	  All	  State,	  Dem	  Comparison	  with	  Cnty-­‐Dem,	  Dem-­‐Qtr	  and	  State-­‐Qtr	  FE's	  Post	  x	  Calif	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   0.0131	   0.0123	   0.00287	   0.00454	  	   (0.0108)	   (0.0108)	   (0.0044)	   (0.0042)	  Observations	   588,319	   588,320	   588,319	   588,316	  R2	   0.999	   0.999	   0.988	   0.986	  
Note:	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  and	  are	  clustered	  
at	  the	  County-­‐Dem	  level.	  Panel	  A	  contains	  separate	  county,	  demographic	  and	  quarter	  FE’s.	  
Panel	  B,	  the	  largest	  model	  we	  are	  able	  to	  run	  contains	  the	  County-­‐Demographic,	  
Demographic-­‐Quarter	  and	  State-­‐Quarter	  two-­‐way	  FE’s.	  We	  estimate	  the	  model	  on	  stable	  
employment,	  defined	  as	  workers	  who	  have	  worked	  at	  the	  firm	  for	  at	  least	  3	  months	  and	  on	  all	  	  
(i.e.	  point-­‐in-­‐time)	  employment.	  	  
	  	  








Table	  12:	  CPFL	  Effects	  on	  Earnings	  and	  Flows	  of	  Young	  Women:	  Triple	  Diff	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   ln(NH	  Earn)	   ln(New	  Hires)	   ln(Seps)	   ln(Recalls)	  Panel	  A:	  All	  State,	  Dem	  Comparison	  with	  Cnty,	  Dem	  and	  Qtr	  FE's	  Post	  x	  Calif	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.00332	   0.0332***	   0.0268***	   0.0301**	  	   (0.0042)	   (0.0107)	   (0.0094)	   (0.0144)	  Observations	   533,393	   546,577	   552,793	   493,685	  R2	   0.926	   0.991	   0.988	   0.947	  
Panel	  B:	  All	  State,	  Dem	  Comparison	  with	  Cnty-­‐Dem	  and	  Qtr	  FE's	  Post	  x	  Calif	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.00158	   0.0309***	   0.0245***	   0.0297**	  	   (0.0043)	   (0.0109)	   (0.0095)	   (0.0148)	  Observations	   533,393	   546,577	   552,793	   493,685	  R2	   0.963	   0.995	   0.993	   0.95	  
Panel	  C:	  All	  State,	  Dem	  Comparison	  with	  Cnty-­‐Dem,	  Dem-­‐Qtr	  and	  State-­‐Qtr	  FE's	  Post	  x	  Calif	  x	  Fem	  19-­‐34	   -­‐0.00215	   0.03034***	   0.02379***	   0.02941***	  	   (0.0032)	   (0.0088)	   (0.0073)	   (0.0118)	  N	   533,393	   546,577	   552,793	   493,685	  R2	   0.9671	   0.996	   0.995	   0.966	  
Note:	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  and	  are	  
clustered	  at	  the	  County-­‐Dem	  level.	  Panel	  A	  contains	  separate	  county,	  demographic	  and	  
quarter	  FE’s.	  Panel	  B	  contains	  county-­‐demographic	  FE’s	  and	  quarter	  FE’s.	  Panel	  C,	  the	  
largest	  model	  we	  are	  able	  to	  run	  contains	  the	  County-­‐Demographic,	  Demographic-­‐Quarter	  
and	  State-­‐Quarter	  two-­‐way	  FE’s.	  	  
Column	  1	  of	  Panel	  C	  finds	  new	  hire	  earnings	  effects	  that	  are	  effectively	  zero.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  two-­‐tenths	  of	  one	  percent	  combined	  with	  the	  small	  standard	  errors	  suggest	  that	  the	  policy	  had	  a	  minimal	  impact	  on	  the	  earnings	  of	  young	  female	  new	  hires,	  the	  group	  for	  whom	  you	  would	  most	  likely	  see	  an	  impact.	  The	  minimal	  wage	  effect	  is	  likely	  to	  reflect	  some	  combination	  of	  weak	  disruption	  costs	  among	  employers	  from	  CPFL	  (i.e.,	  small	  demand	  shifts)	  and	  integrated	  labor	  markets	  in	  which	  young	  women	  receive	  wages	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  other	  similarly	  productive	  workers.	  	  




on	  worker	  flows.	  CPFL	  is	  shown	  to	  increase	  new	  hires	  by	  an	  estimated	  3	  percent,	  separations	  by	  2.4	  percent,	  and	  recalls	  (extended	  leaves)	  by	  2.9	  percent.	  These	  findings	  are	  statistically	  and	  quantitatively	  significant	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  CPFL	  had	  substantive	  labor	  markets	  impacts,	  outcomes	  that	  cannot	  be	  observed	  when	  focusing	  only	  on	  employment	  levels.	  We	  interpret	  these	  effects	  below.	  
Discussion	  of	  results	  
The	  results	  from	  our	  preferred	  specifications	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  labor	  market	  effects	  of	  CPFL.	  First,	  we	  find	  a	  very	  limited	  impact	  of	  the	  program	  on	  young	  women’s	  earnings.	  Point	  estimates	  show	  a	  very	  small	  earnings	  impact	  for	  newly	  hired	  young	  women.	  Although	  the	  confidence	  interval	  includes	  zero,	  the	  point	  estimate	  is	  precisely	  estimated	  and	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  program	  had	  large	  negative	  effects	  on	  young	  women’s	  earnings.	  These	  small	  earnings	  estimates	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  our	  back-­‐of-­‐the-­‐envelope	  calculation	  which	  found	  that	  even	  under	  full	  wage	  shifting,	  large	  earnings	  impacts	  were	  unlikely	  to	  be	  observed	  given	  the	  limited	  size	  of	  the	  program.	  	  




coupled	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  non-­‐tax	  disruption	  costs	  of	  leave	  are	  minor	  and	  that	  young	  female	  workers	  within	  California	  (at	  the	  margin)	  are	  close	  substitutes	  for	  other	  new	  hires,	  thus	  minimizing	  wage	  offer	  differentials.	  
A	  substantial	  increase	  in	  young	  female	  new	  hires	  and	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  employment	  levels	  is	  better	  understood	  once	  we	  examine	  separations	  and	  recalls,	  both	  increasing	  substantially	  following	  implementation	  of	  CPFL.	  The	  finding	  that	  extended	  leaves	  increase	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  findings	  from	  Rossin-­‐Slater	  et	  al	  (2013)	  that	  indicate	  increased	  leave	  time	  for	  women	  as	  a	  result	  of	  CPFL.	  Moreover,	  if	  young	  women	  were	  previously	  staying	  in	  jobs	  which,	  apart	  from	  their	  paid	  leave	  policy,	  were	  an	  inferior	  match,	  then	  providing	  universal	  paid	  leave	  should	  reduce	  job	  lock	  and	  allow	  workers	  to	  find	  new	  jobs	  that	  were	  better	  matches.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  this	  type	  of	  labor	  market	  churn	  may	  well	  have	  occurred	  in	  response	  to	  CPFL.	  The	  increase	  in	  extended	  leaves	  (recalls)	  implies	  that	  CPFL	  has	  enabled	  some	  women	  with	  young	  children	  to	  substantially	  increase	  their	  time	  off	  from	  work	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  mandated	  paid	  leave	  and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  return	  to	  their	  same	  employer	  following	  extended	  leaves.	  This	  is	  a	  notable	  outcome	  given	  that	  CPFL	  does	  not	  provide	  job	  protection	  beyond	  what	  was	  previously	  available	  through	  state	  law	  and	  the	  FMLA.	  	  
Placebo	  policy	  tests	  of	  earnings,	  employment,	  separation,	  and	  recalls	  




new	  hires,	  separations,	  and	  recalls.	  These	  placebo	  policy	  tests	  allow	  us	  to	  assess	  the	  reliability	  of	  our	  California	  estimates.	  Small	  and	  insignificant	  estimates	  for	  all	  or	  at	  least	  most	  of	  the	  placebo	  policies	  would	  provide	  a	  valuable	  falsification	  test.	  A	  systematic	  set	  of	  results	  that	  either	  mimics	  those	  for	  California	  or	  that	  is	  highly	  noisy	  and	  produces	  numerous	  estimates	  that	  are	  large	  and/or	  statistically	  significant	  would	  suggest	  that	  our	  data	  and	  empirical	  approach	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  reliably	  identify	  the	  impact	  of	  CPFL.	  
Table	  13:	  Placebo	  Policy	  Results	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   ln(NH	  Earn)	   ln(New	  Hires)	   ln(Seps)	   ln(Recalls)	  CA	   -­‐0.0016	   0.0309***	   0.0245***	   0.0297**	  
Placebo	  Groups:	   	   	   	   	  CT	  PA	  DE	  WV	   0.0074**	   -­‐0.0027	   0.0130	   0.0238	  IL	  MI	  WI	   -­‐0.0015	   0.0054	   -­‐0.0152**	   -­‐0.0132	  OH	  IN	  KY	  TN	   0.0029	   -­‐0.0105	   -­‐0.0186***	   -­‐0.0054	  MN	  ND	  SD	  MT	  ID	   -­‐0.0049	   -­‐0.0111	   0.0109	   0.0495	  MD	  DC	  VA	  NC	  SC	   0.0087***	   0.0014	   0.0088	   -­‐0.0082	  GA	  FL	  AL	  MS	   -­‐0.0001	   0.0065	   0.0197*	   -­‐0.0299	  AR	  LA	  TX	   -­‐0.0168***	   -­‐0.0126	   -­‐0.0087	   -­‐0.0272	  OK	  NE	  KS	  IA	  MO	   -­‐0.0024	   0.0066	   0.0066	   0.0397**	  WY	  CO	  NM	  AZ	  UT	   -­‐0.0061	   -­‐0.0133	   -­‐0.0169	   0.0017	  NV	  WA	  OR	  AK	   0.0102**	   -­‐0.0007	   -­‐0.0023	   -­‐0.0204	  
Mean	  placebo	  
estimates	   -­‐0.0003	   -­‐0.0031	   -­‐0.0003	   0.0010	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  .	  The	  first	  line	  provides	  CPFL	  estimates	  shown	  previously	  in	  Table	  5,	  Panel	  B.	  Table	  6	  reports	  placebo	  results	  in	  which	  groups	  of	  states	  (clustered	  geographically	  and	  of	  similar	  size	  to	  California)	  are	  designated	  as	  the	  treated	  geographic	  region.	  The	  last	  line	  provides	  unweighted	  means	  of	  the	  placebo	  estimates.	  	  	  




estimates	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  numerically	  and	  statistically	  significant	  estimates.	  
We	  first	  examine	  estimates	  for	  new	  hire	  earnings,	  where	  we	  previously	  obtained	  a	  near-­‐zero	  estimate	  for	  California.	  Most	  of	  the	  placebo	  results	  for	  new	  hire	  earnings	  produce	  coefficients	  that	  are	  larger	  in	  absolute	  value	  than	  our	  California	  estimates.	  Four	  of	  the	  coefficients	  are	  statistically	  significant,	  with	  one	  having	  a	  reasonably	  large	  negative	  sign	  and	  three	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  of	  about	  1	  percent.	  Six	  of	  the	  ten	  results	  are	  statistically	  insignificant	  and	  tiny	  in	  magnitude.	  We	  previously	  argued	  that	  theory	  suggests	  a	  tiny	  wage	  effect	  from	  CPFL	  and	  that	  our	  empirical	  estimates	  of	  new	  hire	  wage	  effects	  were	  not	  clear-­‐cut.	  Results	  from	  our	  placebo	  tests	  reinforce	  this	  latter	  conclusion.	  Although	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  causal	  wage	  effects	  from	  CPFL	  are	  negative	  but	  small,	  available	  data	  and	  methods	  are	  insufficiently	  powerful	  to	  confirm	  (or	  reject)	  such	  a	  belief.	  	  




Overall,	  the	  placebo	  test	  results	  suggest	  that	  while	  the	  QWI	  is	  well	  suited	  for	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  workplace	  mandates	  on	  hires,	  separations,	  and	  recalls	  it	  is	  not	  powerful	  enough	  to	  unambiguously	  distinguish	  between	  small	  wage	  effects	  of,	  say,	  1	  or	  1.5	  percent.	  Although	  the	  causal	  new	  hire	  wage	  impacts	  from	  CPFL	  are	  too	  small	  to	  measure	  with	  any	  degree	  of	  certainty,	  we	  regard	  our	  small	  negative	  estimates	  as	  plausible	  given	  theory.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  earnings	  results,	  the	  placebo	  tests	  enhance	  confidence	  in	  our	  conclusion	  that	  there	  was	  a	  substantive	  increase	  in	  labor	  market	  churn	  following	  CPFL,	  with	  hiring,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves	  increasing	  among	  young	  women.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  Employer	  mandates	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  small	  effects.	  Nonwage	  benefits	  highly	  valued	  by	  workers	  relative	  to	  their	  costs	  are	  those	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  voluntarily	  provided	  by	  employers	  (with	  costs	  shifted	  to	  workers).	  Benefits	  that	  have	  substantial	  costs	  relative	  to	  worker	  valuation	  are	  those	  least	  likely	  to	  be	  mandated	  through	  the	  political	  process.	  Mandated	  worker	  benefits	  not	  provided	  voluntarily	  but	  that	  are	  politically	  viable	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  small	  or	  offsetting	  benefits	  and	  costs.	  	  




through	  dismissals.	  The	  margin	  for	  which	  one	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  observe	  wage	  and	  employment	  adjustments	  in	  response	  to	  an	  employer	  mandate	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  new	  hires,	  both	  through	  changes	  in	  their	  demographic	  composition	  and	  in	  the	  wages	  offered,	  as	  well	  as	  changes	  in	  other	  worker	  flows.	  
The	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicators	  (QWI)	  data	  set	  provides	  a	  relatively	  new	  and	  underutilized	  resource	  that	  lends	  itself	  to	  evaluation	  of	  public	  policies	  that	  differentially	  affect	  employment	  and/or	  earnings	  with	  respect	  to	  time,	  location,	  and	  demographic	  group.	  Particularly	  appealing	  is	  QWI’s	  provision	  of	  data	  on	  the	  number	  and	  earnings	  of	  stable	  (not	  short-­‐term)	  new	  hires,	  margins	  over	  which	  labor	  market	  adjustments	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  occur.	  We	  believe	  that	  this	  type	  of	  analysis	  strengthens	  and	  improves	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  CPFL	  and	  provides	  a	  template	  for	  future	  labor	  market	  policy	  analysis.	  




but	  are	  better	  able	  to	  measure	  and	  control	  for	  individual-­‐level	  earnings,	  hours,	  and	  worker	  attributes.	  While	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  include	  detailed	  controls	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  our	  data	  do	  contain	  the	  universe	  of	  all	  private	  sector	  worker	  flows	  and	  relies	  on	  a	  large	  set	  of	  fixed	  effects	  to	  control	  for	  demographic	  and	  geographic	  differences.	  	  
California’s	  mandatory	  paid	  family	  leave	  policy,	  a	  first	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  effectively	  added	  six	  weeks	  of	  partially	  paid	  leave	  to	  new	  mothers	  (or	  fathers).	  Rossin-­‐Slater	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  and	  others	  indicates	  that	  CPFL	  led	  to	  increased	  time	  off	  among	  mothers	  with	  infants.	  Our	  analysis	  concludes	  that	  CPFL	  resulted	  in	  little	  change	  in	  earnings	  for	  young	  women	  in	  California,	  coupled	  with	  increased	  churn	  in	  the	  form	  of	  extended	  leaves,	  separations,	  and	  hires.	  Part	  of	  this	  increased	  churn	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  reduced	  job	  lock	  and	  enhanced	  job	  matching	  made	  possible	  by	  universal	  paid	  family	  leave.	  The	  results	  of	  our	  study	  suggest	  that	  there	  may	  well	  be	  benefits	  from	  mandated	  paid	  family	  leave	  that	  offset	  the	  costs,	  with	  little	  apparent	  efficiency	  loss	  and	  possibly	  an	  efficiency	  gain.	  Blau	  and	  Kahn	  (2013)	  provide	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  family-­‐friendly	  policies	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  developed	  economies,	  helps	  explain	  the	  U.S.	  reversal	  in	  female	  labor	  force	  participation,	  being	  ranked	  sixth	  out	  of	  22	  OECD	  countries	  in	  1990,	  but	  17th	  of	  22	  in	  2010.	  The	  finding	  that	  increased	  hiring,	  separations,	  and	  extended	  leaves	  resulted	  from	  the	  adoption	  of	  CPFL’s	  family-­‐friendly	  policy	  supports	  the	  inference	  drawn	  from	  international	  comparisons.	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Chapter	  III:	  EVIDENCE	  OF	  AN	  “ENERGY-­‐MANAGEMENT	  GAP”	  IN	  U.S.	  




	  The	  notion	  that	  a	  “well-­‐managed”	  company	  does	  all	  things	  equally	  well,	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  management	  practices	  need	  to	  be	  targeted	  to	  specific	  results/goals	  or	  will	  simply	  “spill	  over”	  into	  good	  performance	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  firm.	  	  This	  paper	  explores	  this	  issue	  by	  looking	  for	  evidence	  of	  differences	  in	  energy	  use	  in	  well	  managed	  companies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  others.	  	  If	  there	  are	  no	  positive	  spillovers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  	  improvements	  in	  energy	  performance	  resulting	  from	  otherwise	  good	  management,	  then	  we	  interpret	  this	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  type	  of	  “energy	  management	  gap.”	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  examine	  whether	  “generic”	  management	  practices,	  i.e.	  those	  that	  are	  not	  specifically	  targeted	  to	  energy,	  which	  have	  been	  measured	  in	  a	  carefully	  constructed	  survey,	  result	  in	  improved	  energy	  performance.	  	  Using	  non-­‐public,	  plant	  level	  data	  to	  conduct	  the	  study,	  we	  control	  for	  differences	  in	  plant	  energy	  use	  at	  a	  detailed,	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry	  level	  and	  examine	  whether	  management’s	  effects	  differ	  by	  the	  average	  energy	  intensity	  of	  the	  industry	  to	  which	  the	  plant	  belongs.	  	  The	  former	  is	  done	  to	  avoid	  mistaking	  differences	  in	  the	  energy	  requirements	  to	  produce	  various	  products	  as	  differences	  in	  “energy	  efficiency.”	  	  The	  latter	  is	  done	  to	  see	  if	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  required	  “energy	  spend”	  relative	  to	  other	  costs	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  put	  energy	  on	  the	  radar	  of	  management.	  	  We	  find	  beneficial	  spillovers	  for	  some	  types	  of	  management	  practices,	  but	  not	  all.	  	  The	  energy	  consumption	  of	  firms	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries	  is	  shown	  to	  respond	  more	  to	  management	  practices.	  	  However,	  some	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management	  practices	  that	  improve	  productivity	  actually	  increase	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  instead	  of	  lowering	  it.	  	  We	  interpret	  the	  results	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  energy	  management	  gap,	  ;	  the	  failure	  of	  non-­‐energy	  centric	  management	  practices	  to	  result	  in	  (relatively)	  lower	  energy	  expenditures.	  Energy	  economists	  have	  devoted	  substantial	  resources	  to	  understanding	  both	  the	  extent	  of	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  so	  called	  “Energy	  Efficiency	  Gap”.60	  That	  this	  topic	  is	  of	  great	  interest	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  given	  that	  improvements	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  could	  potentially	  result	  not	  only	  in	  increased	  levels	  of	  firm	  profits	  but	  also	  in	  decreased	  levels	  of	  the	  harmful	  pollutants	  associated	  with	  fossil	  fuels.	  One	  traditional	  explanation	  for	  why	  firms	  vary	  in	  their	  energy	  efficiency	  is	  that	  unobserved	  differences	  in	  management	  quality	  lead	  some	  firms	  to	  adopt	  more	  efficient	  production	  techniques	  and	  to	  improve	  the	  monitoring	  of	  their	  inputs.	  Well	  run	  firms	  will	  be	  quick	  to	  spot	  wasteful	  energy	  use	  and	  poorly	  run	  firms	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  suffer	  from	  incomplete	  information	  and	  principal-­‐agent	  problems.61	  	  This	  literature	  often	  uses	  energy	  efficiency	  as	  synonymous	  with	  energy	  intensity,	  specifically	  either	  reductions	  in	  intensity	  over	  time	  or	  lower	  intensity	  in	  a	  cross-­‐section.	  Other	  studies	  use	  “efficiency”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  frontier	  analysis,	  e.g.	  (Boyd	  2008;	  2014).	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  term	  energy	  efficiency	  (or	  energy	  performance)	  will	  be	  used	  to	  mean	  the	  latter;	  i.e.	  lower	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  in	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  plants62.	  	  	  While	  economists	  have	  typically	  shied	  away	  from	  studying	  firms’	  management	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  See	  DeCanio	  (1993),	  Jaffe	  and	  Stavins	  (1994)	  DeCanio	  and	  Watkins	  (1998),	  Boyd	  et	  al	  (2011),	  Alcott	  and	  Greenstone	  (2012).	  61	  Of	  course,	  these	  issues	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  energy.	  Economists	  have	  also	  puzzled	  over	  empirical	  observations	  that	  show	  wide	  variation	  in	  labor	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  	  (for	  a	  survey	  see	  Syverson	  2011)	  and	  developed	  new	  approaches	  to	  measure	  firm’s	  efficiency	  (for	  a	  survey	  see	  Murillo-­‐Zamorano,	  2004).	  62	  Also,	  our	  data	  only	  permit	  analysis	  of	  energy	  expenditures,	  not	  quantities,	  so	  the	  term	  energy	  is	  taken	  primarily	  to	  mean	  energy	  expenditure	  throughout.	  Firms’	  energy	  outcomes	  are	  then	  determined	  by	  taking	  the	  ratio	  of	  their	  expenditure	  to	  either	  their	  gross	  output	  or	  value	  added.	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quality,	  business	  schools,	  consulting	  firms	  and	  even	  governments	  have	  long	  recognized	  that	  management	  practices	  can	  lead	  to	  increased	  productivity	  and	  the	  more	  efficient	  use	  of	  inputs	  generally,	  including	  energy,	  e.g.	  McKinsey	  (2009).	  Perhaps	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  sustained	  push	  to	  reduce	  energy	  use	  through	  better	  management	  practices	  has	  come	  from	  environmental	  agencies’	  development	  of	  voluntary	  energy	  efficiency	  programs.	  	  These	  programs	  arose	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s	  (Storey,	  et	  al	  1997)	  and	  expanded	  in	  the	  US	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  EPA	  Energy	  Star	  for	  Industry	  (Boyd	  et	  al	  2008)	  and	  various	  Department	  of	  Energy	  (DOE)	  programs..	  	  	  They	  typically	  require	  company	  or	  industry	  level	  commitments	  to	  improve	  the	  monitoring	  and	  measurement	  of	  energy	  use	  and/or	  meet	  specific	  energy	  reduction	  targets.63	  	  	  	  Since	  improved	  energy	  management	  practices	  are	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  interventions	  of	  some	  of	  the	  U.S,	  voluntary	  government	  programs	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  which	  generic	  management	  practices	  of	  the	  firm	  may	  be	  either	  complimenting,	  or	  in	  competition	  with,	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  energy	  consumption.	  Furthermore,	  well-­‐run	  firms	  may	  have	  no	  need	  for	  improved	  energy-­‐centric	  management	  practices	  if	  their	  ‘good’	  generic	  management	  practices	  result	  in	  an	  efficient	  use	  of	  energy.	  The	  difficulties	  in	  quantifying	  a	  firm’s	  management	  practices	  have	  historically	  prevented	  economists	  from	  studying	  how	  these	  practices	  may	  impact	  firm	  outcomes.	  However,	  in	  recent	  years	  a	  small	  but	  growing	  economics	  literature	  has	  emerged	  which	  seeks	  to	  overcome	  the	  dearth	  of	  quantifiable	  measures	  of	  firm	  management	  practices	  (Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  2007).	  Innovative	  survey	  techniques	  have	  been	  used	  to	  elicit	  reliable	  answers	  from	  plant	  managers	  on	  whether	  they	  have	  adopted	  effective	  monitoring,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Companies	  are	  incentivized	  to	  participate	  both	  by	  the	  potential	  energy	  savings	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public	  recognition	  they	  receive	  upon	  successfully	  completing	  the	  programs	  (Price,	  L.,	  E.	  Worrell,	  et	  al.	  2003).	  
112 
 
operations,	  targets	  and	  incentives	  practices.	  These	  data	  have	  been	  matched	  to	  firm	  level	  production	  data	  to	  examine	  total	  factor	  productivity	  for	  firms	  around	  the	  world	  (Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  2007;	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Lazear	  and	  Oyer	  2012).	  More	  recently,	  two	  papers	  have	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010)	  examine	  generic	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency,	  while	  Martin	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  focus	  on	  energy	  and	  climate	  centric	  management	  issues	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  energy	  outcomes.	  	  	  Heretofore,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  studies	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  States.64	  In	  order	  to	  fill	  this	  hole	  in	  the	  literature	  we	  link	  management	  survey	  data	  collected	  by	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (BVR)	  with	  detailed	  establishment	  level	  data	  found	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  of	  Manufactures	  (CM).	  The	  management	  data	  contains	  scores	  on	  multiple	  questions	  in	  four	  management	  practice	  categories,	  none	  of	  
which	  are	  directly	  related	  to	  energy.	  The	  survey	  then	  rates	  the	  firm	  on	  a	  1	  to	  5	  scale,	  from	  “bad	  to	  good,”	  as	  described	  below.	  Performing	  this	  merge	  allows	  us	  to	  observe	  both	  the	  survey	  results	  alongside	  detailed	  plant-­‐level	  output	  and	  energy	  expenditure	  data	  found	  in	  the	  CM,	  confirm	  and	  reproduce	  past	  results	  which	  have	  found	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  (TFP);then	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  manufacturing	  plants	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Past	  research	  on	  UK	  firms	  has	  shown	  an	  unambiguous	  negative	  relationship	  between	  both	  generic	  and	  energy-­‐centric	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  intensity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  The	  research	  on	  management	  and	  TFP	  for	  U.S.	  firms	  is	  also	  limited.	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (2007)	  collect	  management	  score	  data	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  all	  U.S.	  but	  the	  TFP	  results	  rely	  on	  Compustat	  data	  which	  contains	  only	  publicly	  listed	  firms.	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Using	  data	  on	  U.S.	  manufacturing	  establishments	  we	  find	  the	  relationship	  between	  generic	  practices	  and	  energy	  to	  be	  more	  complex.	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  literature,	  we	  find	  a	  positive	  and	  significant	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  TFP.	  However,	  the	  firm’s	  overall	  management	  score	  has	  only	  a	  loose	  association	  with	  energy	  efficiency.	  This	  loose	  association	  masks	  strong	  and	  competing	  effects	  of	  the	  underlying	  management	  components.	  	  Effective	  monitoring,	  incentive	  structures	  and	  lean	  manufacturing	  operations	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  energy	  use	  while	  the	  implementation	  of	  production	  targets	  (conditional	  on	  other	  practices)	  is	  found	  to	  increase	  energy	  consumption.65	  	  Furthermore,	  we	  find	  this	  relationship	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  those	  plants	  in	  relatively	  more	  energy	  intensive	  industries.	  	  Good	  management	  practices	  have	  larger	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency	  in	  industries	  where	  energy	  expenditure	  is	  a	  larger	  component	  of	  their	  overall	  input	  costs.	  We	  take	  these	  results	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  energy	  management	  gap	  whereby	  even	  well	  run	  firms	  that	  successfully	  use	  management	  practices	  to	  improve	  profitability	  and	  labor	  productivity	  do	  not	  necessarily	  use	  these	  practices	  to	  improve	  energy	  outcomes.66	  	  As	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  the	  observed	  relationships	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  the	  outcome	  variables	  of	  interest	  do	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  causality.	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  other	  factors	  that	  may	  be	  driving	  differences	  in	  energy	  efficiency,	  but	  there	  remains	  the	  possibility	  that	  omitted	  variables	  could	  be	  correlated	  with	  both	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  use.	  Perhaps	  firms	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  paper	  the	  Targets	  component	  of	  the	  management	  score	  measures	  primarily	  financial	  and	  production	  targets.	  66	  By	  “gap”	  we	  simply	  refer	  to	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  management’s	  impact	  on	  productivity	  and	  management’s	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency.	  Unlike	  some	  definitions	  of	  the	  “gap”,	  our	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  missed	  profit	  opportunities	  or	  a	  market	  failure.	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are	  more	  willing	  to	  hire	  management	  consultants	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  energy	  saving	  techniques	  for	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  their	  management	  practices67.	  However,	  past	  literature	  on	  the	  energy	  efficiency	  gap	  has	  suggested	  a	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  management	  practices	  may	  strongly	  impact	  energy	  outcomes	  (Gillingham	  and	  Palmer	  2014).	  First,	  effective	  communication	  between	  production	  workers	  and	  plant	  managers	  may	  lead	  upper	  management	  to	  more	  quickly	  become	  aware	  of	  wasted	  resources	  at	  the	  floor	  level.	  Workers	  whose	  pay	  is	  tied	  with	  production	  efficiency	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  notice	  and	  address	  these	  issues	  and	  overcome	  potential	  principal-­‐agent	  problems	  within	  the	  firm.	  The	  implementation	  of	  “lean”	  manufacturing	  techniques	  will	  also	  reduce	  energy	  waste.	  These	  techniques	  allow	  for	  the	  computerized	  monitoring	  of	  every	  step	  in	  the	  production	  process	  and	  are	  meant	  to	  closely	  track	  the	  use	  of	  resources.	  They	  also	  permit	  the	  effective	  monitoring	  of	  capital	  and	  inputs	  thus	  providing	  plant	  managers	  the	  information	  they	  need	  to	  identify	  and	  address	  bottle	  necks	  and	  inefficiencies	  in	  production.	  	  Other	  potential	  drivers	  of	  the	  energy	  efficiency	  gap,	  such	  as	  capital	  constraints,	  uncertainty	  and	  principal	  agent	  problems	  (Decanio	  1993,	  Gillingham	  et	  al	  2009,	  Alcott	  and	  Greenstone	  2012)	  may	  also	  be	  alleviated	  with	  improved	  management	  practices.	  Understanding	  management’s	  role	  in	  energy	  consumption	  is	  crucial	  to	  designing	  appropriate	  policy	  instruments	  as	  well.	  If	  informational	  and	  principal	  agent	  problems	  prevent	  firms	  from	  participating	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  programs	  then	  improved	  management	  practices	  may	  result	  in	  certain	  policy	  instruments,	  such	  as	  tax	  credits	  for	  energy	  saving	  investments,	  to	  become	  more	  effective.	  Anderson	  and	  Newell	  (2004)	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  industrial	  energy	  audits	  and	  find	  that	  once	  provided	  with	  information	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Current	  research	  (Bloom	  et	  al	  2012)	  is	  attempting	  to	  overcome	  causation	  issues	  by	  collecting	  panel	  data	  on	  management	  practices.	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the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  or	  energy	  saving	  investments,	  firms’	  adoption	  of	  energy	  investments	  was	  consistent	  with	  hurdle	  rates	  of	  non-­‐energy	  investments.	  Research	  on	  voluntary	  participation	  programs	  by	  Howarth	  et	  al	  (2000)	  finds	  that	  they	  are	  effective	  because	  of	  market	  failures	  within	  the	  firm	  whereby	  energy	  saving	  initiatives	  are	  not	  adopted	  due	  to	  imperfect	  information,	  firm	  organization	  and	  coordination	  problems.	  Our	  finding	  that	  improvements	  in	  most	  management	  practices	  improve	  energy	  efficiency	  supports	  this	  past	  work.	  However,	  our	  results	  do	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  market	  failure.	  	  Improvement	  in	  management	  practices	  will	  be	  costly	  to	  the	  firm	  and	  such	  costs	  could	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  of	  improved	  productivity	  and	  input	  efficiency.	  	   Overall,	  this	  research	  finds	  that	  management	  has	  an	  important	  relationship	  with	  energy	  efficiency	  that	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  past	  research	  on	  the	  subject	  has	  suggested.	  Management	  matters	  most	  within	  energy	  intensive	  industries	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  production	  targets	  increases	  energy	  expenditure.	  However,	  our	  results	  do	  suggest	  that	  policies	  which	  improve	  most	  generic	  management	  practices	  would	  allow	  firms	  to	  be	  both	  more	  productive	  and	  more	  energy	  efficiency.	  For	  firms	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries,	  improving	  their	  operations,	  monitoring	  and	  incentives	  management	  score	  from	  the	  25th	  to	  75th	  percentile	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  energy	  consumption	  of	  around	  15%.68	  Given	  that	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  consumes	  25%	  of	  all	  energy	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  represents	  a	  substantial	  source	  of	  potential	  energy	  savings.	  	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  I	  describes	  the	  BVR	  management	  data	  as	  well	  as	  the	  non-­‐public	  CM	  data.	  Section	  II	  gives	  the	  methodology	  and	  the	  results.	  Section	  III	  provides	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  findings	  and	  Section	  IV	  concludes.	  	  





	  The	  two	  sources	  of	  data	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  the	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  management	  survey	  data	  and	  the	  non-­‐public	  U.S.	  Census	  of	  Manufactures.	  The	  management	  data	  were	  constructed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  survey	  tool	  created	  by	  Bloom,	  Van	  Reenen	  and	  a	  large	  global	  consulting	  firm.	  The	  process	  of	  collecting	  the	  data	  relied	  on	  a	  unique	  survey	  methodology	  designed	  first	  to	  obtain	  interviews	  from	  plant	  managers	  and	  then	  to	  elicit	  accurate	  responses	  regarding	  their	  management	  techniques.	  After	  a	  number	  of	  rounds	  of	  testing	  and	  development,	  the	  surveys	  were	  administered	  by	  MBA	  students	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  in	  2006	  and	  2007.	  Over	  4,000	  firms	  were	  interviewed	  in	  12	  countries	  around	  the	  world.69	  	  	  	   While	  firms	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  were	  interviewed,	  this	  project	  uses	  only	  data	  collected	  on	  U.S.	  firms.	  Medium	  size	  U.S.	  manufacturing	  firms	  were	  randomly	  selected	  from	  Compustat	  database	  to	  participate.	  Once	  selected,	  interviewers	  conducted	  hour	  long	  interviews	  with	  plant	  managers.	  Plant	  managers	  were	  chosen	  as	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  interview	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  answers	  from	  an	  individual	  in	  the	  firm	  who	  would	  have	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  plant’s	  floor	  level	  operations	  as	  well	  as	  knowledge	  of	  senior	  management	  at	  company	  headquarters.	  The	  interviews	  were	  framed	  to	  the	  plant	  managers	  as	  being	  a	  “piece	  of	  work”	  which	  sought	  to	  study	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  plant.70	  The	  survey	  was	  double-­‐blind	  in	  that	  the	  plant	  managers	  were	  unaware	  they	  were	  being	  scored	  and	  the	  interviewers	  had	  no	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  company’s	  performance.	  The	  plant	  managers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Additional	  survey	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  in	  recent	  years	  as	  part	  of	  the	  World	  Management	  Survey.	  70	  Interviewers	  were	  given	  incentives	  based	  on	  the	  response	  rate	  percentage	  they	  were	  able	  to	  obtain.	  The	  final	  response	  rate	  was	  54%.	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were	  asked	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  on	  18	  management	  practices	  which	  are	  grouped	  into	  four	  areas:	  operations,	  monitoring,	  incentives	  and	  targets.	  The	  operations	  category	  asks	  questions	  on	  the	  production	  process	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  lean	  manufacturing	  techniques.	  The	  monitoring	  category	  asks	  questions	  on	  the	  types	  of	  production	  and	  input	  data	  that	  is	  collected	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  performance	  of	  capital	  and	  workers	  is	  measured.	  The	  incentives	  category	  asks	  questions	  on	  the	  hiring	  and	  firing	  of	  workers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  criteria	  for	  bonuses	  and	  promotions.	  Finally	  the	  targets	  category	  asks	  whether	  the	  firm	  has	  targets,	  how	  they	  are	  implemented,	  whether	  they	  are	  demanding	  and	  if	  there	  are	  consequences	  for	  consistently	  failing	  to	  meet	  them.	   	  The	  interviewer	  scored	  each	  of	  the	  18	  management	  practices	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  5	  with	  5	  indicating	  the	  best	  possible	  management	  in	  that	  category.	  A	  number	  of	  checks	  were	  put	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  consistent	  scoring	  by	  the	  interviewers.	  First,	  a	  common	  scoring	  guide	  was	  given	  to	  the	  interviewers	  to	  provide	  examples	  of	  typical	  answers	  and	  how	  these	  answers	  should	  be	  scored.	  Second,	  a	  number	  of	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  multiple	  people	  listening	  and	  independently	  scoring	  the	  answers	  of	  the	  plant	  managers.	  Third,	  firms	  with	  multiple	  establishments	  were	  frequently	  the	  subject	  of	  multiple	  interviews	  to	  ensure	  that	  management	  scores	  were	  correlated	  across	  a	  firm’s	  different	  plants.	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  	  (2007)	  show	  that	  the	  scores	  are	  robust	  to	  these	  and	  other	  consistency	  checks.	  Furthermore,	  because	  interviewers	  surveyed	  on	  average	  a	  total	  of	  50	  firms,	  the	  regressions	  can	  use	  interviewer	  fixed	  effects	  to	  control	  for	  any	  systemic	  differences	  between	  the	  interviewers.	  Additional	  data	  was	  collected	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  week	  the	  interview	  took	  place,	  the	  length	  of	  the	  interview,	  the	  gender	  of	  the	  plant	  manager	  and	  the	  plant	  manager’s	  tenure	  at	  the	  firm.	  These	  interview	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  noise	  controls	  in	  the	  regressions	  and	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Table	  14:	  Summary	  Statistics	  of	  the	  US	  Management	  Survey	  	  	   Management	   Monitoring/	  Incentive/Opera-­‐tions	  	  
Targets	   Firm	  Age	  
	   Mean	   S.D.	   Mean	   S.D.	   Mean	   S.D.	   Mean	   S.D.	  Full	  Sample	  (598	  Firms)	   3.30	   .660	   3.37	   .663	   3.21	   .804	   49.83	   43.10	  Matched	  Sample	  (321	  Firms)	   3.40	   .635	   3.41	   .652	   3.38	   .734	   54.64	   41.99	  
	  Note:	  This	  table	  provides	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  overall	  management	  score,	  the	  average	  of	  the	  combined	  Monitoring,	  Incentives	  and	  Operations	  variable,	  the	  Targets	  component	  and	  firm	  age	  for	  the	  full	  sample	  and	  for	  the	  sample	  that	  was	  successfully	  matched	  to	  the	  CM.	  	  
Methodology	  and	  Results	  
	  Before	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency,	  we	  first	  attempt	  to	  replicate	  the	  productivity	  results	  of	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (2007).	  We	  find	  this	  exercise	  to	  be	  informative	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  by	  providing	  new	  results	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  productivity	  we	  add	  to	  an	  expanding	  literature	  which	  attributes	  part	  of	  the	  significant	  heterogeneity	  in	  firm	  productivity	  to	  differences	  in	  management	  practices	  (Bloom	  et	  al	  2014).	  Second,	  and	  more	  pertinent	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand,	  the	  productivity	  results	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  baseline	  against	  which	  we	  interpret	  the	  energy	  results.	  If	  differences	  arise	  between	  our	  productivity	  results	  and	  those	  of	  past	  studies	  then	  the	  energy	  results	  need	  to	  evaluated	  in	  light	  of	  these	  differences.	  	  	  	  To	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  use,	  we	  consider	  two	  separate	  specifications.	  The	  first	  method	  is	  a	  one-­‐step	  procedure	  used	  by	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010).	  	  This	  specification	  creates	  an	  energy	  intensity	  measure	  for	  every	  plant	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in	  the	  BVR	  survey	  by	  taking	  the	  ratio	  of	  energy	  expenditure	  to	  gross	  output	  and	  then	  regresses	  this	  variable	  on	  management	  practice	  variables,	  3-­‐digit	  industry	  code	  fixed	  effects	  and	  other	  control	  variables.	  After	  examining	  the	  results,	  we	  then	  propose	  a	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  which,	  partly	  through	  the	  use	  of	  more	  detailed	  industry	  data,	  allows	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  driving	  mechanism	  behind	  the	  initial	  findings	  of	  the	  baseline	  specification.	  The	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  first	  creates	  a	  plant-­‐level	  measure	  of	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  for	  every	  plant	  in	  the	  CM	  by	  comparing	  each	  plant	  to	  all	  other	  plants	  in	  its	  narrowly	  defined	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry.	  Then,	  for	  those	  plants	  in	  the	  management	  survey	  we	  regress	  this	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  measure	  on	  their	  management	  practice	  variables	  and	  other	  control	  variables.	  While	  the	  two	  methodologies	  yield	  similar	  results,	  the	  greater	  industry	  detail	  in	  the	  two	  step	  procedure	  allows	  us	  to	  1)	  more	  precisely	  measure	  a	  plant’s	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  within	  a	  narrowly	  defined	  industry	  and	  2)	  better	  examine	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  varies	  by	  industry.	  Understanding	  which	  industries	  are	  driving	  the	  results	  is	  crucial	  to	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  results	  in	  the	  baseline	  specification.	  After	  presenting	  the	  two-­‐step	  energy	  results,	  we	  then	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  labor	  productivity	  and	  management	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  using	  a	  similar	  two-­‐step	  procedure.	  	  
One	  Step	  Procedure	  
	  As	  a	  baseline	  approach	  to	  modeling	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  either	  TFP	  or	  energy	  efficiency,	  we	  consider	  the	  following	  econometric	  specifications	  used	  by	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010)	   𝑔𝑜! = 𝛼 + 𝛼!𝑙! + 𝛼!𝑘! + 𝛼!"#𝐼𝑛𝑡! + 𝛼!!𝑒𝑒! + 𝛽𝑀! + 𝛾𝑍! + 𝑢! 	  (1a)	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(𝐸𝐸/𝐺𝑂)!×100 =   𝛼 + 𝛼!"𝑔𝑜! + 𝛼!𝑙! + 𝛼!𝑘! + 𝛽𝑀! + 𝛾𝑍! + 𝑢! 	  	  	  (1b).	  Where	  EE	  is	  the	  total	  energy	  expended	  for	  establishment	  i,	  GO	  is	  the	  gross	  output,	  M	  is	  either	  the	  overall	  management	  score	  or	  a	  vector	  of	  the	  management	  components,	  and	  go,	  l,	  
k,	  int,	  and	  ee	  are	  the	  logged	  values	  of	  gross	  output,	  number	  of	  workers,	  value	  of	  capital,	  value	  of	  intermediate	  materials,	  and	  energy	  expenditures,	  respectively.	  The	  first	  specification	  is	  a	  standard	  cobb-­‐Douglas	  production	  function.	  	  The	  second	  specification	  includes	  gross	  output,	  labor	  and	  capital	  to	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  input	  mixture	  as	  well	  as	  potential	  economies	  of	  scale.	  The	  key	  coefficient	  of	  interest	  is	  𝛽,	  which	  represents	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  management	  score(s)	  and	  either	  TFP	  or	  energy	  expended	  per	  dollar	  of	  gross	  output.	  The	  vector	  Z	  is	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  controls	  which	  includes	  a	  full	  set	  of	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  fixed	  effects,	  various	  firm	  characteristics	  such	  as	  firm	  age	  and	  ownership	  structure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  survey	  noise	  controls,	  such	  as	  interviewer	  fixed	  effects,	  that	  were	  described	  in	  the	  data	  section.71	  	  	   Table	  C.1	  reports	  the	  management	  coefficient	  estimates	  from	  (1a),	  a	  series	  of	  TFP	  regressions	  where	  the	  logged	  value	  of	  gross	  output	  is	  regressed	  on	  the	  overall	  management	  score	  as	  well	  as	  the	  logged	  values	  of	  labor,	  capital,	  intermediate	  inputs,	  energy	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  firm	  and	  survey	  controls.72	  Column	  1	  simply	  examines	  the	  correlation	  between	  management	  and	  total	  output	  without	  controlling	  for	  input	  use	  or	  other	  firm	  characteristics.	  Unsurprisingly,	  better	  managed	  firms	  produce	  more	  output	  and	  are	  larger.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  This	  specification	  does	  not	  use	  the	  full	  CM	  data	  to	  calculate	  the	  left-­‐hand	  side	  variable.	  Rather	  it	  simply	  defines	  it	  as	  the	  energy	  expenditure	  to	  gross	  output	  ratio.	  Using	  only	  the	  321	  firms	  for	  which	  there	  is	  management	  data	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  use	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  controls.	  Following	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010),	  we	  use	  the	  broader	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry	  controls.	  Note	  also	  that	  equation	  (1b)	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  reworking	  of	  (1a).	  The	  energy	  specification	  uses	  energy	  and	  output	  levels	  rather	  than	  logs	  and	  (following	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  2010)	  does	  not	  include	  intermediate	  inputs.	  	  	  72	  These	  specifications	  are	  designed	  to	  mirror	  those	  run	  by	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  Note	  that	  equation	  (1a)	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  reworking	  of	  (1b).	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Columns	  2-­‐4	  add	  in	  various	  controls	  building	  up	  to	  a	  full	  TFP	  specification.	  All	  specifications	  find	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  management	  variable	  to	  be	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  In	  the	  full	  model	  the	  management	  coefficient	  of	  	  0.065	  signifies	  that	  a	  one	  point	  increase	  in	  a	  firm’s	  management	  score	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  6.5	  percent	  increase	  in	  productivity.	  Columns	  5	  -­‐	  8	  run	  the	  full	  TFP	  regression	  separately	  on	  the	  different	  sub	  components	  of	  the	  management	  variable.	  While	  not	  all	  coefficients	  are	  statistically	  significant	  they	  are	  all	  positive,	  ranging	  between	  0.023	  and	  0.068	  Incentives	  and	  Targets	  appear	  to	  have	  the	  largest	  impact	  on	  productivity.	  Overall	  we	  find	  point	  estimates	  on	  the	  management	  coefficient	  to	  be	  slightly	  higher	  and	  slightly	  noisier	  than	  results	  from	  previous	  research.	  However,	  they	  are	  well	  within	  the	  confidence	  intervals	  of	  past	  results	  and	  lend	  credence	  to	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  name	  and	  address	  match.73	  	  The	  findings	  for	  the	  energy	  specification	  (1b)	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  C.2.	  Given	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  energy	  intensity	  variable,	  a	  negative	  management	  coefficient	  would	  imply	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  management	  quality	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  energy	  use.	  Column	  1	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  specification	  and	  simply	  regresses	  energy	  intensity	  on	  the	  average	  overall	  management	  variable	  as	  well	  as	  a	  full	  set	  of	  3-­‐digit	  industry	  code	  fixed	  effects.	  Column	  2	  additionally	  controls	  for	  firm	  age,	  which,	  among	  other	  things,	  may	  partially	  control	  for	  the	  vintage	  of	  the	  capital	  stock.	  Column	  3	  adds	  in	  region	  and	  survey	  noise	  controls	  as	  well	  as	  gross	  output	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  energy	  economies	  of	  scale.	  Column	  3	  additionally	  includes	  the	  logged	  value	  of	  capital	  and	  labor	  as	  additional	  controls	  for	  input	  mixture	  and	  energy	  economies	  of	  scale.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  For	  example,	  using	  data	  from	  the	  UK,	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  find	  a	  coefficient	  of	  0.44	  with	  a	  SE	  of	  0.20	  (see	  column	  4	  of	  their	  table	  C.2).	  Using	  data	  from	  four	  countries	  (France,	  Germany,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  U.S.)	  Bloom	  (2007)	  find	  equivalent	  coefficients	  ranging	  from	  0.033	  to	  0.077.	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   Columns	  1-­‐3	  of	  table	  C.2	  show	  a	  coefficient	  on	  the	  management	  variable	  that	  is	  negative,	  but	  statistically	  insignificant	  and	  close	  to	  zero.	  After	  controlling	  for	  input	  mixture,	  the	  coefficient	  in	  column	  4	  is	  larger	  but	  remains	  statistically	  insignificant.	  At	  best,	  these	  findings	  show	  a	  modest	  relationship	  between	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  management,	  but	  little	  can	  be	  determined	  given	  the	  size	  of	  the	  standard	  errors.	  These	  findings	  are	  in	  contrast	  with	  previous	  findings	  for	  UK	  plants	  which	  show	  a	  robust	  and	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  all	  of	  these	  specifications.74	  	   Initially surprising is the strong positive coefficient on the logged capital variable. The 
positive coefficient implies that firms with more capital consume more energy per unit of output 
than firms with less capital and is the results of omitting intermediate inputs from equation (1b). 
Firms can choose to either purchase intermediate inputs or produce them internally using capital 
and energy. Therefore, conditional on labor, gross output and industry, firms that use more 
intermediate inputs will use less capital and less energy. If equation (1b) were simply a 
reorganizing of equation (1a) then the positive coefficient would imply theoretically inconsistent 
upward sloping isoquant and a negative capital input cost share, neither of which are observed in 
the TFP regression results in Table 22. The two-step procedure, which controls for value added, 
corrects for any bias in the management coefficient that might be caused by the omission of 
intermediate inputs. To	  further	  examine	  this	  relationship	  we	  split	  the	  management	  score	  into	  its	  four	  major	  components	  (Operations,	  Monitoring,	  Incentives	  and	  Targets)	  as	  originally	  defined	  in	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (2007).	  Columns	  5-­‐8	  of	  Table	  C.2	  run	  separate	  regressions	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  management	  components.	  Here,	  the	  point	  estimates	  of	  the	  Operations,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Note	  also	  that	  our	  sample	  size	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  studies	  using	  UK	  plant	  data.	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Monitoring	  and	  Incentives	  components	  are	  all	  negative,	  with	  the	  operations	  component	  being	  large	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  Importantly,	  despite	  the	  high	  correlation	  between	  all	  of	  the	  management	  components,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  Targets	  component	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  very	  close	  to	  zero.75	  Table	  15	  reports	  the	  results	  after	  further	  breaking	  down	  the	  components	  into	  each	  of	  the	  eighteen	  management	  questions	  and	  running	  separate	  regressions	  for	  each	  question.	  As	  expected,	  the	  results	  mirror	  those	  from	  the	  component	  regressions.	  High	  scores	  on	  the	  Operations	  questions	  predict	  energy	  efficiency	  while	  high	  scores	  on	  the	  targets	  questions	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency.	  While	  most	  are	  statistically	  insignificant,	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  Monitoring	  and	  Incentives	  questions	  generally	  suggest	  they	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency.	  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  The	  correlation	  between	  targets	  and	  all	  other	  management	  components	  is	  .69	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Table	  15:	  Sub-­‐Component	  Results	  
	   MGMT	  Component	   1	  EE/GO	   2	  EE/GO	   3	  EE/GO	  Lean	   Operations	   -­‐0.165**	   -­‐0.165**	   -­‐0.256***	  Why	  Lean?	   Operations	   -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.121	   -­‐0.175**	  Process	  Documentation	   Operations	   0.013	   0.008	   -­‐0.14	  Performance	  Tracking	   Monitoring	   0.148	   0.134	   0.063	  Review	  of	  Performance	   Monitoring	   0.145	   0.137	   -­‐0.043	  Performance	  Dialogue	   Monitoring	   -­‐0.007	   -­‐0.016	   -­‐0.055	  Consequence	  Management	   Monitoring	   -­‐0.242	   -­‐0.252	   -­‐0.353	  Target	  Breadth	   Targets	   0.015	   0.02	   -­‐0.042	  Target	  Interconnection	   Targets	   	   0.097	   0.105	   0.07	  Target	  horizon	   Targets	   	   0.123	   0.129	   0.06	  Targets	  Stretching	   Targets	   	   0.046	   0.042	   -­‐0.021	  Performance	  Clarity	   Incentives	   	   -­‐0.009	   -­‐0.028	   -­‐0.066	  Managing	  Human	  Capital	   Incentives	   0.037	   0.033	   0.027	  Rewarding	  High	  Performers	   Incentives	   0.019	   0.038	   0.088	  Removing	  Poor	  Performers	   Incentives	   -­‐0.215	   -­‐0.181	   -­‐0.152	  Promoting	  High	  Performers	   Incentives	   -­‐0.029	   -­‐0.015	   -­‐0.055	  Attracting	  Human	  Capital	   Incentives	   -­‐0.16	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐0.124	  Retaining	  Human	  Capital	   Incentives	   -­‐0.077	   -­‐0.064	   -­‐0.092	  	   	   	   	   	   	  NAICS	  FE's	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Noise	  Controls	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Firm	  Controls	   	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	  Labor,	  Capital	  Controls	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  Firms	   	   	   321	   321	   321	  
	  
Note:	  Each	  row	  represents	  a	  regression	  of	  energy	  intensity	  on	  a	  different	  sub-­‐component	  of	  the	  management	  score	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  a	  description	  each	  sub-­‐component	  question).	  Columns	  1,2	  and	  3	  replicate	  the	  specifications	  in	  columns	  2,	  3	  and	  4	  of	  Table	  15.	  All	  results	  include	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry	  controls.	  Firm	  controls	  in	  columns	  2	  and	  3	  include	  firm	  size	  controls.	  Column	  3	  is	  the	  full	  specification	  as	  described	  in	  equation	  1.	  :	  Standard	  Errors	  are	  Robust	  to	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  clustered	  at	  the	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  level.	  ***,	  **	  and	  *	  indicates	  significance	  at	  1,	  5	  and10	  percent	  accordingly	  	  	   To	  determine	  whether	  the	  Targets	  component	  has	  a	  separate	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency	  than	  the	  other	  three	  components,	  Table	  16	  presents	  identical	  regressions	  as	  found	  in	  columns	  1-­‐4	  of	  TableC.2	  but	  removes	  the	  targets	  component	  from	  the	  overall	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management	  score	  and	  includes	  both	  the	  new	  management	  variable	  and	  the	  targets	  component	  separately	  in	  the	  regression.	  The	  new	  management	  score	  variable	  is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  Operations,	  Monitoring	  and	  Incentive	  components	  and	  the	  Targets	  score	  is	  included	  separately.	  Controlling	  for	  Targets,	  the	  remaining	  management	  score	  component	  	  is	  shown	  to	  strongly	  predict	  energy	  efficiency	  with	  results	  that	  are	  quite	  similar	  to	  findings	  in	  previous	  research	  on	  UK	  plants	  (Bloom	  et	  al	  2010,	  Martin	  et	  al	  2012).	  Importantly,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  targets	  is	  positive,	  implying	  higher	  energy	  use,	  and	  is	  statistically	  significant	  in	  two	  of	  the	  specifications,	  but	  not	  the	  most	  detailed.	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Table	  16:	  Regression	  Results	  Using	  One	  Step	  Process,	  Separating	  Out	  Targets	  (Equation	  1)	  
 1 2 3 4 VARIABLES	   EE/GOx100	   EE/GOx100	   EE/GOx100	   EE/GOx100	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  Ops/Mon/Incent	   -­‐.223	   -­‐.367**	   -­‐.367**	   -­‐.456***	  	   (.153)	   (.161)	   (0.163)	   (0.126)	  	  Targets	  	  	  ln(go)	  	  
	  .205	  (.166)	   	  .303**	  (.126)	   	  .308**	  (.145)	  	  .0022	  (.130)	  
	  .250	  (.152)	  	  -­‐1.08***	  (.182)	  	  ln(labor)	   	   	   	   	  -­‐.161	  	   	   	   	   (.239)	  	  ln(capital)	   	   	   	   	  1.222***	  (.306)	  	  NAICS	  3	  Controls	  Firm	  Controls	  Noise	  Controls	  Region	  Dummies	  	  
	  Yes	   	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Firms	   321	   321	   321	   321	  Adj.	  R-­‐squared	   0.263	   0.301	   0.303	   0.355	  
	  
Notes: Standard Errors are Robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 3-digit NAICS level. ***, ** 
and * indicates significance at 1, 5 and10 percent accordingly. The variable “Ops/Mon/Incent” is the 
average of the three non-target management components (Operations, Monitoring and Incentives). Other 
variables and controls are defined in Table C.2. 	  	   	  	  
Two	  Step	  Procedure	  
	  The	  one	  step	  approach	  provides	  a	  useful	  baseline	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  energy	  and	  management	  for	  U.S.	  firms	  may	  not	  be	  as	  clear	  as	  past	  research	  on	  UK	  plants	  has	  suggested.	  It	  is	  possible	  however	  that	  our	  lack	  of	  clear	  results	  is	  due	  either	  to	  an	  imprecise	  measure	  of	  energy	  performance	  or	  a	  failure	  to	  identify	  the	  firms	  which	  would	  
128 
 
most	  benefit	  from	  ‘good’	  management	  practices.	  Therefore,	  we	  suggest	  a	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  which	  uses	  detailed	  industry	  information	  to	  define	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  then	  examines	  where	  the	  impact	  of	  management	  is	  felt	  most.	  Different	  industries	  require	  widely	  varying	  amounts	  of	  energy	  depending	  on	  the	  product	  they	  are	  producing.	  Three	  digit	  industry	  code	  fixed	  effects	  used	  in	  most	  studies	  may	  account	  for	  only	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  inter-­‐industry	  variation	  in	  energy	  use.	  For	  example,	  at	  the	  three	  digit	  level	  a	  low	  energy	  intensity	  toiletry	  product	  manufacturer	  would	  be	  lumped	  together	  with	  a	  very	  energy	  intensive	  manufacturer	  of	  chlorine.76	  A	  more	  industry-­‐specific	  measure	  of	  energy	  efficiency	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  data	  available	  to	  us	  through	  the	  CM	  and	  would	  compare	  the	  BVR	  firms	  not	  only	  to	  others	  in	  the	  management	  survey	  but	  to	  every	  manufacturing	  establishment	  in	  the	  entire	  United	  States.	  Using	  the	  universe	  of	  U.S.	  manufacturing	  plants	  allows	  us	  to	  control	  for	  differences	  at	  a	  six-­‐digit	  NAICS	  level	  where	  inter-­‐industry	  variation	  is	  far	  smaller.77	  	   A	  second	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  specification	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  control	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  intermediate	  inputs	  used	  by	  the	  establishment.	  The	  amount	  of	  intermediate	  inputs	  required	  in	  the	  production	  process	  can	  be	  a	  major	  determinant	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  energy	  used	  by	  an	  establishment.	  Two	  plants	  that	  produce	  the	  exact	  same	  amount	  of	  output	  may	  have	  very	  different	  energy	  requirements	  if	  one	  of	  them	  processes	  the	  raw	  materials	  themselves,	  while	  the	  other	  uses	  intermediate	  inputs	  purchased	  and	  produced	  by	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Energy	  expenditure	  divided	  by	  value	  of	  shipments	  is	  .003	  for	  toiletries	  product	  manufacturing	  but	  is	  .251	  for	  alkalies	  and	  chlorine	  manufacturing.	  Both	  are	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry	  but	  one	  consumes	  83	  times	  more	  energy	  per	  dollar	  of	  output	  than	  the	  other.	  	  There	  are	  many	  other	  examples	  of	  these	  extremes	  within	  a	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS.	  77	  Note	  that	  the	  one	  step	  procedure	  as	  described	  above	  can	  only	  be	  run	  for	  the	  subset	  of	  manufacturing	  firms	  in	  the	  CM	  that	  have	  been	  matched	  to	  the	  management	  data.	  To	  obtain	  a	  more	  precise	  measure	  of	  energy	  efficiency,	  we	  propose	  a	  preliminary	  step	  to	  obtain	  a	  baseline	  energy	  efficiency	  measure	  that	  does	  not	  require	  any	  of	  the	  management	  data	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  run	  for	  all	  observations	  in	  the	  CM.	  After	  obtaining	  this	  measure,	  we	  then	  run	  management	  regressions	  on	  the	  subset	  of	  matched	  firms.	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separate	  establishment	  (Boyd	  et	  al,	  2011).78	  	  	  	   A	  final	  feature	  of	  the	  model	  allows	  for	  management	  practices	  to	  have	  heterogeneous	  impacts	  on	  energy	  efficiency	  based	  on	  the	  type	  of	  product	  being	  produced.	  This	  model	  specification	  allows	  us	  to	  determine	  whether	  management	  practices	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  spillover	  into	  energy	  efficiency	  if	  energy	  is	  a	  larger	  portion	  of	  the	  firm’s	  input	  costs.	  Past	  research	  has	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  differentiate	  management’s	  impact	  by	  industry.79	  If	  management	  practices	  are	  driving	  energy	  efficiency	  then	  the	  relationship	  may	  be	  more	  evident	  in	  industries	  for	  which	  energy	  is	  a	  major	  cost.	  Creating	  a	  specification	  which	  demonstrates	  differential	  impacts	  by	  industry	  would	  bolster	  the	  results.	  	   Consider	  the	  following	  first	  stage	  specification	  which	  is	  run	  separately	  for	  each	  of	  the	  450	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  manufacturing	  industries:	  𝑒𝑒! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!"𝑣𝑎! + 𝜀! 	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  Here,	  𝑒𝑒! 	  is	  the	  logged	  energy	  expenditure	  of	  establishment	  i	  and	  𝑣𝑎! 	  is	  that	  establishment’s	  logged	  value	  added	  (gross	  output	  –	  non-­‐energy	  intermediate	  inputs).	  In	  this	  specification	  the	  residual	  𝜀! ,	  represents	  the	  percent	  difference	  from	  the	  mean	  conditional	  on	  the	  establishment’s	  value	  added.	  By	  defining	  𝜀! 	  as	  the	  establishment’s	  relative	  energy	  intensity	  we	  obtain	  a	  measure	  of	  each	  establishment’s	  relative	  energy	  performance	  which	  addresses	  the	  first	  two	  concerns	  above.80	  In	  this	  specification,	  establishments	  are	  compared	  to	  others	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Including	  the	  value	  of	  the	  capital	  stock,	  as	  done	  in	  the	  one-­‐step	  procedure,	  also	  addresses	  this	  issue	  as	  more	  capital	  will	  reflect	  more	  processing	  of	  raw	  materials	  and	  more	  energy	  consumption.	  	  79	  Results	  from	  previous	  research	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  high	  energy	  industries	  but	  the	  model	  specification	  gives	  no	  way	  to	  examine	  this.	  This	  has	  important	  implications.	  If	  energy	  savings	  are	  coming	  from	  low	  energy	  industries	  then	  the	  overall	  quantity	  of	  energy	  reduction	  will	  be	  small	  but	  if	  the	  reduction	  comes	  from	  high	  energy	  industries	  then	  the	  energy	  savings	  from	  management	  could	  be	  substantial.	  80	  State	  dummies	  are	  also	  included	  in	  equation	  (2)	  to	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  energy	  prices	  across	  regions.	  The	  ranking	  of	  establishments	  based	  on	  their	  residual	  is	  very	  similar	  when	  combinations	  of	  gross	  output,	  capital	  and	  labor	  are	  included	  on	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side.	  As	  expected,	  including	  value	  added	  alone	  appears	  to	  do	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in	  their	  narrowly	  defined	  industry	  ensuring	  that	  a	  low	  energy	  toiletries	  manufacturer	  is	  no	  longer	  lumped	  together	  with	  a	  very	  energy	  intensive	  manufacturer	  of	  chlorine.	  	  Second,	  energy	  intensity	  is	  allowed	  to	  vary	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  value	  added	  within	  the	  much	  more	  narrowly	  defined	  industry.	  Establishments	  that	  purchase	  more	  preprocessed	  inputs	  will	  have	  lower	  value	  added	  compared	  to	  those	  that	  purchase	  raw	  materials	  and	  produced	  the	  intermediate	  goods	  internally.	  This	  should	  be	  reflected	  in	  their	  energy	  intensity	  measure,	  e.g.	  a	  plastics	  plant	  that	  purchases	  ethylene	  would	  have	  lower	  energy	  use	  than	  one	  that	  produces	  the	  ethylene	  internally.	  	  	   The	  second	  step	  of	  the	  procedure,	  shown	  below	  in	  equation	  (3)	  defines	  𝜀! 	  	  (the	  residual	  	  from	  equation	  (2)	  as	  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡! 	  and	  regresses	  this	  energy	  intensity	  variable	  on	  the	  management	  score	  M,	  	  and	  other	  firm	  and	  survey	  controls,	  represented	  by	  X,	  that	  are	  found	  only	  in	  the	  BVR	  management	  data.	  	  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡! =   𝛿! + 𝛽!𝑀! + 𝑋! + 𝜖! 	  	  	  	  (3)	  	  	   The	  results	  from	  equation	  (3)	  are	  found	  in	  panel	  1	  of	  Table	  17.	  A	  negative	  coefficient	  on	  the	  management	  score	  would	  imply	  that,	  after	  controlling	  for	  product-­‐type,	  level	  of	  raw	  materials,	  economies	  of	  scale,	  firm	  characteristics	  and	  survey	  noise	  controls,	  good	  management	  practices	  are	  associated	  with	  energy	  efficiency.	  As	  seen	  in	  columns	  2	  and	  3,	  controlling	  for	  firm	  characteristics	  and	  survey	  noise	  controls	  results	  in	  negative	  but	  statistically	  insignificant	  coefficients.	  In	  panel	  2	  of	  Table	  17	  we	  again	  separate	  out	  the	  targets	  component	  from	  the	  operations,	  monitoring	  and	  incentives	  components	  due	  to	  our	  concern	  that	  the	  non-­‐energy	  specific	  financial	  and	  production	  targets	  may	  have	  a	  separate	  and	  competing	  impact	  on	  energy	  consumption.	  The	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  fails	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  good	  job	  of	  controlling	  for	  input	  mixture.	  Scale	  effects	  are	  mitigated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  logged	  energy	  expenditure.	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immediately	  reveal	  any	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  inefficiency.	  Column	  3,	  which	  shows	  the	  most	  detailed	  specification,	  continues	  to	  find	  a	  negative	  but	  statistically	  insignificant	  relationship	  between	  energy	  use	  and	  the	  components	  of	  management.	  	  
 Table	  17:	  Energy	  Efficiency	  Results	  Using	  Two	  Step	  Procedure	  	   1	   2	   3	  VARIABLES	   EnergyInt	   EnergyInt	   EnergyInt	  	  
	  
Panel	  1	  Management	   .0021	   -­‐.033	   -­‐.037	  	   (.042)	   (.046)	   (0.047)	  	  
	  
	  
Panel	  2	  Ops/Mon/Incent	   -­‐.002	   -­‐.033	   -­‐.054	  	   (.059)	   (.060)	   (.061)	  	  Targets	   	  .003	   	  -­‐.001	   	  .014	  	   (.055)	   (.056)	   (.056)	  	   	   	   	  State	  Dummies	  Firm	  Age	  Noise	  Controls	  Union	  and	  Public	  	  
Yes	  	  	  	  	  
Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  	  
Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Firms	  Adj.	  R-­‐Squared	   321	  tbd	   321	  tbd	   321	  tbd	  	   	   	   	  
Notes: The dependent variable is derived in the first step using equation (2). The coefficients reported 
here are obtained from running the model in equation (3). Panel 2, like Table 15, separates out the Targets 
component from the other three management components (Operations, Monitoring and Incentives). 
Because the first stage uses data from the entire CM, state, rather than region controls, can be used.  
Standard Errors are Robust to heteroskedasticity and control variables are as defined in Table C.2. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and10 percent accordingly.
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Figure	  11:	  Energy	  Cost	  Share	  of	  Value	  Added	  (Six-­‐Digit	  NAICS)	  
	  
















Average	  share	  of	  energy	  costs	  to	  	  value	  added	  (less	  energy)	  is	  4.7%	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   While	  these	  results	  reveal	  no	  clear	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  energy,	  neither	  do	  they	  distinguish	  between	  industries	  that	  require	  little	  energy	  in	  their	  production	  process	  and	  those	  whose	  production	  process	  requires	  a	  significant	  quantity.	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  11,	  the	  share	  of	  energy	  costs	  is	  quite	  low	  for	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  industries.	  One	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  management	  practices	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  translate	  into	  lower	  energy	  use	  in	  those	  industries	  where	  energy	  is	  a	  higher	  portion	  of	  their	  costs.	  To	  examine	  this,	  we	  interact	  the	  management	  variable	  (and	  its	  components)	  with	  the	  average	  energy	  intensity	  of	  the	  entire	  6-­‐digit	  NAICS	  industry	  to	  which	  the	  plant	  belongs.	  Consider	  equation	  (4)	  below	   𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡! =   𝛿! +   𝛽!×!"#𝑀!×𝐼𝑛𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑀! + 𝛽!"#𝐼𝑛𝑡! + 𝑋! + 𝜖! 	  	  	  	  (4)	  The	  specification	  follows	  equation	  (3)	  but	  includes	  an	  industry	  energy	  intensity	  variable,	  𝐼𝑛𝑡! ,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interaction	  of	  this	  variable	  with	  the	  management	  score.81	  𝐼𝑛𝑡! 	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  energy	  expenditure	  of	  all	  establishments	  in	  the	  industry	  divided	  by	  the	  overall	  output	  of	  that	  industry.82	  The	  coefficient	  𝛽!×!"# 	  provides	  a	  measure	  of	  whether	  management	  impacts	  energy	  efficiency	  more	  for	  firms	  in	  high	  energy	  industries.	  	  Panel	  1	  of	  Table	  18	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  equation	  (4)	  and	  shows	  the	  coefficient	  𝛽!×!"# 	  to	  be	  negative	  and	  marginally	  significant.	  Using	  the	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐.385	  found	  in	  column	  3	  of	  panel	  1	  this	  implies	  that,	  for	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  high	  energy	  industry	  (with	  	  𝐼𝑛𝑡!=.05)	  an	  increase	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Other	  specifications	  not	  reported	  here	  have	  interacted	  the	  management	  variable	  with	  an	  indicator	  variable	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  the	  establishment	  is	  in	  an	  industry	  with	  an	  energy	  intensity	  measure	  greater	  than	  .05.	  Given	  disclosure	  requirements,	  we	  only	  release	  one	  sample	  of	  firms.	  Disclosure	  risks	  also	  prevent	  displaying	  industry	  or	  plant	  specific	  effects.	  82	  𝐼𝑛𝑡! = 𝐸𝐸!/ 𝐺𝑂!!!!!!!!! ∀  𝑖 ∈ 𝑘.	  This	  form	  of	  industry	  heterogeneity	  has	  been	  exploited	  in	  recent	  work	  by	  Kahn	  and	  Mansur	  (2013)	  and	  Curtis	  (2013).	  
134 
 
the	  management	  score	  from	  the	  25th	  to	  the	  75th	  percentile	  would	  result	  in	  a	  reduction	  in	  energy	  expenditure	  of	  1.5%.83	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Predicted	  change	  in	  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡! 	  when	  moving	  from	  25th	  management	  percentile	  (score	  of	  2.889)	  to	  75th	  percentile	  (score	  of	  3.722	  	  for	  firm	  in	  industry	  with	  ind_int=.05	  is	  [(.05x2.889)-­‐(.032x2.889)]-­‐[(.05x3.722)-­‐(.032x3.722)]=.015	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   Table	  18:	  Energy	  Efficiency	  Results	  Using	  Two	  Step	  Procedure	  	   1	   2	   3	  VARIABLES	   Energy	  Intensity	   Energy	  Intensity	   Energy	  	  Intensity	  	  
Panel	  1	  	   	   	   	  MGMT	  x	  Ind_Int	   -­‐.332	   -­‐.425*	   -­‐.385	  	   (.227)	   (.234)	   (0.239)	  	  MGMT	   	  .006	   	  .027	   	  -­‐.032	  	   (.042)	   (.046)	   (.047)	  	  
Panel	  2	  	   	   	   	  Ops/Mon/Incent	  x	  Ind_Int	   -­‐3.37*	   -­‐3.85**	   -­‐3.59**	  	   (1.74)	   (1.80)	   (1.75)	  	  Targets	  x	  Ind_Int	   	  2.99*	   	  3.37**	   	  3.14*	  	   (1.64)	   (1.68)	   (1.64)	  	  Ops/Mon/Incent	  	  	  	  Targets	  	  
	  .066	  (.072)	  	  -­‐.060	  	  (.068)	  
	  .042	  (.073)	  	  -­‐.072	  	  (.073)	  
	  .020	  (.073)	  	  -­‐.056	  (.071)	  	  State	  Dummies	  Firm	  Age	  Noise	  Controls	  Union	  and	  Public	  	  
	  Yes	  	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Firms	  Adj.	  R-­‐squared	   321	  tbd	   321	  tbd	   321	  tbd	  	  	  
Notes: The dependent variable is derived in the first step using equation (2). The coefficients reported 
here are obtained from running the model in equation (3). Panel 2, like Table 4, separates out the Targets 
component from the other three management components (Operations, Monitoring and Incentives). These 
management variables are then interacted with the industry’s average energy intensity measure. Standard 
Errors are Robust to heteroskedasticity and control variables are as defined in Table 3. ***, ** and * 




Panel	  2	  again	  separates	  the	  targets	  component	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  management	  score	  and	  interacts	  each	  with	  the	  industry	  energy	  intensity	  variable.	  	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  separating	  the	  management	  score	  as	  done	  in	  Table	  16.	  The	  results,	  found	  in	  Panel	  2	  of	  Table	  18	  show	  that	  most	  forms	  of	  good	  management	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  firms	  in	  high	  energy	  industries.	  However,	  the	  targets	  component	  is	  again	  shown	  to	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  Conditional	  on	  other	  management	  practices,	  when	  a	  firm	  implements	  strong	  targets	  we	  find	  this	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency,	  particularly	  within	  industries	  for	  which	  energy	  is	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  their	  overall	  costs.	  The	  coefficients	  in	  Table	  18	  suggest	  that	  Targets,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  management	  practices	  have	  little	  distinguishable	  impact	  on	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  firms	  in	  low	  energy	  industries.	  However,	  if	  we	  consider	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  high	  energy	  industry,	  moving	  from	  the	  25th	  percentile	  to	  the	  75th	  percentile	  of	  targets	  management	  is	  shown	  to	  increase	  energy	  expenditure	  by	  13%,	  while	  moving	  from	  the	  25th	  to	  the	  75th	  percentiles	  of	  all	  other	  management	  practices	  is	  shown	  to	  reduce	  energy	  expenditure	  by	  15%.	  	  
	  
Two	  Step	  Labor	  and	  TFP	  Results	  
	  Is	  the	  role	  of	  generic	  management	  practices	  on	  energy	  performance	  different	  from	  other	  inputs?	  	  To	  interpret	  these	  results	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  energy-­‐centric	  phenomena	  specific	  to	  the	  US,	  and	  not	  simply	  an	  artifact	  of	  the	  US	  management	  survey	  sub-­‐sample	  matched	  to	  the	  Census	  data,	  we	  conduct	  a	  parallel	  analysis	  for	  labor	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  (TFP).	  	  	  The	  first	  stage	  is	  to	  modify	  equation	  (2),	  substituting	  log	  labor	  for	  log	  energy	  expenditures.	  	  The	  second	  stage	  uses	  the	  resulting	  labor	  intensity	  measure	  in	  a	  modification	  of	  equation	  (3),	  resulting	  in	  a	  set	  of	  regressions	  of	  the	  resulting	  labor	  intensity	  measure	  on	  the	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management	  score	  and	  various	  controls	  (see	  Table	  19).	  	  The	  impact	  of	  management	  on	  labor	  efficiency	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  unlike	  the	  energy	  results.	  	  The	  analysis	  for	  TFP	  is	  similar,	  but	  slightly	  more	  complicated.	  	  Equation	  (2)	  is	  now	  a	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  production	  function	  regression	  of	  logged	  values	  of	  gross	  output	  on	  logged	  number	  of	  workers,	  logged	  material	  expenditures,	  and	  logged	  value	  of	  capital.	  	  The	  residual	  is	  now	  a	  measure	  of	  TFP,	  not	  input	  efficiency.	  	  Table	  20	  is	  the	  TFP	  analog	  to	  the	  regressions	  in	  equation	  (3).	  	  The	  impact	  is	  again	  statistically	  significant,	  only	  in	  this	  case	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  is	  expected,	  since	  the	  residual	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  productivity,	  not	  input	  intensity.	  The	  results	  in	  Tables19	  and	  20	  serve	  both	  as	  a	  validity	  check	  to	  our	  two-­‐step	  procedure	  and	  as	  a	  point	  of	  comparison	  for	  our	  energy	  results.	  They	  show	  a	  clear	  relationship	  between	  overall	  generic	  management	  practices	  and	  other	  important	  firm	  outcomes	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  previous	  work	  by	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (2007)	  and	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010).	  84	  Moving	  from	  the	  25th	  management	  score	  percentile	  to	  the	  75th	  	  management	  score	  percentile	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  an	  11%	  decrease	  in	  labor	  intensity	  and	  a	  5.5%	  increase	  in	  TFP.	  This	  clear	  relationship	  between	  the	  overall	  management	  score	  and	  non-­‐energy	  outcomes	  lends	  credence	  to	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  energy	  results	  and	  suggests	  that	  our	  findings	  do	  in	  fact	  represent	  a	  gap	  between	  energy	  outcomes	  and	  generic	  management	  practices.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Other	  types	  of	  labor	  productivity	  and	  TFP	  specifications	  yielded	  similar	  results.	  Furthermore,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  that	  the	  management	  component	  scores	  had	  differential	  impacts	  of	  these	  outcomes.	  
138 
 
	   Table	  19:	  Labor	  Intensity	  Results,	  2-­‐step	  process	  	   1	   2	   3	  VARIABLES	   Labor	  Intensity	   Labor	  Intensity	   Labor	  Intensity	  	  MGMT	   	  -­‐.064*	   	  -­‐.111***	   	  -­‐.117***	  	   (.039)	   (.039)	   (.039)	  	  State	  Dummies	  Firm	  Age	  Noise	  Controls	  Union	  and	  Public	  	  
	  Yes	  	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  Firms	  Adj.	  R-­‐squared	   321	  0.054	   321	  0.117	   321	  0.129	  
	  
Notes: This specification is identical to that of Table 4 except log of labor replaces log of energy 
expenditure as the dependent variable in the first stage. The residual is now defined as Labor_eff. 
Standard Errors are Robust to heteroskedasticity. . ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and10 
percent accordingly. 
	   Table	  20:	  Total	  Factor	  Productivity	  Results,	  2-­‐step	  process	  	   1	   2	   3	  VARIABLES	   TFP	   TFP	   TFP	  	  MGMT	   	  .0413*	   	  0.0546**	   	  .0530**	  	   (.021)	   (.022)	   (.022)	  	  State	  Dummies	  Firm	  Age	  Noise	  Controls	  Union	  and	  Public	  	  
	  Yes	  	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  Firms	  Adj.	  R-­‐squared	   321	  0.063	   321	  0.111	   321	  0.117	  
	  
Notes: This specification is again similar to the two-step procedure defined in equations (2) and (3). TFP 
is defined as the residual from a standard Cobb-Douglas regression where logged gross output is 
regressed on logged employment, logged value of materials and logged value of capital. The residual is 
defined as TFP and then regressed on management and the other control variables. Standard Errors are 
Robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and10 percent accordingly. 





	  By	  merging	  management	  survey	  data	  with	  the	  CM,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  consumption	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Our	  empirical	  analysis	  first	  confirms	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  and	  then	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  efficiency.	  While	  most	  good	  management	  practices	  predict	  energy	  efficiency	  we	  find	  the	  relationship	  to	  be	  strongest	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries	  and	  we	  find	  the	  Targets	  component	  of	  the	  score	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  increased	  energy	  use,	  conditional	  on	  a	  large	  set	  of	  controls	  and	  a	  firm’s	  other	  management	  practices.	  These	  findings	  warrant	  further	  discussion	  as	  to	  their	  place	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  their	  overall	  credibility.	  	   Past	  research	  on	  UK	  plants	  has	  shown	  a	  clear	  relationship	  between	  the	  overall	  management	  score	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  but	  has	  made	  no	  direct	  attempt	  to	  determine	  which	  industries	  were	  driving	  the	  observed	  efficiency	  gains	  associated	  with	  good	  management	  practices.	  Given	  that	  most	  previous	  research	  has	  used	  a	  specification	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  equation	  (1b),	  it	  is	  possible,	  as	  our	  results	  suggest,	  that	  their	  findings	  are	  also	  being	  driven	  by	  firms	  in	  high	  energy	  industries.	  As	  shown	  in	  figure	  1,	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  equation	  (1b)	  will	  be	  coming	  from	  these	  high	  energy	  industries.	  Our	  use	  of	  the	  two-­‐step	  method	  creates	  a	  measure	  of	  energy	  intensity	  whose	  variance	  is	  similar	  across	  industries.	  Interacting	  the	  management	  variable	  with	  the	  industry’s	  energy	  intensity	  is	  a	  way	  of	  reintroducing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  required	  “energy	  spend”	  necessary	  to	  produce	  the	  product.	  Thus,	  Table	  7	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  the	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U.S.	  the	  spillovers	  to	  energy	  savings	  from	  good	  management	  occur	  predominantly	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries.	  	  The	  heterogeneous	  impact	  of	  management	  has	  two	  important	  implications.	  That	  these	  energy	  savings	  occur	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries	  implies	  a	  far	  greater	  overall	  drop	  in	  energy	  quantity	  consumed	  attributable	  to	  beneficial	  management	  practices	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  estimated.	  For	  example,	  had	  the	  relative	  energy	  efficiency	  gains	  only	  occurred	  in	  low	  energy	  industries,	  then	  the	  overall	  energy	  savings	  due	  to	  management	  would	  be	  much	  smaller.85	  The	  second	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  driving	  mechanism	  through	  which	  management	  reduces	  energy	  consumption	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  through	  increased	  profits	  rather	  than	  a	  correlation	  with	  altruism.	  Firms	  whose	  production	  process	  requires	  little	  energy	  costs,	  stand	  to	  gain	  less	  from	  a	  one	  percent	  decrease	  in	  their	  energy	  consumption.	  However,	  for	  firms	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries,	  a	  one	  percent	  decrease	  will	  have	  a	  sizable	  impact	  on	  their	  profit	  margin.	  If	  a	  correlation	  with	  altruism	  were	  driving	  the	  result,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  improvements	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  for	  firms	  in	  all	  industries,	  and	  not	  only	  those	  for	  whom	  energy	  expenditure	  has	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  their	  profits.	  	  This	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  energy	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  on	  the	  “management	  radar”	  when	  it	  is	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  costs,	  hence	  more	  spillover	  from	  general	  management	  practices	  to	  energy.	  	  	  	   The	  other	  distinctive	  finding	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  high	  scores	  on	  the	  Targets	  component	  of	  management	  practices,	  conditional	  on	  the	  other	  management	  components,	  appears	  to	  cause	  firms	  to	  be	  inefficient	  in	  their	  use	  of	  energy.	  This	  differs	  from	  UK	  studies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  The	  estimated	  energy	  reduction	  accounted	  for	  by	  good	  management	  in	  Bloom	  et	  al	  (2010)	  is	  assumed	  to	  occur	  for	  a	  firm	  whose	  energy	  intensity	  measure	  at	  the	  average	  of	  all	  industries.	  We	  have	  shown	  that,	  while	  little	  energy	  will	  be	  saved	  for	  a	  firm	  in	  the	  average	  industry,	  most	  good	  management	  are	  associated	  with	  significant	  energy	  savings	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  most	  energy	  intensive	  industries.	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which	  found	  all	  management	  components	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  increased	  energy	  efficiency.	  While	  initially	  surprising,	  we	  believe	  that	  this	  result	  has	  support	  from	  the	  economics	  and	  management	  literature	  on	  goal	  and	  target	  setting	  as	  well	  as	  anecdotal	  support	  from	  industry	  insiders.	  To	  begin	  with,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  revisit	  the	  specific	  targets	  questions	  which	  were	  asked	  of	  the	  plant	  managers.	  Of	  the	  18	  management	  practices,	  five	  of	  them	  were	  part	  of	  the	  targets	  component.	  These	  five	  sought	  to	  measure	  the	  type	  of	  targets,	  whether	  the	  targets	  were	  interconnected,	  the	  time	  horizon	  of	  the	  targets,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  goals	  were	  stretching	  and	  the	  clarity	  of	  the	  goals.	  There	  is	  no	  language	  in	  the	  questions	  that	  refer	  specifically	  to	  energy	  targets	  and	  according	  to	  the	  guide	  provided	  to	  the	  interviewers,	  high	  scores	  were	  to	  be	  given	  for	  well-­‐developed	  financial	  and	  production	  
targets	  that	  pushed	  plants	  and	  their	  managers	  to	  achieve	  a	  high	  level	  of	  output	  by	  a	  certain	  
deadline.	  Firms	  were	  also	  given	  high	  scores	  if	  these	  goals	  were	  clear	  and	  all	  employees	  were	  actively	  striving	  to	  meet	  them.	  	  The	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  data	  prevents	  us	  from	  performing	  a	  direct	  comparison	  between	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  results	  and	  thus	  our	  ability	  to	  fully	  explain	  the	  differing	  results	  is	  limited.	  However,	  a	  primary	  driver	  behind	  their	  differences	  is	  likely	  the	  history	  of	  higher	  energy	  prices	  in	  the	  UK86	  and	  the	  UK	  participation	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol.	  Firms	  facing	  higher	  energy	  prices	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  set	  energy	  targets,	  which	  are	  not	  observed	  in	  our	  data,	  and	  to	  prioritize	  energy	  targets	  when	  they	  come	  into	  competition	  with	  production	  targets.	  If	  energy	  prices	  are	  low	  then	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  firm	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  include	  energy.	  Even	  energy	  intensive	  firms	  may	  rationally	  ignore	  energy	  outcomes	  if	  improving	  those	  outcomes	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  production	  outcomes.	  For	  UK	  firms,	  energy	  prices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  For	  example,	  in	  2007,	  the	  average	  price	  of	  electricity	  for	  industrial	  consumers	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  $0.130/Kwh	  while	  in	  the	  US	  it	  was	  $0.064/Kwh.	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may	  be	  high	  enough	  that	  energy	  targets	  will	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  production	  targets.	  Because	  of	  higher	  UK	  energy	  prices,	  energy	  targets	  will	  be	  given	  higher	  priority	  when	  they	  conflict	  with	  production	  targets.	  	  The	  explicit	  management	  of	  carbon	  emissions,	  which	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  energy	  use	  may	  be	  another	  reason	  for	  the	  UK	  firms	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  energy	  management	  specifically.	  The	  implications	  of	  goal	  setting	  and	  targets	  in	  the	  form	  of	  agency	  contracts	  have	  been	  examined	  in	  depth	  within	  both	  the	  personnel	  economics	  and	  management	  literature	  (see	  Prendergrast	  (1999)	  for	  a	  review).	  Among	  the	  key	  findings	  is	  that	  setting	  specific	  targets	  on	  certain	  outcomes,	  particularly	  if	  tied	  to	  compensation,	  can	  frequently	  lead	  to	  other	  often	  important	  outcomes	  being	  ignored.	  	  This	  includes	  the	  possibility	  that	  agents	  (e.g.	  plant	  managers)	  will	  respond	  to	  the	  target	  objective	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  is	  actually	  harmful	  to	  the	  firm.	  	  If	  firms	  set	  strict	  production	  targets	  and	  there	  is	  significant	  pressure	  on	  plants	  to	  meet	  them,	  then	  other	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  the	  efficient	  use	  of	  energy	  may	  be	  ignored.	  For	  example,	  plants	  operating	  under	  real	  time	  electricity	  pricing	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  ramp	  up	  production	  when	  electricity	  prices	  are	  high.	  They	  may	  also	  delay	  maintenance	  /	  upgrades	  of	  energy-­‐using	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  production	  quotas.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  economics	  literature	  provide	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  the	  result	  on	  targets,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  substantial	  anecdotal	  evidence	  suggesting	  energy	  efficiency	  is	  frequently	  ignored	  when	  production	  targets	  are	  pressing.	  For	  example,	  concerns	  over	  product	  quality	  delayed	  the	  implementation	  of	  some	  very	  simple	  energy	  efficiency	  activities	  in	  auto	  assembly	  paint	  booths	  at	  Toyota	  for	  as	  many	  as	  five	  years.	  	  After	  addressing	  this	  long	  list	  of	  concerns,	  the	  efficiency	  measures	  were	  finally	  implemented,	  but	  not	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time	  passed	  during	  which	  energy	  use	  was	  higher	  than	  
143 
 
necessary.87	  	  If	  “production	  is	  king”	  and	  targets	  do	  not	  include	  energy	  but	  are	  primarily	  to	  meet	  production,	  sales,	  or	  quality	  goals,	  then	  there	  may	  be	  no	  “room	  at	  the	  table”	  for	  energy	  efficiency	  activities,	  even	  if	  these	  activity	  are	  unlikely	  to	  impede	  those	  goals.	  	  This	  failure	  to	  prioritize	  energy	  is	  supported	  with	  some	  anecdotal	  evidence	  as	  described	  by	  corporate	  energy	  managers	  from	  a	  range	  of	  companies.88	  	  Thomas	  Pagliuco,	  corporate	  energy	  manager	  at	  Merck,	  characterizes	  the	  prioritization	  this	  way:	  
For	  most	  plants,	  the	  priorities	  are:	  safety,	  quality,	  output,	  compliance,	  cost,	  and	  cost	  is	  
probably	  prioritized	  as	  labor,	  raw	  material,	  maintenance/materials,	  and	  energy.	  	  My	  
experience,	  even	  for	  a	  large	  energy	  user	  is	  that	  energy	  is	  at	  best	  6th	  or	  7th	  priority.	  	  
	  Voluntary	  government	  programs	  are	  designed	  largely	  to	  overcome	  management	  problems,	  so	  energy	  does	  not	  take	  a	  backseat	  to	  other	  firm	  outcomes.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  these	  voluntary	  programs	  even	  for	  well-­‐run	  companies.	  Additionally,	  firms	  that	  improve	  their	  overall	  operations,	  monitoring	  and	  incentives	  practices	  are	  likely	  to	  achieve	  improvements	  not	  only	  in	  overall	  productivity	  but	  also	  a	  reduction	  in	  their	  energy	  use.	  This	  also	  aligns	  with	  Worrell	  (2011)	  who	  describes	  a	  benchmarking	  exercise	  (CFI	  2003)	  undertaken	  by	  ten	  Canadian	  potash	  operations	  	  which	  showed	  that	  increased	  employee	  awareness	  and	  training	  was	  the	  most	  frequently	  identified	  opportunity	  for	  improved	  energy	  performance.	  Energy	  may	  not	  even	  be	  on	  the	  radar	  screen	  of	  many	  firms	  and	  we	  present	  evidence	  that,	  even	  for	  high-­‐energy	  firms,	  energy	  takes	  a	  back	  seat	  to	  other	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  firm.	  The	  nuanced	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  energy	  that	  we	  describe	  above	  suggests	  that,	  for	  U.S.	  firms,	  being	  a	  generally	  well-­‐run	  company	  does	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Brad	  Reed,	  2003,	  presentation	  to	  the	  3rd	  Annual	  Energy	  Star	  Focus	  for	  Motor	  Vehicle	  Assembly,	  Detriot	  MI	  	  88	  Private	  communications	  Thomas	  Pagliuco.	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imply	  the	  efficient	  use	  of	  energy.	  Of	  course,	  these	  findings	  do	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  firm	  outcomes,	  but	  do	  suggest	  the	  presence	  (or	  often	  times	  absence)	  of	  possible	  spillover	  effects.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  various	  correlations	  (both	  positive	  and	  negative)	  between	  management	  practices	  and	  energy	  use	  for	  U.S.	  plants	  is	  an	  important	  finding	  in	  its	  own	  right	  that	  is	  suggestive	  of	  positive	  spillovers	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  an	  energy	  management	  gap.89	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  	  The	  results	  found	  in	  this	  paper	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  management	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  First,	  we	  find	  that	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  relationship	  is	  more	  nuanced	  than	  has	  been	  shown	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  UK.	  While	  most	  good	  management	  practices	  have	  beneficial	  spillovers	  on	  energy	  efficiency,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  targets,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  non-­‐energy	  targets,	  is	  correlated	  with	  energy	  inefficiency.	  	  Additionally,	  using	  a	  more	  precise	  measure	  of	  energy	  efficiency	  we	  show	  that	  the	  energy	  gains	  associated	  with	  good	  management	  occur	  primarily	  in	  energy	  intensive	  industries.	  Therefore	  the	  overall	  energy	  gains	  associated	  with	  good	  management	  are	  larger	  than	  previous	  estimates	  which	  assumed	  the	  savings	  occurred	  for	  the	  average	  industry.	  	  	   Further	  research	  is	  warranted	  to	  more	  closely	  examine	  the	  relationships	  at	  hand	  in	  this	  paper	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  energy	  management	  gap.	  Panel	  data	  and	  randomized	  experiments	  would	  present	  a	  more	  causal	  interpretation.	  More	  work	  should	  also	  be	  done	  to	  determine	  the	  types	  of	  targets	  employed	  by	  a	  firm	  and	  the	  spillovers	  these	  targets	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Recent	  research	  using	  a	  randomized	  control	  trial	  in	  India	  has	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  management	  and	  productivity	  (Bloom	  et	  al	  2012).	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Appendix	  A:	  	  Chapter	  I 	  Data	  Appendix	  County	   Business	   Patterns	  	  does	  	  not	   report	  	  observations	  	  for	   which	  	  there	  	  is	  	  no	  employment	   in	   a	   given	   year.	  If	   firms	   shutdown	   and	   employment	   in	   a	   state-­‐industry	  goes	   from	   1,000	   one	   year	   to	   zero	   the	   following	   year	   then	   this	   drop	   will	   not	   be	  observed	   because	  there	  will	  be	  no	  record	   for	   the	  zero	  employment	   (the	  same	   issue	  could	  occur	   in	  reverse.	  whereby	  employment	  growth	  that	  is	  attributable	  to	  new	  establishments	  locating	  in	  a	   state-­‐industry	  with	  zero	  previous	  employment	  will	  not	  be	  captured	  because	  the	  zero	   employment	   wasa	   not	   observed	   in	   the	   prior	   years.	  	  To	  address	   this	   concern,	   I	   create	   a	   balanced	   panel	   of	   every	   state-­‐industry	   between	  1998	   and	   2008	   by	   adding	   zeros	   when	  there	   is	   no	   record	   listed	   in	   the	   CBP.	   Data	   that	  is	   suppressed	   for	   disclosure	   purposes	   is	  imputed	   by	   the	  method	   used	   by	   Kahn	  &	  Mansur	   (2010)	   as	   described	   in	   the	   text.	  Other	  methods	  of	   imputation	  were	  explored,	  but	   results	  were	  not	   sensitive	   to	   the	  use	  of	  other	   methods.	  Employment	  data	  is	  observed	  for	  49%	  of	  county-­‐industry	  pairings.	  Observed	  cells	  contain	  68%	  of	  all	  employment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  A	  large	  percent	  of	  the	  overall	  employment	  remains	  because	  employment	  is	  only	  suppressed	  for	  observations	  with	  few	  establishments.	   Also,	  some	  noise	  is	  infused	  in	  observations	  for	  which	  there	  are	  few	  establishments,	  but	   these	  noise	  infusions	  are	  always	  less	  than	  5%,	  sum	  to	  zero	  at	  the	  state	  level	  and	  are	  made	   in	  fewer	  than	  5%	  of	  the	  observations.	  The	  QWI	  is	  the	  seond	  source	  of	  data	  in	  this	  paper.	   It	  is	  built	  from	  state	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  records	  and	  contains	  98%	  of	  all	  private-­‐sector,	  non-­‐agriculture	  employment	   at	   high	   levels	   of	   demographic,	   geographic	   and	   industry	  detail.	  Importantly,	   it	  contains	  data	  on	  job	  and	  worker	  flows.	  A	  job	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  a	  worker	  and	  an	   establishment	  where	  the	  worker	  receives	  positive	  earnings	  from	  that	  establishment	  in	  a	   quarter.	  Unlike	  the	  CBP,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  impute	  suppressed	  data.	  Quarterly	  Workforce	  Indicator	  data	  is	  also	  suppressed	  at	  times	  though	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  bias	  against	  finding	  a	  result.	  If	  small	  drops	  in	  employment	  lead	  to	  an	  observation	  becoming	  suppressed,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  employment	  declines	  resulting	  from	  the	  NBP	  will	  not	  be	  observed	  if	  the	  observation	  becomes	  suppressed.	  This	  would	  bias	  against	   finding	  a	  result.	  The	  ten	  states	  not	  included	  in	  the	  QWI	  results	  are	  Alabama,	  Arkansas,	  Arizona,	  Kentucky,	  Massachusetts,	  Michigan,	  Mississippi,	  Missouri,	  New	   Hampshire	  and	  Wyoming.	  Hiring,	   Separations,	   Creations	   and	  Destructions	   are	   all	   refer	   to	   stable	   jobs.	   A	   job	   is	  considered	  stable	  if	  the	  worker	  receives	  positive	  earnings	  from	  the	  establishment	  for	   three	  consecutive	  quarters.	  Periods	  of	  non-­‐employment	  for	  separating	  workers	  is	  obtained	  by	  tracking	   each	  worker	   that	   separates	   from	   their	   firm	   for	   the	   following	   four	  quarters.	   If	   they	  are	   not	   observed	  working	   at	   any	   other	   employer	   then	   they	   are	   assigned	  four	  quarters	  of	  non-­‐employment.	  If,	   in	  the	  quarter	  following	  their	  separation	   they	  are	  observed	  working	  at	  another	  firm,	  then	  they	  are	  assigned	  zero	  quarters	  of	  non-­‐employment.	   Currently,	  the	  QWI	  is	  only	  able	  to	  track	  workers	  if	  they	  find	  employment	  in	  the	  same	  state	  in	  which	  they	  separated.	  Using	  state-­‐industry	  fixed	  effects	  accounts	   for,	  among	  other	  things,	  time-­‐invariant	  differences	  that	  may	  arise	  due	  to	  a	  state’s	  size.	  Plotting	  this	  variable	  over	  time	  reveals	  differences	  by	  state	  that	  are	  consistent	  over	  time.	   EPA’s	  website	  provides	  a	  list	  of	  regulated	  plants	   in	  the	  NBP.	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Based	  on	  the	  author’s	  calculation,	  93%	  of	  regulated	  manufacturing	  facilities	  are	  in	  the	  high	  intensity	  industry	  grouping	   as	   defined	   in	   section	   5.	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Appendix	  B:	  Chapter	  III	  Data	  Appendix	  
	  The	  BVR	  management	  survey	  interviews	  plant	  managers	  with	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  both	  the	  floor	  level	  production	  process	  as	  well	  as	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  firm’s	  upper	  level	  management.	  These	  scores	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  firm	  level	  scores	  which	  apply	  to	  all	  establishments	  within	  the	  firm.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  may	  result	  in	  an	  imprecise	  measure	  of	  firm	  management	  if	  there	  is	  heterogeneity	  in	  management	  practices	  across	  a	  firm’s	  establishments.	  However,	  we	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  BVR	  and	  apply	  the	  score	  to	  each	  establishment	  owned	  by	  the	  firm.	  We	  apply	  two	  techniques	  to	  move	  from	  the	  establishment	  to	  the	  firm	  level.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  simply	  aggregate	  the	  labor,	  capital,	  intermediate	  inputs	  and	  energy	  for	  every	  establishment	  within	  a	  firm	  and	  use	  these	  aggregate	  measures	  to	  run	  firm	  level	  regressions.	  This	  provides	  firm	  level	  data	  that	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  compustat	  firm	  level	  data	  used	  in	  Bloom	  and	  Van	  Reenen	  (2007).	  Our	  preferred	  method	  uses	  establishment	  level	  data	  found	  in	  the	  CM	  and	  assigns	  each	  establishment	  the	  management	  score	  of	  the	  firm.	  We	  weight	  each	  establishment	  according	  to	  its	  percentage	  of	  the	  firm’s	  total	  sales.	  Weighting	  is	  performed	  to	  ensure	  that	  one	  or	  two	  firms	  with	  dozens	  of	  establishments	  do	  not	  dominate	  the	  results	  and	  that	  a	  firm’s	  largest	  establishment	  is	  given	  more	  weight	  than	  its	  smallest	  ones.	  Using	  the	  establishment	  level	  data	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  more	  precise	  industry	  codes	  and	  input	  information,	  both	  of	  which	  will	  be	  crucial	  for	  our	  measurement	  of	  energy	  efficiency.	  	  Matching	  the	  BVR	  data	  to	  the	  2007	  Census	  of	  Manufactures	  is	  a	  two-­‐step	  process	  relying	  on	  name,	  address	  and	  industry	  variables.	  First	  the	  BVR	  data	  is	  merged	  to	  Census’	  Business	  Register,	  which	  unlike	  the	  Census	  of	  Manufactures,	  contains	  the	  establishment	  name.	  After	  matching	  to	  the	  Business	  Register	  we	  use	  a	  common	  establishment	  id	  (survuid)	  to	  merge	  in	  the	  establishment	  level	  CM	  data.	  The	  Firm	  ID	  of	  the	  establishment	  is	  then	  used	  to	  locate	  other	  establishments	  owned	  by	  the	  firm.	  We	  drop	  establishments	  whose	  energy	  efficiency	  variable	  (EE/GO)	  falls	  in	  the	  top	  and	  bottom	  percentile	  of	  the	  matched	  sample.	  This	  removes	  observations	  which	  suffer	  from	  misreporting.	  After	  the	  cleaning	  has	  been	  performed	  the	  final	  matched	  data	  set	  contains	  321	  firms	  and	  4242	  establishments	  for	  a	  match	  rate	  of	  approximately	  54%.	  The	  CM	  is	  performed	  in	  years	  ending	  in	  2	  and	  7.	  For	  the	  years	  in	  between,	  the	  Census	  performs	  the	  Annual	  Survey	  of	  Manufactures	  on	  roughly	  16%	  of	  all	  manufacturing	  establishments	  in	  the	  CM.	  We	  attempted	  to	  match	  the	  management	  survey	  data	  to	  the	  ASM	  years	  as	  well	  but	  our	  match	  rate	  was	  very	  low.	  We	  also	  considered	  using	  data	  from	  the	  2002	  CM.	  However,	  we	  decide	  against	  using	  this	  data	  because	  many	  firms	  report	  changing	  ownership	  or	  making	  major	  management	  practice	  changes	  in	  the	  3	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  survey.	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Table	  21:	  Productivity	  Results	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  VARIABLES	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	   Ln(GO)	  Management	   0.416***	   0.420***	   0.228***	   0.065*	   	   	   	   	  	   (.080)	   (.079)	   (0.060)	   (0.038)	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Operations	  	   	   	   	   	   0.023	  (0.027)	   	   	   	  Monitoring	   	   	   	   	   	   0.029	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.032)	   	   	  Incentives	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.066**	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.032)	   	  Targets	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.068**	  (0.026)	  	  ln(labor)	   	   	   	  0.944***	  (0.043)	   	  0.304***	  (0.033)	   	  0.303***	  (0.035)	   	  0.303***	  (0.034)	   	  0.302***	  (0.034)	   	  0.307***	  (0.032)	  ln(capital)	   	   	   	   0.121***	   0.124***	   0.125***	   0.124***	   0.121***	  	   	   	   	   (0.031)	   (0.033)	   (0.031)	   (0.031)	   (0.032)	  ln(int	  inputs)	   	   	   	   0	  .405***	  (0.066)	   0.406***	  (0.067)	   0.406***	  (0.067)	   0.406***	  (0.067)	   0.404***	  (0.065)	  ln(energy)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  NAICS	  3	  Controls	  Firm	  Controls	  Noise	  Controls	  Region	  Dummies	  	  
	  Yes	   	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Firms	   321	   321	   321	   321	   321	   321	   321	   321	  Adj.	  R-­‐2	   0.263	   0.265	   0.726	   0.913	   0.914	   0.913	   0.914	   0.914	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Note:	  Standard	  Errors	  are	  Robust	  to	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  3-­‐digit	  NAICS	  level.	  ***,	  **	  and	  *	  indicate	  significance	  at	  1,	  5	  and10	  percent	  accordingly.	  	  A	  full	  set	  of	  NAICS	  three	  digit	  indicator	  variables	  is	  used	  in	  each	  regression.	  Firm	  characteristics	  include	  firm	  age,	  ownership	  category	  and	  union	  status.	  Noise	  Controls	  include	  interviewer	  fixed	  effects,	  interview	  day	  of	  the	  week,	  gender	  of	  plant	  manager	  and	  tenure	  of	  the	  plant	  manager.	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Table	  22:	  Regression	  Results	  Using	  One	  Step	  Process	  (See	  Equation	  1)	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  VARIABLES	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	   EE/GO	  x100	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Management	   .0014	   -­‐.030	   -­‐.031	   -­‐.169	   	   	   	   	  	   (.122)	   (.187)	   (0.218)	   (0.149)	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Operations	  	   	   	   	   	   -­‐.221**	  (.097)	   	   	   	  Monitoring	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐.1135	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (.169)	   	   	  Incentives	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐.139	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (.154)	   	  Targets	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐.001	  (.153)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  ln(go)	  	   	   	  	   	  .0022	  (.130)	   	  -­‐1.008***	  (.166)	   	  -­‐1.056***	  (.183)	   	  -­‐1.066***	  (.181)	   	  -­‐1.062***	  (.180)	   	  -­‐1.069***	  (.177)	  ln(labor)	   	   	   	   -­‐.203	   -­‐.182	   -­‐.166	   -­‐.163	   -­‐.162	  	   	   	   	   (.240)	   (.230)	   (.236)	   (.240)	   (.240)	  ln(capital)	   	   	   	   1.252***	  (.313)	   1.238***	  (.303)	   1.222***	  (.304)	   1.214***	  (.302)	   1.214***	  (.306)	  	  NAICS	  3	  Controls	  Firm	  Controls	  Noise	  Controls	  Region	  Dummies	  	  
	  Yes	   	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  
	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  Yes	  




Appendix	  C:	  Survey	  Appendix	  	  
Practice	   Practice	  number	  
Practice	  








2	   Operations	   a) Can	  you	  take	  through	  the	  rationale	  to	  introduce	  these	  processes?	  b) What	  factors	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  these	  lean	  (modern)	  management	  practices?	   	  
Process	  
documentation	  
3	   Operations	   a) How	  would	  you	  go	  about	  improving	  the	  manufacturing	  process	  itself?	  b) How	  do	  problems	  typically	  get	  exposed	  and	  fixed?	  c) Talk	  me	  through	  the	  process	  for	  a	  recent	  problem.	  d) Do	  the	  staff	  ever	  suggest	  process	  improvements?	   	  
Performance	  tracking	   4	   Monitoring	   a) Tell	  me	  how	  you	  track	  production	  performance?	  b) What	  kind	  of	  Key	  Performance	  Indicators	  (KPIs)	  would	  you	  use	  for	  performance	  tracking?	  How	  frequently	  are	  these	  measured?	  Who	  gets	  to	  see	  this	  KPI	  data?	  c) If	  I	  were	  to	  walk	  through	  your	  factory	  could	  I	  tell	  how	  you	  were	  doing	  against	  your	  KPI’s?	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Performance	  review	   5	   Monitoring	   a) How	  do	  you	  review	  your	  Key	  Performance	  Indicators	  (KPIs)?	  b) Tell	  me	  about	  a	  recent	  meeting.	  Who	  is	  involved	  in	  these	  meetings?	  c) Who	  gets	  to	  see	  the	  results	  of	  this	  review?	  	  
Performance	  dialogue	   6	   Monitoring	   a) How	  are	  these	  meetings	  structured?	  Tell	  me	  about	  your	  most	  recent	  meeting.	  b) During	  these	  meeting,	  how	  much	  useful	  data	  do	  you	  have?	  c) How	  useful	  do	  you	  find	  problem	  solving	  meetings?	  d) What	  type	  of	  feedback	  occurs	  in	  these	  meetings?	   	  
Consequence	  
management	  
7	   Monitoring	   a) What	  happens	  if	  there	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  business	  (or	  a	  manager)	  who	  isn’t	  achieving	  agreed	  upon	  results?	  Can	  you	  give	  me	  a	  recent	  example?	  b) What	  kind	  of	  consequences	  would	  follow	  such	  an	  action?	  c) Are	  there	  are	  any	  parts	  of	  the	  business	  (or	  managers)	  that	  seem	  to	  repeatedly	  fail	  to	  carry	  out	  agreed	  actions?	  	  
Target	  breadth	   8	   Targets	   a) What	  types	  of	  targets	  are	  set	  for	  the	  company?	  What	  are	  the	  goals	  for	  your	  plant?	  b) Tell	  me	  about	  the	  financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	  goals?	  c) What	  do	  Company	  Head	  Quarters	  (CHQ)	  or	  their	  appropriate	  manager	  emphasize	  to	  you?	  	  
Target	  
interconnection	  
9	   Targets	   a) What	  is	  the	  motivation	  behind	  your	  goals?	  b) How	  are	  these	  goals	  cascaded	  down	  to	  the	  individual	  workers?	  c) What	  are	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  top	  management	  team	  (do	  they	  even	  know	  what	  they	  are!)?	  d) How	  are	  your	  targets	  linked	  to	  company	  performance	  and	  their	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goals?	   	  	  	  
Target	  time	  horizon	   10	   Targets	   a) What	  kind	  of	  time	  scale	  are	  you	  looking	  at	  with	  your	  targets?	  b) How	  are	  long	  term	  goals	  linked	  to	  short	  term	  goals?	  c) Could	  you	  meet	  all	  your	  short-­‐run	  goals	  but	  miss	  your	  long-­‐run	  goals?	  	  
Targets	  are	  stretching	   11	   Targets	   a) How	  tough	  are	  your	  targets?	  Do	  you	  feel	  pushed	  by	  them?	  b) On	  average,	  how	  often	  would	  you	  say	  that	  you	  meet	  your	  targets?	  c) Are	  there	  any	  targets	  which	  are	  obviously	  too	  easy	  (will	  always	  be	  met)	  or	  too	  hard	  (will	  never	  be	  met)?	  d) Do	  you	  feel	  that	  on	  targets	  that	  all	  groups	  receive	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  difficulty?	  Do	  some	  groups	  get	  easy	  targets?	   	  
Performance	  clarity	  
and	  comparability	  
12	   Targets	   a) What	  are	  your	  targets	  (i.e.	  do	  they	  know	  them	  exactly)?	  Tell	  me	  about	  them	  in	  full.	  b) Does	  everyone	  know	  their	  targets?	  Does	  anyone	  complain	  that	  the	  targets	  are	  too	  complex?	  c) How	  do	  people	  know	  about	  their	  own	  performance	  compared	  to	  other	  people’s	  performance?	  	  
Managing	  human	  
capital	  





14	   Incentives	   a) How	  does	  you	  appraisal	  system	  work?	  Tell	  me	  about	  the	  most	  recent	  round?	  b) How	  does	  the	  bonus	  system	  work?	  c) Are	  there	  any	  non-­‐financial	  rewards	  for	  top-­‐performers?	  	  
Removing	  poor	  
performers	  
15	   Incentives	   a) If	  you	  had	  a	  worker	  who	  could	  not	  do	  his	  job	  what	  would	  you	  do?	  Could	  you	  give	  me	  a	  recent	  example?	  b) How	  long	  would	  underperformance	  be	  tolerated?	  c) Do	  you	  find	  any	  workers	  who	  lead	  a	  sort	  of	  charmed	  life?	  Do	  some	  individuals	  always	  just	  manage	  to	  avoid	  being	  fixed/fired?	  	  
Promoting	  high	  
performers	  
16	   Incentives	   a) Can	  you	  rise	  up	  the	  company	  rapidly	  if	  you	  are	  really	  good?	  Are	  there	  any	  examples	  you	  can	  think	  of?	  b) What	  about	  poor	  performers	  –	  do	  they	  get	  promoted	  more	  slowly?	  Are	  there	  any	  examples	  you	  can	  think	  of?	  c) How	  would	  you	  identify	  and	  develop	  (i.e.	  train)	  your	  star	  performers?	  d) If	  two	  people	  both	  joined	  the	  company	  5	  years	  ago	  and	  one	  was	  much	  better	  than	  the	  other	  would	  he/she	  be	  promoted	  faster?	  	  
Attracting	  human	  
capital	  





18	   Incentives	   a) If	  you	  had	  a	  star	  performer	  who	  wanted	  to	  leave	  what	  would	  the	  company	  do?	  	  b) Could	  you	  give	  me	  an	  example	  of	  a	  star	  performers	  being	  persuaded	  to	  stay	  after	  wanting	  to	  leave?	  c) Could	  you	  give	  me	  an	  example	  of	  a	  star	  performer	  who	  left	  the	  company	  without	  anyone	  trying	  to	  keep	  them?	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